653 S.W.2d 430 | Tenn. Crim. App. | 1983
OPINION
These defendants were indicted by the Grand Jury in Greene County, Tennessee for the offense of stealing livestock. The jury found them guilty and sentenced Gos-nell to serve not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years in the penitentiary. Foulks was sentenced to serve not less than five (5) years nor more than five (5) years. The case against Gosnell was abated by death.
Several of the issues filed are based on a motion to suppress. Evidently there was a written motion filed, however none appears in this record. The pertinent grounds laid in the motion for new trial state that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and incorporated by reference, “each and every ground contained in said motion to suppress”. At the hearing of the motion the court’s comments make it clear that a written motion was filed. The grounds relied upon were (1) that T.C.A. § 38-4211 is unconstitutional; (2) that defendants stop and arrest in the State of North Carolina was without proper legal authority and, (3) the search and seizure were unconstitutional due to the unlawful arrest without a warrant.
The trial judge denied the motion to suppress. The rule in this State is that findings of the trial court upon questions of fact are conclusive unless the appellate court finds the evidence preponderates against the lower courts judgment. Mitchell v. State, 512 S.W.2d 661, (Tenn.Cr.App.1974).
Having found that Officer Burns was engaged in fresh pursuit of the defendants into the State of North Carolina and that there was probable cause to stop them there as well as to place them under arrest, we do not consider the issue questioning the officer’s right to arrest the appellants in the State of North Carolina under the authority of T.C.A. § 39-4211, or the constitutionality of that statute. In the first instance this issue was not raised in defendant’s motion for new trial and so may not be considered and must be treated as waived. T.R.A.P. Rule 3(e). Nonetheless, the attack on the constitutionality of the statute is based on Article 2, Sec. 17 of the Tennessee Constitution which states in part that, “No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title. All acts which repeal, revive or amend former laws, shall recite in their caption, or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, revived or amended.” In this case defendant confuses the caption of an act with the chapter heading of the statute. The purpose of the constitutional provision is to assure that members of the legislature and the public be given notice of legislative proposals and to prevent surprise and fraud in enactments. State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn.1974). As we said in Farris v. State, 579 S.W.2d 899, (Tenn.Cr.App.1978). Had there been such a flaw in the caption of the Act as defendant insists, it would not be one which affected individual constitutional rights but applied only to the manner of the enactment of the statute which would render it invalid under the Constitution. The present penalty provisions of T.C.A. § 39-4211 were enacted by Chapter 532, Public Acts of 1974. This chapter had been codified several times over since its enactment which has the effect of revalidating that law. See Farris v. State, supra.
The only remaining question pertains to the preponderance and legal validity of the evidence. We have said heretofore that the police authorities were acting within the law in apprehending and arresting the defendants. Our discussion of the evidence in relation to earlier assignments also makes it clear that it was abundantly sufficient to warrant a reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Tennessee Appellate Procedure Rule 13(e) requires that findings of guilt in criminal actions shall be set aside only if the evidence is insufficient to support such findings by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. We have reviewed the evidence and find that it overwhelmingly sustains the jury verdict.