Case Information
*1
[Cite as
State v. Folley
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO.
24221 v.
: T.C. NO. 10CRB3191 MICHAL FOLLEY : (Criminal appeal from
Municipal Court) Defendant-Appellant :
:
. . . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 9 th day of September , 2011.
. . . . . . . . . .
SHAUNA HILL, Atty. Reg. No. 0074569, Assistant City Prosecutor, 335 W. Third Street, Room 372, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee THADDEUS A. HOFFMEISTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0081977, University of Dayton Law Clinic, 300 College Park, Dayton, Ohio 45469
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . . .
DONOVAN, J. *2
Defendant-appellant Michal Folley appeals her conviction and sentence for one
count of obstructing official business, in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), a misdemeanor of the second degree, and one count of failure to disclose personal information, in violation of R.C. 2921.29(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
I The incident which fоrms the basis for the instant appeal occurred on April 15,
2010, when Dayton Police Officer Officer Christopher Pawleski responded to a call at an apartment building at 1051 Grafton Avenue in order to investigate a complaint involving an alleged criminal trespass. Specifically, Officer Pawleski testified that dispatch indicated that there was a female causing a disturbance, and the property management wanted her removed. Upon arriving, Officer Pawleski encountered Folley and Frederick Sampson arguing with the assistant property manager and the property manager. Officer Pawleski testified that the assistant property manager repeatedly asked Folley and Sampson to leave, but Folley refused, stating that her mother lived in the apartment building. Folley also stated that she was on the lease, and therefore, did not have to leave. Sampson testified that he was Folley’s mother’s boyfriend. Offiсer Pawleski testified that he informed Folley that she needed to leave the
property, but she began walking towards the entrance to the apartment building. Folley then stated again that she did not have to leave the apartment, thus Officer Pawleski arrested her for criminal trespass and placed her in the back of his cruiser. At that point, Officer Pawleski asked Follеy for her name and social security number, but she refused to provide any personal information. Officer Susan Benge arrived on the scene shortly thereafter. Officer Benge testified thаt she also asked Folley for her personal information, but Folley refused to provide *3 it. Officer Benge testified that she was eventually able to obtain Folley’s personal informatiоn from the leasing office at the apartment building. Folley was transported to jail and charged with obstructing official business and failure to disclose.
{¶ 4} A bench trial was held on August 2, 2010. After the closе of the State’s case, Folley made a Crim. R. 29 motion for acquittal which the trial court overruled. The trial court subsequently found Folley guilty of obstructing official business and failure to disclose. Fоlley was sentenced to a jail term of ninety days, eighty-nine days suspended, and non-reporting community control for a period not to exceed six months for obstructing official business. For the failure to disclose conviction, Folley was sentenced to a jail term of thirty days, twenty-nine days suspended, and non-reporting community control for a period not to exceеd six months. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrent to one another. It is from this judgment that Folley now appeals
II In her first assignment, Folley contends that the trial court erred when it
overruled her Crim. R. 29 motion for acquittal made at the close of the State’s case because the evidence presented by the State was insufficient as a matter of lаw to sustain a conviction for obstruction of official business. Crim. R. 29(A) states that a court shall order an entry of judgment of acquittal if
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for the charged offense. “Reviewing the
denial of a Crim. R. 29 motion therefore requires an appellate court to use the same standard
as is used to review a sufficiency of the evidenсe claim.”
State v. Witcher
, Lucas App. No.
L-06-1039,
2921.31(A), which states: “No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to
prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act
within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a
public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.”
“Ohio courts have consistently held that in order to violate the obstructing
official business statute a defendant must engage in some affirmative or overt act or
undertaking that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the
official’s
lawful duties.” State v. Harrell, Montgomery App. No. 21736,
attempting to enter the apartment building after Officer Pawleski arrived at the scene.
Folley, on the other hand, argues that her refusal to provide the officers with any
*5
рersonal information, standing alone, cannot form the basis of a conviction for
obstructing official business. In support of her argument, Folley relies on State v.
Prestel , Montgomery Apр. No. 20822,
overt act done with an intent to obstruct the officers, “but it also must prove that [the
defendant] succeeded in actually hampering оr impeding them.” State v. McCoy,
Montgomery App. No. 22479,
{¶ 12} Folley’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶ 13} Folley’s second and final assignment of error is as follows: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER RELEVANT DIRECT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS PRIVILEGED TO BE AT THE PREMISES WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. SUCH FAILURE IS PLAIN ERROR, AS IT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS AS TO [THE] CHARGED OFFENSES.” In her second assignment, Folley argues that the trial court erred by
failing to fully consider her affirmative defense that she was privileged to be at the apartment complex because she wаs a co-signor on the lease to her mother’s apartment. Folley asserts that testimony was adduced at trial which established
that she was a co-signor on the lease to her mothеr’s apartment. Folley argues, therefore, that she would have been privileged to be present at the apartment complex where her mother resided. Officer Benge, howеver, testified that the apartment manager informed her that Folley was not on the lease, but another unnamed family member was. We note that a copy of the lease was not admitted into *7 evidence and Folley admitted that she did not live at the apartment. We also note that although Folley was not ultimately charged with criminal trespass, probable causе for her arrest
for trespassing existed because she ignored the directives of both the assistant property manager and Officer Pawleski to leave the property. Even if Folley was privileged to be on the property, which is not established on this record, it is irrelevant to her conviction for obstructing official business, and no issue exists regarding the trial court’s consideration of said evidence. Folley’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV Folley’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
. . . . . . . . . .
FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Shauna Hill
Thaddeus A. Hoffmeister
Hon. Carl Sims Henderson