{¶ 3} At approximately 5:00 p.m. on February 14, 2006, Detective Bline was working undercover and performing surveillanсe on the home at 59 Vine Street. He ran a license plate check on a vehicle parked in front of the home, finding the vehicle registered to the Appellant.
{¶ 4} Detective Bline parked his vеhicle down the street and walked to the front of the home. He observed someone standing in the front room behind thin curtains. Detective Bline then walked down Vine Street to Lawrence Street, approximately six to eight feet, and smelled a faint odor of growing marijuana. Detective Bline concluded the odor to be emanating from 59 Vine Street.
{¶ 5} Detective Bline called for backup, and approаched the front door with another officer, Sgt. Dave Haren, also dressed for undercover work. Again, Detective *3 Bline detected the smell of green marijuana. Appellant answered the front door, аnd both officers identified themselves and asked to speak with Appellant. Once the door to the home opened, the smell of green marijuana emanated from the interior.
{¶ 6} Appellant told the officers he did not want to talk, and attempted to shut the door. Detective Bline placed his foot in the doorway, and secured the home, including entering the residence to look for others. In plain view, Dеtective Bline observed a substantial amount of marijuana inside. Detective Bline secured the residence to prevent the destruction of evidence and ensure the officers' safety.
{¶ 7} Detectivе Bline filed an affidavit in the Licking County Municipal Court on February 14, 2006, containing allegations of illegal activity at the residence referenced as 59 Vine Street, Newark, Ohio, Licking County. A nighttime search warrant was issued.
{¶ 8} The State indicted Appellant on one count of possession of marijuana, a third degree felony; one count of cultivation of marijuana within the vicinity of a school zone, a second degree felony; and one count of possession of materials or tools to grow marijuana, a fifth degree felony.
{¶ 9} On April 7, 2006, Appellant moved the trial court to suppress the evidence. The trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant's motion on May 9, 2006. Via Judgment Entry of May 22, 2006, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress.
{¶ 10} Appellant plead no contest on each count of the indictment. Thе trial court accepted the pleas, and sentenced Appellant to six years imprisonment.
{¶ 11} Appellant now appeals assigning as error: *4
{¶ 12} "I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE."
{¶ 13} In the sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress аs the evidence presented against Appellant was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Appellant asserts the State's search and seizure were unlawful.
{¶ 14} There are threе methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v.Fanning (1982),
{¶ 15} In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility. Guysinger, supra, at 594 (citations omitted). Accordingly, an appellate court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id., citing State v. Fausnaugh (Apr. 30, 1992), Ross App. No. 1778,
{¶ 16} The
{¶ 17} Appellant argues the failure of the State to establish the existence оf a valid search warrant authorizing the search and seizure in question or to fit the search into an exception to the warrant requirement, triggers the exclusionary rule and requires the suppression of the evidence illegally obtained. Murray v. United States (1988),
{¶ 18} Even if we were to determine the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, we find the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to *6
suppress under the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon (1984),
{¶ 19} "(1) * * * the magistrate or judge * * * was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth * * *; (2) * * * the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role * * *; (3) an officer рurports to rely upon * * * a warrant based upon an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) * * * depending on the сircumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e. in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing оfficers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid."
{¶ 20} The only exception to the "good faith exception" which is arguably applicable in the instant case is the third exception. Upon reviеw of the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant, we find the affidavit is not so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. *7
{¶ 21} In State v. Moore,
{¶ 22} "Probable cause must be based upon objective facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate. State v. Welch
(1985),
{¶ 23} After reviewing the facts, the Moore court held in its syllabus "the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause tо conduct a search."
{¶ 24} Upon review of the record, testimony presented at the suppression hearing indicated Detective Bline witnessed someone in the home behind a thin curtain as he approached the residence. Detective Bline had worked ten years in law enforcement and the majority of those years in drug enforcement. He testified he *8 detected the smell of marijuana as it is grоwing inside and outside hundreds of times and had participated in between 20 and 30 searches of major indoor growing operations. Accordingly, Detective Bline was qualified to know and identify the distinctive odor emаnating from appellant's residence as marijuana. We find these facts constitute a sufficient basis to justify the issuance of the search warrant and the officer had a reasonably objective belief in the validity of the warrant.1
{¶ 25} Based upon the foregoing, the May 22, 2006 Judgment Entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
*9By: Hoffman, P.J. Wise, J. and Delaney, J. concur.