141 N.W. 990 | S.D. | 1913
Appellant was convicted in the circuit court of Gregory county, upon an indictment charging .him with the crime of keeping and maintaining a house of ill fame. The appeal is from the judgment and order overruling motion for a new trial. Upon his arraignment, the accused moved the court to set aside the indictment returned by a grand jury, on the grounds: -First, that the indictment was not found indorsed, presented, -and filed, as provided by law; second, that the grand jury was not regularly drawn, in that no notice of the drawing was given as provided by law.
Upon the hearing of this motion, the following facts were conclusively made to appear to the trial court: On the afternoon of April 8, 1911, the board of county commissioners of Gregory county being then in session, a resolution was adopted, on request of the state’s attorney, that a grand jury was necessary to investigate certain public offenses within the county; that the judge of the circuit court be requested to order the calling of a grand jury for said term of court; and that the county auditor be instructed- to forward a copy of said resolution to said judge at Oaeorna, S. D. Immediately upon the adoption of this resolution, a telegram- was
Section 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “The indictment or information must be set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, and upon his motion, in either of -the following cases: * * * (4) AVhen the defendant has not been held to answer before the finding of the indictment, on any ground which would have been good ground for challenge, either t-o the panel or to any individual grand juror.”
Section 166, -Code of Criminal Procedure, provides: “A challenge to the panel may be interposed by either party for one or more of the following causes only: (1) That the requisite number of ballots was not drawn from the jury box of the county or subdivision. (2) That notice of the drawing of the grand jury was not given. (3) That the drawing was not had in the presence of the officers designated by law, or in the manner prescribed by law.”
Section 710 of the Political Code provides: “That a grand jury shall not hereafter be drawn, summoned or required to attend
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure further provides : “No grand jury shall be drawn, summoned or required to attend at the sitting of any court within this state unless the judge thereof shall so direct by writing, under his hand and filed with the clerk of said court,” which order may be made upon the petition of the state’s attorney or upon resolution of -the board of county commissioners.
Section 716 of the Political Code also provides: “Within two days from the receipt of the order of the judge of the circuit court, directing a jury to be summoned, the clerk of the circuit court, .or his deputy in case such clerk of court does not act, and the county auditor, county treasurer, and sheriff, or a majority of them, shall meet together at the county seat. * * * The meeting of said officers shall be after notice in writing has been served the ■same day upon them, or their deputies. * * * Said notice must be served by the said clerk of the court, and must state therein the object to be to draw names for jurors for the next term of the circuit court, and the place and time of such meeting.”
The record in this case shows that a notice was served by the clerk, on the officers named in the statute, on the day on which the grand jury was drawn; but such notice referred only to the drawing of a petit jury, and did not include the drawing of a grand jury. Appellant therefore contends that no notice of the drawing of the grand jury was given as required by law, and that the indictment should have been quashed under subdivision 2, §166, Code of 'Criminal Procedure, which makes the failure to give this notice a specific ground of challenge to the panel.
Section 716, Political Code, supra, is the only section found in our Codes relating to notice of the drawing of jurors. It con
Section 717, Political Code, prescribes the procedure for drawing jurors from the box, and says: “And one of said county officers, other than the clerk of the court or his deputy, shall then proceed to draw enough of said tickets to equal the number 'of jurors directed to be summoned by the judge of the circuit court, and the clerk of the circuit court or his deputy shall record such names in .the order in which they are drawn, in a book to be kept for. that purpose. The jurors, first drawn, to the number required in the order, shall serve as grand jurors, if a grand jury shall be ordered to be summoned, and the remainder drawn in compliance with said order shall -be liable to serve as petit jurors.”
Under these provisions of our law, we are satisfied that a notice of the drawing of jurors to serve at a term of the circuit court sufficiently and substantially complies with the requirement as to notice of drawing grand jurors, even though the notice does not specifically recite that grand jurors as well as petit jurors are to be drawn at the time and place named in the notice.
Under a former California statute similar to our own, upon a motion to quash an indictment on the ground that notice of the drawing of a grand jury was not given as required by law, the Supreme Court of that state, in People v. Gallagher, 55 Cal. 462, said: “The drawing was regular. Verbal notice alone was given by the clerk to the superior judge and sheriff, but inasmuch as the object of the provision requiring notice is only that those officers may be present, and as the case shows they both were, in fact, present when the drawing- was had, it is entirely immaterial whether any notice was given them.” The record in 'this case shows that all .the officers upon whom notice is required to be served were actually present when the grand jury was drawn. We are satisfied the trial court committed no error in refusing to set aside the indictment on that ground.
Precisely the same question was before this court in the case of State v. Fulwider, 28 S. D. 622, 134 N. W. 807, where this court held that, if a defendant was surprised by the indorsement of the names of new witnesses upon an information, he should have moved for a continuance or postponement of the trial tO' enable him to prepare to meet their evidence, and that, in the absence of a motion to postpone or continue the case, on the ground of surprise, no prejudice can be presumed.
Appellant also.assigns error in overruling objections to the introduction of certain testimony and in refusing to strike out answers to questions propounded to certain witnesses. We have carefully examined the entire evidence in the record, and the particular rulings complained of, and, while some of the rulings may have been technically erroneous, we are not satisfied that any of them are so'prejudicial as to> require a reversal of the judgment.
The order and judgment of the trial court are affirmed.