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State v. Ford
780 P.2d 1192
Or. Ct. App.
1989
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*1 20, 1988, 12, July July In Banc reversed on record and briefs resubmitted Submitted 1989, for new trial October reconsideration denied March and remanded 26,1990 (309 698) April petition allowed for review Oregon Reports later issue See OREGON, OF STATE Respondent, FORD, CHARLES TIMOTHY Appellant. A45907)

(10-87-01668; CA 780 P2d 1192 Gary Babcock, Defender, D. Public Gartlan, and Peter Salem, filed the brief for appellant. Frohnmayer,

Dave Attorney General, Virginia Linder, L. General, Solicitor Kistler, and Rives Attorney Assistant Gen- eral, Salem, filed respondent. the brief for

BUTTLER, J.

Deits, J., dissenting.

BUTTLER, J. pos- for unlawful his conviction appeals

Defendant 475.992, substance, assigning ORS of a controlled session evidence obtained suppress failure to to the trial court’s error in violation of conducted allegedly of a search the course 133.235, Fourth rule, and the and ORS “knock announce” the search constituted agree We Amendment. suppression reverse. requires violation that and a stopped defendant Eugene Police Officer Nauta in a in which defendant was woman while car defendant and the woman for passenger. asked Nauta (Jones) and gave The woman her name names addresses. staying her. defendant was her address and stated that Ford, Douglas as rather than Defendant identified himself name, Ford, living he was real Charles confirmed that that, encounter, during with the woman. Nauta testified pack he saw a blue back in the back of car. day, anonymous

The next caller informed Department just apartment that he had left an Eugene Police resided, Ford Ford possessed Charles and Jones which stolen, five jewelry that he have firearms, he had concealable two which on *3 kept in pack, three of which he in a blue back and he was possession recognized of the name methamphetamine. Nauta and, of had remembering the woman and the address that she before, compared police a the he passenger day had with her and then realized that photos Douglas of Charles Ford. Nauta (defendant), an passenger the had been Charles ex-convict appear on fel- outstanding with arrest warrants for failure to charges. I ony driving suspended trespass while and criminal buy/sell an of Another officer then told Nauta that owner sold shop had told him three weeks earlier defendant had shop him a and that he left the with concealable firearm had in his possession. another firearm for obtained warrant search defendant his order to execute the warrants for arrest concedes that possession.

cealable firearms his state face, did not the search warrant defective on its because it the searched. Defen- particularity place describe with suppressed should be dant does not assert that evidence defective; only contention search warrant was during that the evidence was obtained an improper execu- outstanding tion of the arrest warrants.

While application for the search warrant was being processed, apartment two officers drove complex to determine the layout the residence. While were in lot, parking stepped balcony a man onto Jones’ apartment and watched them until were out of sight. Meanwhile, another officer an unmarked surveillance van the apartment watched until the warrant was issued. During time, he being saw another man to the apart- admitted ment by someone inside. Neither the men observed apartment outside the However, was defendant. time, throughout car in which defendant day seen parked directly apartment. before was below the

The police chose to execute the search warrant with a eight tactical team. Six to officers arrived with the warrant. All military fatigue wore face masks and camouflage uniforms placards with on the front them as identifying police. Using a battering-ram, one officer struck the door three times until it broke while another open, shouted “Police officers with a search apartment guns warrant.” entered the drawn, which began shouting, time defendant “Is it the cops? it the cops?” Is the woman. Defendant was hand- and, down, put cuffed when he did not calm an officer a hood over head. assigns error the trial denial

Defendant court’s suppress, his motion to the execution of the arguing arrest warrants violated “knock announce” rule of 133.235, provides, part: ORS which

“(5) arrest, peace may make order to officer enter premises in probable officer has believethe cause to present. to be to be arrested “(6) identity, giving If notice of the officer’s author- after admitted, ity purpose, officer is the officer premises, by breaking, necessary.” (Empha- if enter sis supplied.) *4 presence purpose The officers here did not announce their was a before battered the door down. Their conduct clear suppression of the requires violation statute. violation of (1) result if evidence obtained as a of the unlawful it is

5 (2) violation. a constitutional or it constitutes aggravated 352, (1980). Bishop, v. 349, 642 State 288 Or 605 P2d 711, State in 62 Or 663 P2d We noted Valentine/Darroch, 54, in State v. (1983), 264 Or 504 38 Bishop, and State v. cert den 412 US 948 (1972), (1973), 84 P2d supra, statutory, rising to

“the court treated the violations as Oregon of or federal Constitu- level of a violation either tions, suppression. They cited declined to order have been suppression justi- proposition of evidence is not for the by police, recently most fied for a violation Brock, 15, (1982) (nighttime State v. 294 Or 653 P2d 543 statute). thought search authorized of It has been violation in an suppression in such cases would result overdose of however, uniform, approach, has not been deterrence. That qualifications. has Valdez, 621, (1977), 277 P2d “Since (authorizing evidence seized violation ORS 131.615 reasonably stop suspects the if the officer crime) suppressed, person has committed has been protect purpose of the statute is to ‘interests of the kinds by protected to the United which are the Fourth Amendment I, Oregon by States Constitution and Article section Ponce, But see State v. Constitution.’ 277 Or at 629. rev den App 581,635 P2d 1042 Or 568 Yet (ORS 131.615) Oregon stop is more restrictive statute Ohio, Terry v. requires, than the Amendment US Fourth therefore, 1, 88 1868, 20 (1968), and, L S Ct Ed 2d 889 necessarily encroaching on Fourth Amend violated without rights. ment hand, the other the ‘knock-and-announce’ statute is

“On requirements the Fourth Amendment as codification in Ker. by Supreme the United Court enunciated States Supreme Oregon Court held Although it is true that Bishop ‘knock-and- both Valentine/Darroch part protection requirements of the announce’ are not Constitution, I, by Oregon Article section afforded only may infringe the fact that a violation not seem to offer a viable distinc- federal constitution would Valdez to hold that if Valdez. We understand tion from kind protect interests of the statute violated is intended provi- or protected the relevant state federal constitutional subject sions, is as a result of the violation evidence obtained only practical method ‘the suppression, because that *5 * * rights protect which has devised to of this *.’ kind Valdez, supra, v. State Further, 277 Or at 629. we understand Valentine/Darroch, supra, State v. to construe the ‘knock- (1) protect persons as to and-announce’ rule intended who might injured by be to violent resistance unannounced entries (2) protect right privacy. and the householder’s to In order statutory magnitude to rise to the aof violation infringement, stitutional both interests must be violated. Valentine/Darroch, supra, State v. 64-65; 264 Or at Bishop, supra, they are, at 356-57. If those two cases suppression appropriate remedy. indicate that is the “Aside from giving circumstances rise to a constitutional violation, the court indicated both Valentine/Darroch Bishop that, if the circumstances of violation particularly aggravated, disregard were or if of the requirements prevalent, suppression may were become be appropriate compliance. to enforce In neither case did protected by court find both interests the rule violated or that particularly aggravated. the circumstances In were Valentine/ Darroch, gained entry by subterfuge,’ the officer ‘ruse or so possibility there was no entry, of violence as a result of the Bishop, although right privacy defendant’s In invaded. two uniformed executing officers an arrest warrant wife, knocked and identified themselves to defendant’s opened speak the door. said wanted to to her hus- band; stepped porch she said he was not there and on out so, talk them further. As she did one officers her, became aware that there was a man in the room behind so through doorway.” he went at 715. Tweed,

In plain-clothes seven officers and one uni- form executed a warrant to search the defendant’s home for drugs. An officer in plain clothes knocked on the door while officers, uniform, five including one in stood behind him. The defendant opened and, so, the door did when he non- stepped inside, uniformed officer displayed badge pulled pistol, pointing it at the defendant. officer did not identify entering himself before or state his purpose. having officer smelled alcohol and admitted consumed one and one-half beers about two and one-half hours before executing warrant. Neither the defendant nor wife the men knew were officers or that had a warrant until were inside. We held that the evidence must be suppressed, because the circumstances of the officers’ entry rule, protected violated both interests intended violation, also that thereby constituting constitutional particularly aggravated. circumstances v. it is to State is closer to Tweed than This case In neither supra. supra, Bishop, or State Valentine/Darroch, down, did the door two cases the officers break of the latter safety endanger the home entering nor their conduct did interest of within, although privacy did invade the of those peace- occupants. although officers entered could fully, they created a situation reasonably were the victims of an have believed that robbery violently. reacted might armed have

Here,, officers believed that their violent *6 potential danger was of “the involved” justified because safety is our surprise probably biggest “the element of a for always potential We that there is recognize factor.” surprise that a warrant and the element of danger executing however, is no Here, the there police. be of benefit to they that were about suggestion thought that the drug or that major ring execute for the warrant They did have reason to believe that defen- dangerous. the pistols, or more but that dant carried one knew for and that warrants his arrest related to non-violent offenses history Although he had no of violence. the officers testified war- that one of them shouted “Police officers with search battering another hit the door three times with a rant” while ram, surprising is not the announcement was not that it the heard, by defendant, least “Is began shouting, at cops?” as the officers entered. express findings on

Although the trial made no judge findings the assume that he made suppress, motion we forced implicit legal with his conclusion that consistent Gladden, 250 443 not See Ball v. entry aggravated. was is However, dispute P2d there no but police made no privacy was invaded or that occupants’ comply requirements with the attempt authority before enter- presence, purpose announce their ing using until before force. or that wait refused simul- making We not believe that announcement do forced or the taneously very noisy entry, with a and violent surprise danger general benefit of general potential for or aggravated or nature mitigate the violation minimize did, the violation here. If they statutory requirements meaningless. would be

We conclude that violation was aggra- vated, suppression requiring the evidence.1

Reversed and remanded new trial. J.,

DEITS, dissenting. This case involves the execution of an arrest warrant in a situation where the police legitimate had concerns for safety. majority’s their requires police decision officers to requirements follow technical of the knock and announce statute the face information leads them believe so, by doing will substantial risk of death or before, injury. We have required never and we should not do so I agree now. the “knock and However, announce” was statute violated here. I not agree do that the violation was aggravated. Accordingly, I dissent. determining test for an aggravated when vio- lation has has been precisely occurred articulated. The other majority examines cases this involving issue Tweed, cludes that the here facts are closest to State v. P2d the one case where a violation of aggravated. statute found to be obtained warrant search defendant’s home for “mari- juana special barbituates.” no reason to be concerned for safety other than general concerns that *7 accompany the execution of search warrant. Two hours they warrant, before the executed the officers to decided drink This “couple beers.” then occurred: a.m., husband], response knock, 12:30 “At in to a [defendant’s opened slightly, door front his wife and two children home; objectively police a man was not identifiable as a officer, alcohol, stepped smelling through the door into the hallway identifying stating first or without himself mis- sion, hastily displayed badge and drew under his coat [from weapon], uni- an automatic which shook as he held it. Other men, plainclothes, rapidly in dentified also first.” followed the App 62 Or at 717. 1 aggravated, Given our that the was conclusion violation we do not

decide whether it also violated the constitution. federal

9 the defendant’s gun to hold his on proceeded The first officer minute, tripped, then without for half unarmed husband the defendant reason, attempted as hand he apparent in Tweed was the violation agree I would that search warrant. far from cry this case is a Tweed.1 but aggravated, Tweed, accord- similarity this case and between occupants reasonably the could is that majority, to the ing robbery of an they were the victims armed have believed However, in case violently. the facts this have reacted might not Here, although police the did announce quite different. are entered, they under they as should have presence their before statute, and continued they they did so as entered resi- throughout the search presence announce their their on the front of clothes They placards dence.2 Further, police. they as did not smell of alco- identifying them if in a manner that cause one doubt hol or behave would police officers, did in Tweed. they were as the officers Additionally, there was no in Tweed that the evidence safety, their did artic- officers were concerned for not any entry. not As announcing ulate other reason for Berardinelli, 95 Or P2d recognized App in State (1989), den Or 79 important rev an consideration if a of the knock and announce determining violation statute in the entering has occurred is officers’ reasons manner Berardinelli, did.3 where warrant was executed a.m., some officers were plain at 3 were uniform some clothes, special while others wore uniforms with hoods and a stun an win- goggles. grenade upper The officers threw into dow, explosion, “diversionary a loud as a tactic.” causing 1Although in Tweed found a violation of the constitutional knock entirely requirement, clear that was and announce is not violation 711,663 (1983) (Rossman, aggravated. App State v. found to be 62 Or P2d 38 J., concurring). specially police presence majority acknowledges as that the did announce their entered, ineffective, entry noisy. was Even but was because the concludes noisy, assuming fact continued the initial occupants police. presence announce their was sufficient to let the know that Moreover, testified told defendant that it was officer that one asked, cops?” when defendant “Is it the rule Berardinelli dealt with a violation of the knock codified announce 133.575(2), Although specific relating ORS execution of search warrants. identical, wording analysis of is in the a violation under either two statutes Arce, 185, 188 2, 730 rev virtually See State v. n 83 Or P2d 1260 same. 349, 352, 605 Bishop, (1987); den 303 Or 332 P2d 642 *8 open guns

kicked entering the door and entered with drawn. Soon after

they killing fired at Dobermans, the defendants’ two injuring one and the other. The defendants contended that the police identity purpose did not announce until after they occupants The entered. testified had no idea what happening. thought was were them Two of testified that

being aggra- robbed. heldWe that the violation was vated, because the had reason to believe that com- pliance endangered with the statute could have both them and occupants of the house. was There evidence that occupants armed, officers believed the to be that there were guard large dogs two in the house that lookouts were posted occupants presence police. alert the to the Berardinelli, 95 Or at 367-68.

Here, the officers had reason to that believe defen- handguns possession. They dant five knew, had from observing day during stop him before, a traffic that he had presence police.4 behaved in nervous manner in They outstanding knew that there were two warrants for his present arrest. were aware that two other men were apartment that at defendant and least one of them watching police apartment. had been activities outside the Finally, they probably possession knew that defendant inwas property methamphetamine. of stolen majority information

The dismisses all of that stating suggestion police thought that “there is no that major drug ring were about to execute warrant for a occupants dangerous.” any or that the were I am unaware of requirement major drug ring that the warrant must relate to a before a violation of the knock and will announce statute suggestion excused. The statement there was no that the dangerous ignores reality. The officers expressed safety, concerns for their and those concerns were supported by objective facts.5 Defendant so nervous the officer asked the driver of car that had stopped gun backup help had whether defendant and called him with officers stop.

the traffic suppression hearing, apart At the the officer led the search of defendant’s ment testified: Why you entry? did select a forced

“Q. potential danger surprise “A. Because of involved. element probably biggest safety factor.” our should asserts not have possession weapons, been concerned about defendant’s he only been arrested for non-violent crimes and history preposterous had no of violence. It is to hold *9 safety officer cannot act consistent with held legitimately suspected when a warrant on executing drug cerns user to be in of possession drugs, property believed stolen has weapons, unless the officer has knowledge weapons used the in a violent or has a of history manner proof violence. would seem to actual require a situation is rather than a dangerous, more reasonable stan- dard, adopt, which I would there objective be facts support officer’s belief that a situation is dangerous. case, I Accordingly, in this would hold that violation of the aggravated. knock announce statute argues

Defendant also the officers violated the requirement knock and announce federal constitution. level, To rise to that two First, conditions must exist. i.e., violation must purposes, conflict both of the rule’s protection of who might injured those in an unan- nounced protection homeowner’s right privacy. Berardinelli, 368; See State supra, 95 Or Second, v. Bishop, supra, State 288 Or at 356. the justification for the violation not fall must within one the three emer- gency exceptions to rule: preventing destruction of evidence, preventing escape persons within prem- preventing ises or harm to the or to officers others in the Arce, premises. 185, 188, 83 Or App 730 P2d 1260 rev den above, As discussed justified safety violation was the officers’ concern and, therefore, there nowas constitutional violation. I would affirm. Rossman, JJ., join

Richardson and this dissent.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Ford
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Oregon
Date Published: Oct 18, 1989
Citation: 780 P.2d 1192
Docket Number: 10-87-01668; CA A45907
Court Abbreviation: Or. Ct. App.
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