Defendant appeals from his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992(4)(d). He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered following a routine traffic stop. We reverse.
On June 4, 1994, at approximately 1:55 a.m., defendant was a passenger in a car driven by Thompson. Officer Skinner stopped the car because it did not have a rear license plate light. Thompson did not have a driver’s license and told Skinner that defendant owned the car. Skinner subsequently learned from the police dispatcher that Thompson’s driver’s license was suspended and that there was a warrant out for her arrest for a parole or probation violation on an underlying conviction of possession of controlled substances. Based on that information, Skinner arrested Thompson and placed her in the back seat of his patrol car.
Skinner then went to the passenger side of the car and asked defendant to get out; defendant complied. Skinner asked defendant if there were any drugs in the car and defendant replied that there were not. Skinner asked for permission to search the car and defendant “just kinda nodded” and said “yes, go ahead.” Skinner placed defendant in handcuffs, assuring him that he was not under arrest and that the handcuffs were merely for officer safety. Skinner searched the rear seat of the car. There he found and opened the duffel bag and inside found a coffee pot that had some “white stuff” in the bottom. He then found a cloth bag that contained several hypodermic needles, a spoon and cotton swabs, and plastic baggies that contained a white powdery substance. Skinner arrested defendant for possession of controlled substances.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the car. The trial court found that Skinner asked for defendant’s consent to search the car because he was aware of Thompson’s drug conviction and, relying on our opinion in
State v. Aguilar,
126 Or App
*306
22,
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by not suppressing the evidence found during the search of his car, because once the traffic stop and the arrest of Thompson were complete, Skinner lacked authority to detain and question bim further. The state agrees that the traffic stop ended with Thompson’s arrest, but argues that “once an officer develops probable cause to arrest a suspectt,] ORS 810.410(3) no longer limits the officer’s actions” and that defendant’s consent was valid because Skinner’s knowledge of Thompson’s drug conviction gave him an independent basis for requesting the search. The state’s argument is undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Dominguez-Martinez,
In Dominguez-Martinez, the court construed ORS 810.410(3)(b), which authorizes a police officer to
“stop and detain a person for a traffic infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of citation.”
The court held that an officer may investigate only the infraction that gave rise to the stop, unless the state can identify some independent basis to enlarge the scope of the investigation.
Dominguez-Martinez,
3. In this case, the stop for the traffic infraction ended when Skinner arrested Thompson and placed her in the patrol car.
State v. Herrin,
The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in the search of his car.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Notes
Aguilar
was reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court and remanded to us for reconsideration in the light of that court’s ruling in
State v. Dominguez-Martinez,
In our opinion on remand,
Dominguez-Martinez was decided on June 2,1995. Defendant relies in part on that case in support of his assignment of error. The state’s brief, dated September 12,1995, does not mention or argue the effect of Dominguez-Martinez on this case.