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State v. Ford
998 A.2d 684
Vt.
2010
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*1 divorce, again, trial court found In final order of Vermont. that wife hearing, divorce during the provided on evidence based resident. a Vermont findings. court’s error in the trial no clear 12. We find findings similar to make its were court used factors trial divorce, custody, child involving cases previous those used it was provided, jurisdiction. Based personal give “does intend to that wife trial court find clear error indefinitely.” Vermont New domicile to remain her York up ruling trial court’s upholding argues 13. Husband forum encouraging or even condoning be would tantamount however, state to move to another every right, has shopping. Wife resident qualifies laws. If as a she its wife prefers because does, law, deserves as we find that she wife according Vermont juris- including being invoking a resident the benefits courts. diction Vermont’s intended to the trial court found wife summary, abandon New York domiciliary of Vermont and to her

become domicile, finding. therefore find no clear error We we order judgment to the court’s and affirm divorce defer trial motion to for lack denying and the husband’s dismiss ruling matter subject jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

2010 VT 39 Ford Vermont Justin [998 684] No. 08-490 Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund Burgess, JJ. Present:

Opinion May Filed *3 Porter, Orange William J. County Attorney, Chelsea, State’s Plaintiff-Appellee. Valerio, F. General, Saxman,

Matthew Defender Anna Deputy General, Stevens, Intern, Defender Dan Legal Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant. Skoglund, J. Justin Ford from appeals judgment following

conviction rendered his pleas possession conditional marijuana and possession narcotics. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his to suppress motion certain and, evidence seized from his house. agree We accordingly, reverse judgment court the trial and remand. ¶ 2. Sometime in the early of March morning 9-1-1, individual Ford, called his Stephen said name was and said he been an accident and his trapped vehicle on the Hartford-Queehee Road Hartford in County. Stephen Windsor defendant, Ford is the brother of Justin Ford. Nothing record established the time of the 9-1-1 call. Police and the local *4 squad area, EMS responded searched the but did not a find damaged car or Ford in Stephen the area. Subsequently, at around 5:20 a.m. on March a state police Vermont trooper from the Middlesex barracks was at her by contacted home her dispatcher to perform directed a welfare check on Stephen Ford his last address on in known Brook Street Williamstown Orange in County. shortly

¶ address the Brook Street The arrived at trooper 3. snow. driveway by in the buried car and saw one before a.m. no saw for awhile. She not been used had She concluded only The in the house. tracks, lights nor did see on tire she fresh the door of leading to a basement she saw were tracks with experience driveway. prior From adjacent to the house earlier, the months matter six in an unrelated Stephen Ford She of the house. he the basement believed that lived trooper times, announcing on few and knocked it a the door approached to check trooper decided Hearing response, the presence. her no entrance knew was another She there the remainder of house. house, no path there was of the but because on the north side awas because there that direction and through the snow house, side of the leading around the south snowmobile track to the house. along track back proceeded she house, lights trooper of the saw Upon reaching 4. back off Stepping further two basement windows. coming from the house, trail, knocked approached the snowmobile she announced, Police, please come to nearer “State window inside, approached hear from so she anything door.” She did not saw, window, she As bent down to the lighted window. she curtains, marijuana a small through between the several gap glass aquarium bright grow-light. under plants growing room, so halted her anyone did not see inside the she trooper premises. and left the search observed, trooper on what had obtained Based she Street, thought for the on Brook which she

search warrant house she Ford’s At around that afternoon Stephen p.m. house. home, and a number of other officers returned and searched tablets, and marijuana oxycodone seizing plants, dozen several operation. used in a thought drug-growing other materials to be — and of the home progressing, search was owner While Stephen mother of Ford and Ford contacted Justin informed why being searched. The to ask her The caller leading of the series of events to the search. her Stephen lived the home and explained that defendant A search of the home lived for some time. further there to defendant. mail and other items addressed personal uncovered two misdemeanor subsequently charged with Defendant was of narcotics. possession marijuana possession counts of trial, suppress physical moved to Before defendant in the search of his home. Defendant gathered afternoon *5 premise contested the search on the that the warrant authorizing the search based on the trooper’s early-morning was warrantless entry his her grounds onto the home and observations through window, thus, his the evidence was obtained violation his constitutionally protected rights. In opposition, the State claimed that trooper’s entry onto was property lawful exception under the to requirement. aid the warrant At evidentiary hearing, to testified the facts above. testimony, motion, Based on this the trial court denied defendant’s finding that the search requirements satisfied the of the emer- State v. gency 487, as out in laid 171 Vt. (2000). Subsequently, A.2d 639 defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement, admitting guilt pending outcome of this appeal.

¶ 7. On from appeal a denial a motion to we suppress, review the trial court’s fact findings deferentially only if reverse v. Bryant, the findings erroneous. State clearly 39, are 2008 VT ¶ 9, standard, 183 Vt. 950 A.2d 467. Under “we will unless, uphold the findings taking court’s factual the evidence light party, most favorable to prevailing excluding evidence, effect of modifying there is no reasonable or credible Rheaume, them.” State v. support 106, 6, evidence to 2005 VT Vt. 711 (quotation Whether the facts as found meet the proper justifying standard a particular police Mara, of law. State v. 96A, action a question 2009 VT Vt. 987 A.2d 939. Bryant, legal We review issues de novo. ¶39, 2008 VT

¶ 8. Defendant first challenges trial court’s factual findings, (1) arguing the court erred it when found: that the trooper had footprints door”; seen “recent leading the basement (2) that it apparent to the trooper that “someone had recently door”; (3) entered the basement “implied there had been no [Stephen information that had been Ford] picked up by anybody and transported hospital.” In reviewing the trooper’s testimony at the suppression hearing, we can find no support evidence to finding footprints that the entry or into were residence recent. The trooper’s testimony only referred snow; made she no statements about how old or been, new may fallen, the tracks have last snow had any other indicia of prints when the were made. argues that the court logical could make a inference however, we testimony; the trooper’s “recent” from

tracks were testimony from can be drawn such an inference fail see how challenged toAs the second only their existence. establishing above, in the nothing find record as we finding, recently the basement entered finding “someone court’s by the supported of the court are not findings door.” These Defend- upheld. are erroneous and cannot be clearly evidence and finding much as to is not to a so challenge ant’s third been information that “it’s that there had no implied conclusion: transported to up by anybody and [Stephen] picked had been *6 reasonable, immaterial, inference, based on This is a if hospital.” on the Hartford- was not located testimony Stephen dispatched Road and the state Quechee Thus, find no look him. we error his known address to last finding. this

¶ is central argument appeal 9. Defendant’s of resulting discovery and the trooper’s entry property onto his his search of home items constituted warrantless illegal rights under the Vermont Constitution.1 Defendant violation of his house peered walked around his claims that when the window, of his curtilage she invaded the into the basement lighted Though a warrant. defendant home and effected a search without under certain permissible searches are recognizes that warrantless circumstances, search failed to meet he contends that thus, the trial court exception, for the criteria motion to denying suppress. erred in his ¶ protects 10. Article 11 of Vermont Constitution intru government from “unreasonable people’s right be free 39, Bryant, of 2008 legitimate expectations privacy.” sions into VT omitted). “a of repository heightened 10 The home is (quotation such, heightened protec and as it receives privacy expectations,” omitted). 12 (quotation tion Article 11. Id. Because some under intimately confines of a house are so physical areas outside 1 Constitution, argument grounded solely specifi in the Vermont As is foundation, 11, pausing only cally upon to note we decision Article base our privacy long . that our traditional Vermont values have . . held “we — may greater require protection 11 individual freedom embodied Article ¶ 10, Bauder, 16, by v. 2007 VT Constitution.” State than that afforded the federal Thus, way 392, by all cases are 181 references federal Vt. only. illustration 24 life,” “privacies recognize

tied to the we the “same constitu protection tional from unreasonable searches and seizures” for this itself.” 161 curtilage Rogers, [for] so-called “as (1993) 236, 241, Vt. A.2d 572 Oliver v. (citing United (1984)). States, 466 U.S. An interest in privacy individuars government from intrusion safeguarded by requiring “advance judicial approval” Mountford, in the form of a warrant. 171 Vt. at omitted). (quotation at 643 This detached review prevents own, law from “deciding enforcement on their without officer, judicial of a neutral invade a approval person’s privacy” (quo the absence circumstances.” “exceptional Id. government tation agents When conduct a warrantless search, the law such presumes an intrusion into an individual’s privacy is unreasonable and a Bryant, constitutional violation. ¶39, Indeed, VT “permissible such invasions are only pursuant narrowly Bauder, to a exceptions.” few drawn and well-delineated 16, 14; Ohio, (1968) Terry VT see 392 U.S. 25-26 (warrantless “strictly search must be by circumscribed exi initiation”). gencies its justify which

¶ 11. The emergency aid excep assistance tion provides narrow from carve-out the warrant requirement applicable when law enforcement personnel activity discover illicit protect while providing aid to life or property. See 489-90, 171 Vt. at 769 A.2d at (setting 643-44 out of emergency contours aid exception); Connolly, State v. Vt. *7 565, (1975) 571, 364, 368 (recognizing “officers responding to emergency” an exception as to warrant requirement); see also (1978) (“We Arizona, 385, Mincey v. 437 U.S. 392 do not question situations.”). the of the to right police respond to emergency While is distinct from community the caretaking exception, both police operating involve outside their criminal law enforcement and role, and investigation the accordingly requirement warrant is n.*, Mountford, relaxed. 171 Vt. at 490 769 A.2d at 643 n.*. The “distinguishing feature” of both community caretaking and emer gency they assistance searches “is that generated are from a 491, desire to aid rather investigate victims than criminals.” Id. at 769 at 645. A.2d Because this of type search still an constitutes of invasion an expectation however, any individual’s of privacy, resulting search must be strictly by circumscribed the justify which serves to it and should not be used to general exploratory Thus, the search. need for a warrant is

25 aid necessary persons assistance is only police obviated City Brigham injury.” such injured or threatened -with “seriously (2006). 398, Stuart, 403 547 U.S. ¶ recognizing 12. 644, 490-91, adopted A.2d at this Court 769 171 Vt. at

Mountford, of York Court by New analysis developed three-part (N.Y. 1976), Mitchell, 609 N.E.2d People Appeals City, Brigham by Constitution applied as to Federal abrogated require warrant exceptions other 398. As with U.S. that the search ment, prosecution show “the burden is on 493, 769 at at A.2d Mountford, Vt. falls into exception].” [this omitted). 646 (quotation test is that of the prong first Mountford/Mitchell there grounds must have reasonable to believe

“[t]he an for their assistance an at hand and immediate need at at 644 life or Id. A.2d protection property.” for the omitted). an and the officer’s objective inquiry, This is (quotation subjective facts than grounded “must be rather empirical belief Mitchell, analysis at 609-10. of this 347 N.E.2d Our feelings.” “evaluate, factor, however, an is deferential and not invitation on an immediate by actions taken based hindsight, by Mountford, 171 reaction to the circumstances that faced them.” Vt. time, at At the “the burden is on at 646. same exception’s met prosecution” prove stan omitted). (quotation dards. Id. test is a prong 14. The second of Mountford/Mitchell involved; officers

subjective analysis into the motivations by intent to arrest and they “must not be motivated primarily (quotation A.2d at 644 seize evidence.” Id. Supreme States Court Since we decided the United motivation is irrelevant” subjective has held that “officer’s violations of the Fourth Amendment the United determining our Brigham City, 547 U.S. at Because States Constitution. prong depend in this case does this second holding test, determining impact we refrain from Mountford/Mitchell analysis, beyond facet of City ruling has on that our Brigham two remain valid. stating prongs other permissible prong 15. The of the test limits third *8 giving emergency are scope any police search undertaken as of at at search Any assistance. 171 Vt. 644. basis, cause, probable must “some approximating have reasonable place the with to associate the area or to be searched.” factor, Id. this Mitchell (quotation articulating the privilege court noted this “limited afforded to law enforce- ment” a “direct the area to be requires relationship between at emergency.” searched and the 347 N.E.2d 610. Like the court, activity Mitchell we of recognize police “reasonableness judicial always pass any guise must muster” and search under the of the assistance must do Id. at likewise. The search of defendant’s home fails under the first and third set out in the of prongs prong Under first Mountford. test, showing police there was no of an immediate need for assistance at facts trial defendant’s home based on the before the genesis court. The of here was a 9-1-1 call reportedly by made Stephen Though Ford. the record not clear is specifics as to the of emergency personnel re sponse, at the hearing trooper stated and emer gency personnel Road, had responded Hartford-Quechee but were unable to find any the motorist or evidence of accident. The time the 9-1-1 of call was never Nor established. was ever physical established the caller had claimed any injuries. ¶ 17. presented Furthermore there no to why evidence as state the Hartford thought might area the motorist be in Apparently, Williamstown. a check law enforcement prior database indicated a Stephen address Ford judicial Williamstown. We take notice that Williamstown at least forty away part miles from the Hartford-Quechee Road information, closest to Williamstown. With limited if dispatched defendant’s home to Stephen see Ford had returned to this residence needed aid. After at arriving home, testified nothing justify would “reasonable belief’ that the motorist was inside and in need of immediate assistance. approached She a darkened with a house driveway snowed-in car and no sign beyond inhabitants more recent than the last snowfall. She knocked on the most accessible door multiple response. times and received no Absent any upon which to that Stephen surmise Ford residence, otherwise, arrived be- tween the time of the call and dispatch it is trooper, *9 obligation to meet upheld how the its

difficult to see knocking, of to her response The lack a of prong first Mountford. anyone that was more, to a belief was insufficient without an need for medical or that was immediate inside the house there (“[W]e A.2d at Mountford, 171 at 769 646 attention. Vt. See that was knowledge that defendant do not either believe to door is open or failure of to sufficient drunk defendant (citations omitted)). emergency intervention.” Without authorize — at or the trial court evidence the scene before additional there was an emer- there can no reasonable conclusion be in house assistance defendant’s immediate gency requiring the 9-1-1 call.2 solely based There, we itself, regard. in this 18. is instructive when, justified into a home was

recognized police entry in party, of saw defendant reports to a loud responding alone, not home, extremely in intoxicated state. He did his and an of flashlight knocks or the beam a respond yells to their even outside, arose and eyes. they As watched from he shined his wall, adjoining room. Such stumbling before into an walked into circumstances, concluded, a reasonable officer to be we would lead A.2d at well Id. at 769 being. concerned for defendant’s home, contrast, here, approaching officer an to that a motorist had claimed be only knowledge armed with away, car would need more than trapped his miles reasonably home emergency darkened to believe assistance emergency assistance immediately necessary. Unlike other upheld courts have searches of homes cases wherein accidents, here there was insuf- reported connected automobile ficient that an existed inside suggest evidence jurisdictions uniformly home. from sister involve additional Cases justify entry an officer’s beyond report accident See, car following e.g., City into a of a accident. report of any prevent important future welfare It is to note conclusion does not conceded, trooper’s rightly checks calls. As defendant based on door, driveway dooryard, upon not presence knock his did in his her 451, 453, Ryea, 153 Vt. 571 A.2d constitute an unlawful search. See State (1990) (driveway, though curtilage, semiprivate part of “constitutes area” protection). supporting a Had she afforded full constitutional discovered evidence there an immediate assistance reasonable belief need areas, could have her search. those she continued (Mich. 1991) (officer Troy v. Ohlinger, responded N.W.2d 54 accident, injury plate of cross-referenced license number report home); residence, damaged City and saw car outside Fargo with 1994) (N.D. Ternes, 522 to hit-and-run (responding N.W.2d accident, injury damaged officers went to residence and saw parked outside with on truck seat and on door pickup blood residence). unfulfilled, 20. The third prong was likewise Mountford scope justified by

as the search any situation occurred in Hartford as a result of call the 9-1-1 could not extend to the forty away house Williamstown without miles “some reasonable basis, cause, approximating probable the emergency associate the area or to be place with searched.” Vt. at 644 (quotation By searching grounds of the home peering into basement windows when there was insub *10 — anyone stantial evidence at the that let residence alone the home, potentially motorist the was exceeded scope of any emergency the which arose from a reported car accident, especially given the connecting scant evidence defend ant’s home with the 9-1-1 call. With the nature of the emergency very vague no basis and to associate defendant’s empty house with that of a emergency scope permissible search had likewise Contrary contracted. to State’s that position the scope necessarily of the search expanded police were unable to Hartford-Quechee Road, find the motorist on no with that had actually happened accident anyone actually injured, the search could not be enlarged without limit without case, reason. Under the circumstances of this State failed to was a prove there connection between the home and a purported many away. accident scene miles

¶ 21. Supreme As the New Hampshire recognized Court re- cently in its reviewing emergency aid jurisprudence, most of cases “there were alarming or volatile situations warranting [police] entry the private into residences. Even where there is a victim possible private within a dwelling situation, but no volatile we have not exigent found existence of circumstances . . . .” (N.H. Pseudae, 2006). State is the Such case before us today. State failed to uphold has its burden demonstrating that the a trooper had belief reasonable that her entry into immediately the home was necessary to life protect possibility limb. The the motorist was in defendant’s home did not and that alone possibility, needed aid was remote and the search curtilage police entry into defendant’s make home reasonable. his remanded.

Reversed and ¶22. proper Reiber, C.J., This case is about dissenting. — an exception exception emergency aid scope save lives acting quickly in which to situations recognizes those today holds majority interests. The privacy over priority takes informed car a serious accident officer is that when a address, the should last known officer to the accident victim’s sent than rather victim his home leaving dying risk sometimes accident majority requires further. The the situation investigating a wrecked such as tracks or signs, visible blood victims leave officer, vehicle, any pretense, absent evidence of before a cursory take look path around house and lawfully can follow I would signs thought injured. of a be person a window for narrowly. emergency Although read so case, here were my trooper’s a close view actions is recognized to a justified responding the fact that she by no that the emergency and had reason believe dissipated. I therefore dissent.

¶23. recognized A of courts have that 9-1-1 calls number enough “can be warrantless reporting an (7th Richardson, F.3d Cir. searches.” States v. United 2000) cases). true when the caller has (citing particularly This Id.; also, Matthews, ND e.g., identified himself. see 108, 18, reports an identified 9-1-1 caller 665 N.W.2d 28. When efficient and use of emergency, effective “[t]he (and response requires networks other rescue quickly be to such calls and without agents) respond able *11 Richardson, 208 at 630. We unnecessary second-guessing.” F.3d respond must and similarly police quickly have stated that officers thoroughly emergencies: reported act, and is to not to policemen

The business of firemen report on whether the is correct. speculate or meditate act emergencies in if tried to People could well die judicial associated with the with the calm deliberation process. (2000) 646 Mountford, Vt. internal citation

(quotation and ¶ view, my correctly 24. In the trial court concluded that was, therefore, no trooper reasonably, acted and violation of there in Although interests. we know that privacy retrospect defendant’s in person there was not an and that ever actual might emergency, there not have been an these facts at trooper were not known the time she arrived at Though hindsight may today, defendant’s home. such be clear See, Wood, analysis. cannot affect our e.g., Hunsberger F.3d (4th 2009) 546, 555 (holding although Cir. that it turned out that actually no one in cannot danger, judge trooper’s] [the was “we hindsight,” search based on what we know because “[a]t search, time there was reason think needed [someone] Here, help”). stating 9-1-1 call that received there had been an accident. The victim himself accident identified trapped that he said his car. When an rescue crew anyone was unable to locate where the had report- accident edly occurred, standard operating procedures followed dispatched trooper to the victim’s last known address. When home, trooper arrived saw she the snow leading to the of the She building. footprints. back followed those After several attempts at her knocking announcing presence, hearing injured person but no she that an reply, might concluded otherwise incapacitated be unconscious or and therefore unable to answer the door. To seriously determine whether there was a injured person house, peered inside she through window.

¶ 25. The trial court held step that each that the took trooper was reasonable. The majority reaches different conclusion today upon finding based its that “the testified to nothing justify would a ‘reasonable belief’ that the motorist inside and Ante, in need of immediate The majority’s assistance.” conclusion rests primarily following two weaknesses in the (1) argument: the trooper State’s traveled to a location that was forty “at least from accident, miles” reported location of ante, (2) 17; scene, upon arriving at the failed to discover supporting additional “evidence a reasonable belief there was an immediate need assistance in areas,” ante, those Although n.2. I agree these facts case, make this a close we have previously noted close cases “we should be deferential” to trooper’s evaluation situation. Vt. at 769 A.2d at The majority goes holding too far in reversing these facts the trial court’s decision.

31 accident and location of the reported 26. Distance between make search unrea- necessarily does the area searched Matthews, instance, applica- upheld for the court In sonable. searched police aid when officers exception of the emergency tion call Dakota, 9-1-1 though North even Fargo, a residence a number of occurring reported emergency that case 108, 19. Horace, 2003 The North Dakota. ND away miles had a belief that turns the officer reasonable on whether inquiry ¶¶ See, id. 43-44 e.g., was in the home. seriously person a emergency to an responding officers (holding a reasonably possibility there remained “could have . . . believed house,” entered the have been [people] may inside belief, “scope this of the search was dispel to confirm or house Here, respond- objectives”). trooper its reasonable view of that emer- emergency a had a reasonable belief ing reported at home. This may have been needed defendant’s gency assistance reporting 9-1-1 call by underlying was supported belief off the road without details as involving accident vehicle serious location, the failure of several precise to its combined with upon named victim. Based teams find the emergency rescue information, reasonably the officer could conclude home, in need might way found his but was still of victim have Indeed, why protocol precisely medical assistance. that is at of a welfare check the last known residence someone requires reported injured. is as who

¶27. trooper reasonable belief that already Because at emergency an existed when the arrived home, the did not need to discover additional “evidence belief there was immediate need reasonable an supporting Ante, 17 n.2. As the emergency assistance” the house. stated, recently Court do not Supreme United States “[o]fficers likely serious, injury life-threatening ironclad of a proof need Michigan Fisher, _ U.S. aid v. emergency exception.” invoke (2009) curiam) (quotation (per Ct. 549 _, S. _, rejected requirement Similarly, other courts have — recognized the existence of a beyond that additional evidence respond can required before officers Moe, See, F.3d emergencies. e.g., these Schreiber (6th 2010). Schreiber, court held that the Cir. of “this case some though even applied lack[ed] support a manifestations of violence that often

more outward blood, objects, broken or finding exigency,” “signs such as (citations omitted). The noted that stains gunfire.” Id. court blood prerequisites of violence “are not other outward manifestations Id.) Fausel, to a accord finding exigency.” (Conn. 2010) (“Direct evidence is not .”). of Appeals . . . York Court came to a required New *13 (N.Y. Mitchell, in v. similar conclusion N.E.2d 607 People 1976), by Brigham as to Federal abrogated applied Constitution (2006). Stuart, v. court City U.S. 398 The Mitchell created the in three-part adopted test we later 171 Vt. 490-91, explicitly 769 A.2d at 644. The Mitchell court the rejected signs place idea that connect the searched “obvious which be emergency, example, with the for screams or the of a odor corpse” decaying were needed to invoke the aid exception, and the court held that the aid in applied though apparent that case even “no such clues were found.” N.E.2d at ¶28. majority The the proposition cites for that a Mountford trooper’s

lack of a from response knocking “was insufficient to support a belief that was anyone inside the house or that there ¶ Ante, is, was an medical immediate need for attention.” 17. That course, true, trooper’s but here the rested on belief much more than a lack of response. trooper The was a 9-1-1 responding to accident, emergency call a serious reporting reported victim not be The trooper could found. was sent to perform welfare check determine whether the accident victim had returned he home whether was of medical need attention. discussed, As these circumstances themselves created rea- seriously injured sonable belief that a was in A person the house. lack of response trooper’s knocking perfectly consistent with the reasonable may belief the accident victim have returned and may injured have been too to answer door. justified At that point, trooper was in entering curtilage looking through a window to see if person an (2d Barone, the house. United Cf. States 330 F.2d Cir. 1964) (upholding a warrantless search the under exception . . . have been “investigation incomplete would in need there be anyone might . . . whether finding out without aid”).3 ¶ evidence any additional did not need trooper 29. Because is irrelevant performed, she limited search carry out the in the snow footprints established the record whether did not the record thing is that important recent. were anything or in the snow footprints lack of complete establish a belief reasonable dissipate that would else on the scene. had when she arrived is to possibly have could footprints relevance only 30. The belief that trooper’s reasonable additional provide a factual made home. The trial court injured person leading to “recent that the had seen finding of the our review recognizes that majority door.” The basement Further, Ante, findings is deferential. court’s factual trial below, only can we party the prevailing the State was given that if, of the taking all findings factual the trial court’s overturn all excluding to the State light in the most favorable evidence evidence, is no reasonable credible “there modifying Rheaume, 179 Vt. VT support them.” State (quotation 889 A.2d 711

¶ standard, agree I cannot of this deferential light highly had “no that the trial court majority’s conclusion with entry into or finding footprints to that evidence Ante, “footprints recent.” 8. The existence residence were illustration how preeminent in the snow” is often cited as be made from circumstantial evidence: a inference can reasonable snow, it certain are after recent is footprints “when discovered it snow since fell.” passed that animated has over the being some 295, Webster, (1850); see also Mass. 312 Commonwealth v. 59 Prods., 70 Pa. D. & v. Bros. Farm C.2d Commonwealth Zehner 1972) (Ct. 501, passage from (referring Pleas to this 508 Common illustration of circum- most vivid and well-known Webster as “the evidence”). stated trooper might not have Although stantial 3 justified an is even in held that in circumstances officer Some courts have these Matthews, See, investigate reported emergency. e.g., entering home to someone’s upheld 108, “jurisdictions (noting have a warrantless that various 2003 ND person presence inside the searched in which search in circumstances entry”). go far hold dwelling that here to at the time of We need not was unknown justified performed trooper search she from outside in the limited home. was, like it to in state how fresh the snow seems me Vermont, snowfall is a occurrence the winter regular during where assume, months, trooper it is reasonable for a without declar- footprints in an in snow are ing, especially emergency, enough following necessarily recent or not so old either bear as Indeed, may irrelevant. this is obvious have led the be — directly testimony it in her to state most Vermont- that, simply ers take it for so granted because snows often winter, during in footprints necessarily the snow are not old. matter, old, footprints appear For that even if it is not uncommon for people step existing footprints to retrace and into snow to having avoid to break new trail. any 32. To the extent that there debate over the recentness

of the footprints, trooper’s “we should be deferential” to the response evaluation of the situation in to an emergency. 646; accord, e.g., 171 Vt. at 769 A.2d at State v. (N.J. 2004) Frankel, (“[T]hose who must act in heat of luxury the moment do so without the of time for calm deliberation.”). Here, reflection sustained it was reasonable for expect footprints could lead another injured door where an person could have entered all consistent victim, with the an supposition that accident not found at accident, reported the scene of a be could inside his home. Police routinely officers quick make decisions based on the existence of snow, footprints in have consistently and courts such upheld See, (Colo. Clark, e.g., People actions. 547 P.2d App. 1975) (holding that when snow at recent crime scene apartment building lived, led to where defendant warrantless entry of search boots was proper, as wetness of highly boots would be probative preservation). need of ¶ 33. This case is not the first time police officers have entered private property response to a 9-1-1 call that later turned out not to have emergency, been actual and other courts have routinely See, upheld e.g., Macelman, such actions. (N.H. 2003); Frankel, 847 A.2d at 576. In Macelman, Hampshire Supreme the New Court held that *15 exception applied aid to actions premised on far indicating fewer facts an emergency than the investigatory actions that apparent occurred here. The in emergency Macelman arose from an anonymous that a tip reporting car was behind the defendant’s residence and looked as if it might go over an scene, their of the view arrived on the officers When

embankment. the on defend- officers knocked obstructed. The the vehicle was the They then entered door, response. but received no ant’s front the to see if his vehicle backyard approached and the point, At this assistance. any needed occupants vehicle’s and marijuana of use other indications smoke and officers saw on a flat vehicle was It turned out the arrested defendant. it and the embankment. and had a fence between part yard see that the vehicle Nevertheless, could not because officers it, the held that “under they court approached was safe until requirement aid’ the warrant ‘emergency exception the car to approach property to enter the and were entitled an emergency their reasonable belief dispel confirm noted, requirement 834 A.2d at As the court existed.” 328. than cause probable a “is a lower standard reasonable belief Id. at 326. search or seizure.” ordinary for an required Frankel, in received a 9-1-1 call Similarly, dispatcher a line, house, but no one was and from the defendant’s a An officer then they busy signal. back received called home a welfare check. When perform to the defendant’s went arrived, a 9-1-1 call. having denied made the officer the defendant and that a that the defendant was nervous The officer observed might placed a have been such propped against lawn chair door trying to leave way as to form an obstacle to someone a victim hiding the defendant be Believing might house. house, and entered the home backup the officer called for his house, no victim in the but There was without warrant. marijuana plants officer’s limited search did reveal number a motion to view. The defendant filed grow lights plain and warrantless search violated argued officer’s suppress rights. Supreme Court affirmed Jersey his constitutional New officer’s fell the motion and held that actions the denial of requirement. to the warrant under case,” A.2d at The court “close recognized most among of one’s our sanctity and that “[t]he held that these circumstances rights,” but nonetheless cherished need to act duty life preserve protect “the of an outweigh privacy must interests decisively promptly (“Con- Mitchell, Id.; accord, at 611 e.g., N.E.2d individual.” against and sanctions their trans- privacy stitutional guarantees yield paramount must do not exist in a vacuum but gression *16 society for human life legitimate concerns need life”). protect preserve In summary, this case is about how far can police officers view,

go in responding recognized emergencies. my Supreme Arizona it right Court had noted that “we do not want to deter police officers from searches for engaging Fisher, (Ariz. 1984). persons in distress.” State v. 686 P.2d Many gone courts have further and have held we cannot deter such conduct there is a “general obligation because officers to assist whom persons they reasonably believe are in cases); accord, Frankel, Id. at (citing e.g., distress.” (“Courts at 574 are loath to second-guess good decisions made in faith with the of protecting intent life when the circumstances clearly reveal a legitimate emergency delay”). that will abide Under majority’s interpretation limited exception, officers are now to ignore asked this general obligation and risk leaving people undiscovered rather briefly than logically investigating the situation That further. is not message that I would send our law enforcement reasons, officers. For respectfully these I dissent. I36. am authorized to joins state Justice Burgess in this

dissent.

2010 VT 45 Sarah Scheele and Denis Scheele Dustin Lewis

[998 A.2d 697] No. 09-213 CJ., Reiber, Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund Burgess, Present: JJ.

Opinion May 21, Filed

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Ford
Court Name: Supreme Court of Vermont
Date Published: May 14, 2010
Citation: 998 A.2d 684
Docket Number: 2008-490
Court Abbreviation: Vt.
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