Lead Opinion
This сase is before us on appeal from a judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted and sentenced appellant, Guadalupe Fonseca, for drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(4).
On March 17, 1994, appellant was arrested when, pursuant to a warrant, Pеrrysburg police searched his home and found approximately thirty-two pounds of marijuana. Appellant pled guilty to drug trafficking and was sentenced to a prison term of two years. In addition, the trial judge ordered that appellant’s driver’s license be suspended for a рeriod' of five years, pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(M). That statute states in pertinent part:
“In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this section, the court * * * shall suspend for not less than six months nor more than five years the driver’s or commercial driver’s license of any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to any other violation of this section.”
Appellant now appeals the suspension of his driver’s license, raising the following assignment of error:
“The trial court erred in suspending appellant’s driver’s license pursuant to Revised Codе 2925.03(M), because said statute is unconstitutional.”
Appellant contends that this mandatory license suspension provision violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In examining the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, we start with the premise that all such lаws are presumed to be constitutional.
Roosevelt Properties Co. v. Kinney
(1984),
In support of his argument, appellant relies on the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas case of
State v. Gowdy
(1994),
The Illinois license suspension provision is a component of the state Vehicle Code. The stated purpose of that title “is to ensure that drivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive.”
Lindner,
*118
One other Ohio court has considered the constitutionality of the license suspension provision. In
State v. Smith
(May 5, 1995), Washington App. No. 94CA21, unreported,
In addition, the Supreme Courts of Florida, Georgia and Massаchusetts have ruled, on facts similar to those at bar, that such license suspension provisions are constitutional.
In
Lite v. State
(Fla.1993),
In
Quiller v. Bowman
(1993),
Finally, in
Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
(1992),
We find the reasoning of the Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals and the Supreme Courts of Florida, Georgia and Massachusetts persuasive and hold R.C. *119 2925.03(M) constitutional. Specifically, we find that the Ohio legislature may reasonably have intended R.C. 2925.03(M) to impede the transportation and distribution of illegal drugs. Suspending the license of drug offenders, particularly those convicted of trаfficking as in the case at bar, is reasonably related to this proper legislative goal. Consequently, the requirements of due process are satisfied and, thus, we find appellant’s sole assignment of error not well taken.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. Smith, supra, is directly on point, but I believe the position advanced in Judge Harsha’s dissent in that case is correct.
The issue in this case, as I see it, entails the most basic constitutional question about the allocation of power between the separate branches of government. That issue is clouded somewhat by the obvious effect of R.C. 2925.03(M).
If, after a person has completed his sentence for a drug offense, he cannot drive a ear, he is unlikely tо be able to find a job, or get to it if he does. Although we give ex-convicts the biblical mandate, “Go thou and sin no more,” the statute almost guarantees that he will be unable to hold a job and will have to resort to some illegal activity to get by, e.g., driving without a license or, worse, going bаck to selling drugs. This statute is clearly counterproductive, and perhaps even foolish, but that alone is not grounds for the courts to interfere with the exercise of legislative constitutional power. Cynically put, it is well within the constitutional prerogative of the legislature tо enact counterproductive, or even foolish laws.
The legislative branch is the democratic branch, that part of the government that is supposed to react and respond to public sentiment. Clearly, public sentiment is against drug dealing, and just as clearly the publiс is aware that the already heavy sanctions are not working. The legislature, in response to the public outcry, enacted R.C. 2925.03(M).
*120 The question for the court is quite a different one. Is this sanction reasonably related to some state interest, or is there a rational basis fоr this sanction? Any sanction, of course, is directed at either punishment or deterrence.
The majority opinion in this case upholds the driver’s license suspension on a deterrence theory, saying the sanction will discourage the sale and transportation of illegal drugs. Suspending a person’s license after he has been convicted to deter sales can only have the intent of deterring future sales. This rationale presumes that the person will, after completing his sentence, engage in further drug sales and will use a motor vehicle to dо so. In light of the much more severe penalties for a second offense, the driver’s license suspension pales in comparison. The sanction will only have a deterrent effect on those who do not return to drug sales.
Presuming a person will commit further crimes, and punishing him bеfore he does so, is neither rational nor constitutional. It is a particularly dubious assumption to make in a case such as this where the drug offender did not use a car in committing his first offense. There is no rational basis in deterrence for this statute.
Smith, supra, advances a punishment theory, i.e., that heavy punishments themselves are deterrents to crime and the legislature enacted R.C. 2925.03(M) not to punish or deter second offenses, but to make the punishment for the first offense so severe as to make it unattractive. If the legislature can direct that a criminal be deprived of his money or even his liberty, why is it not within its power to deprive him of his driver’s license?
This is the crux of this case. It is not within its power because driving is not related to the drug offense. For example, a person has the right to use a cellular phone, and the use of cellular phones is common among drug dealеrs. They are also used by many others for quite legitimate purposes. Could a statute bar ex-drug offenders from using cellular phones?
A person who meets the academic standards is entitled to attend a state university. Colleges are full of young people away from home and the guiding influence of parental control for the first time, so we do not want drug dealers on campus. Could the legislature deny the right of admission to college, much as R.C. 2925.03(M) denies the right to a driver’s license?
Many cities license street vendors who sell food like hot dogs and taсos from pushcarts. These pushcarts are a perfect cover for drug sales as many people stop by, some for a hot dog, and some for a bag of marijuana or cocaine. Could the legislature bar ex-drug offenders from operating pushcarts?
If cеllular phones, college admissions, and pushcart licenses could be denied, what could not? If an ex-drug offender waters his garden, he might have *121 marijuana growing there and ought to be subject to a lifetime sprinkling ban. If he rents a garage in a public storage facility, it might be used to stоre contraband. There is almost no end to the activities that are ordinary and legal, but which can also be done to further some drug crime. Can the legislature bar ex-drug offenders from each and every one of these activities?
No. The legislature can only ban thosе activities that are rationally related to the offense. Williamson, supra. The majority opinion approves of the license suspension, but the real question in this case is: If a five-year driver’s license suspension is rationally related, what conduct is not?
I have made up an argumеnt for each of the activities above, an argument at least as good as the one for the driver’s license suspension. Some rationale can be advanced for any sanction, but the courts must look to see if the sanction meets the rational basis test.
That test requires that the sanction be related to the crime. We bar sex offenders from schools. We bar felons from carrying guns. We bar drunk drivers from driving. We bar ex-drug offenders from working in pharmacies. We can impose all these sanctions because they are rationally related to the crime committed. Driving is no more related to drug offenses than it is to rape or bank robbery, but we do not suspend the licenses of rapists or robbers, even the ones who used a ear in their crime.
The legislature is frustrated, much as the public is, about the problem of drugs. In that frustrаtion, it adopted R.C. 2925.03(M) which imposes a penalty not rationally related to drug crimes. The courts have a constitutional duty to look for a rational basis. If we find none, if we find that the statute is only an overreaction to the public outcry, we are just as constitutionally bound to strike that statute down.
The legislature’s position is more enviable than that of the courts. Its action is popular, while the court’s exercise of its duty to decide when things have gone too far is not. To hold that this statute is unconstitutional is, by definition, unpopular, but that is what the Constitution is all about.
I am convinced that R.C. 2925.03(M) is unconstitutional because there is no rational relationship between the crime and the punishment. The evil that drugs cause is not to be discounted, but that evil does not compare to the evil which will come from abandoning our constitutional principles. While a drug-free America is a popular goal, it ought not be purchased at the price of Constitution-free America.
Thus, I dissent.
