442 N.E.2d 469 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1981
This cause came on to be heard upon the appeal from the Hamilton County Municipal Court.
The defendant-appellant, Mary Ann Frank, seeks reversal of her conviction for driving while intoxicated in violation of R.C.
As a consequence of the no contest plea, the defendant-appellant conceded that she had been operating a late model *393 automobile on the parking lot of a shopping center in the early morning hours of April 26, 1980. When she was confronted by a police officer at that time, she freely admitted that she had been drinking and experienced great difficulty in producing the car keys and her driver's license.
After being arrested, the defendant-appellant submitted to a breathalyzer test, the results of which showed a concentration of alcohol in her blood of .19 percent by weight. Her general demeanor and her level of performance during several psychomotor tests further indicated to the arresting officer that she was clearly under the influence of alcohol.
In her argument on appeal, however, the defendant-appellant does not contest the fact that she operated a motor vehicle at a time when she was intoxicated. Rather, her challenge concerns the nature of the place where she was found operating the vehicle. She reasons that the statutory prohibition against driving under the influence applies only to the operation of vehicles on public streets and highways; it cannot extend to an incident such as that in the instant cause where the operation of the vehicle occurs on private property.
We cannot agree. R.C.
"No person who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug of abuse, shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state."
There are no exceptions or limitations specifically carved out by the statute to this general prohibition. Furthermore, there is nothing to demonstrate that the statute was intended to have effect only with respect to conduct taking place on public streets and highways. To the contrary, the statutory scheme governing the operation of motor vehicles makes it clear that the General Assembly would have specifically stated the limitation if it had intended that the statute embrace only those instances of motor vehicle operation occurring on public thoroughfares.2
The general statutory prohibition appearing in R.C.
Having determined that the facts admitted by the appellant by way of her no contest plea supported a finding of guilt under R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
BLACK, P.J., SHANNON and KEEFE, JJ., concur.