Lead Opinion
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and driving while suspended. ORS 475.992(1); ORS 813.101; ORS 811.175. The issue is whether evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his car, after he suffered an apparent seizure at the police station, is admissible under the “emergency exception” to the warrant requirement. We hold that the evidence is admissible and affirm.
In reviewing the lawfulness of a warrantless search, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical facts that are supported by evidence in the record. State v. Stevens,
Deputy Sheriff Moyer went to a grocery store while he was off duty. After parking his car, he saw defendant driving at an unusually slow speed through the parking lot. Defendant parked his car straddling two spaces, with the end of the car extending into the traffic lane. He got out of the car and had difficulty inserting his key into the door lock. He opened the trunk and stood by it for a few moments, but Moyer could not see what he was doing. Then, he closed the trunk and went into the store. He picked up a can of dog food and tried to put it in his basket, but he missed. He picked up another can, tried to put it in the basket and missed again. Moyer approached defendant, but did not smell alcohol. Moyer called 911 to summon a uniformed officer; then he followed defendant outside. He asked defendant if he was okay, and defendant mumbled that he was ill and taking medication. Moyer identified himself as an officer and told defendant that a uniformed officer was on the way. He did not allow defendant to drive or walk away, but he did allow him to call his girlfriend.
Officers Sawyer and Walsh arrived, and Moyer told Sawyer what he had observed. Sawyer asked defendant for identification. Defendant said that he had none. His eyes were glassy, and he did not focus on Sawyer when the officer spoke to him. Sawyer asked defendant about his wallet, which he
Walsh took defendant to the police station. Sawyer went to search defendant’s car, but the door was locked, so he went to the police station. When he arrived, defendant was struggling with three officers and “displayed uncharacteristic strength.” After the fracas, defendant lay on the floor. His eyes rolled back in his head. He foamed at the mouth, drooled and began making “guttural sounds.” Sawyer became concerned about defendant’s welfare. Defendant’s condition was consistent with what Sawyer knew to be the symptoms of cocaine overdose. Sawyer searched defendant’s wallet and jacket to try to determine what substance defendant may have ingested. He found some marijuana.
Sawyer decided to return to defendant’s car and search it in an effort to determine what defendant had ingested. When he returned to the parking lot, defendant’s girlfriend and another person were trying to unlock the car by inserting a coat hanger through the window frame. Sawyer asked the girlfriend if she knew what defendant might have consumed, and she said that she did not. Sawyer opened the car. In it, he found a piece of glass and defendant’s Oregon 1. D. card. Each had a white powdery substance on it. Sawyer radioed the police station and said what he had found. Then, he searched further and found two small bags containing cocaine.
The state and federal constitutions independently prohibit warrantless searches and seizures, unless police act within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Stevens, supra,
The court first examined whether the marijuana plants were admissible under the “Emergency/Exigent Circumstances” doctrine. Evidence that police discover after a warrantless entry will not be suppressed, if the police faced exigent circumstances and had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. The court concluded that neither requirement had been met.
Next, the court examined the admissibility of the evidence under the “Emergency Aid Doctrine,” which it had tacitly recognized, but had never applied.
“We never have expressly held that emergencies solely justify warrantless entries in a criminal context, and we decline to do so here.”306 Or at 237 .
The court found that the Emergency Aid Doctrine did not apply, because the threshold requirement of a true emergency had not been met.
Because the Supreme Court has yet to apply the “Emergency Aid Doctrine,” its precise contours remain unclear. We have relied on State v. Bridewell, supra, in holding that evidence discovered after a warrantless entry in a noncriminal context is inadmissible. We relied on this passage:
*677 “In situations not implicating criminal law enforcement functions and not justified by the emergency/exigent circumstances exception, law enforcement officers, like private individuals, also may enter to render emergency assistance. [Hjowever, incriminating evidence arising from the intrusion by law enforcement officers must be suppressed.”306 Or at 239 . (Footnotes omitted.)
That passage is dictum, because the court had already concluded that there had been no emergency, and it is inconsistent with the court’s express declaration that it did not decide whether “emergencies solely justify warrantless entries in a criminal context.”
Bridewell’s dictum cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with the court’s reasoning in State v. Miller,
“[T]he initial entry into defendant’s room was lawful based upon the police officer’s reasonable belief, in the circumstances, that he might be able to render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim.”300 Or at 229 .
The court held that evidence relating to the discovery of the victim’s body was properly admitted at the defendant’s trial.
Although the warrantless entry was related to a criminal investigation, the officer’s purpose was to render emergency aid to the victim. In justifying the entry on that ground, the court made no mention of any requirement that
In this case, the scope of what the “Emergency Aid Doctrine” entails is squarely before us. Sawyer had lawfully arrested defendant for DUII. He returned to defendant’s car to try to find out what substance caused defendant’s apparent seizure. We must determine whether evidence that he discovered while attempting to ameliorate an emergency is admissible in a prosecution against defendant.
In State v. Sanchez,
In defining the contours of the “Emergency Aid Exception” to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, the decisions of other courts that have addressed the issue are instructive. The New York Court of Appeals set out these requirements for the “emergency exception”:
*679 “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.
“(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.
“(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” People v. Mitchell,39 NY2d 173 , 177,383 NYS2d 246 ,347 NE2d 607 , cert den426 US 953 (1976).
Several courts have adopted that language and have held that evidence discovered after a warrantless entry to render “emergency aid” is admissible.
We are persuaded that, with some modification, the framework articulated by the New York court describes the “Emergency Aid Doctrine” that provides an exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9. Our primary objection to New York’s test is its third prong, which requires that an officer have “some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” People v. Mitchell, supra,
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life.
(2) The emergency must be a true emergency — the officer’s good faith belief alone is insufficient.
(3) The search must not be primarily motivated by an intent to arrest or to seize evidence.
(4) The officer must reasonably suspect that the area or place to be searched is associated with the emergency and that, by making a warrantless entry, the officer will discover something that will alleviate the emergency.
We now apply this test to the facts of this case. After struggling with officers at the police station, defendant lay on the floor. He foamed, drooled and made “guttural sounds.” His symptoms were consistent with what Sawyer knew to be the symptoms of a cocaine overdose, and Sawyer believed that it would be helpful to know what substance defendant had consumed. Dr. Miller, an emergency room physician, testified that knowing what substance a patient in defendant’s condition had ingested would be very helpful in determining the appropriate course of emergency treatment. In the light of defendant’s symptoms, Sawyer’s training and experience, and the doctor’s testimony, it is clear that Sawyer observed a true emergency as defendant lay on the station house floor. It is also clear that Sawyer reasonably believed that he could render emergency assistance to defendant by finding out what substance he had ingested. The trial court found that Sawyer’s purpose in searching defendant’s jacket, wallet and car was to identify that substance. His search was not motivated by intent to arrest or to seize evidence. It was motivated by his desire to save defendant’s life.
The final issue is whether Sawyer reasonably suspected that defendant’s car was associated with the emergency and that, by making a warrantless entry, he could
His reasonable suspicion was supported by what he observed when he returned to defendant’s car. When he returned to the car, Sawyer found defendant’s girlfriend trying to unlock it by sliding a coat hanger through the window. Because she was not using a key to open the car, he could reasonably infer that she was trying to get into the car for a purpose other than to drive it away. He could reasonably infer that there was something in the car that she wanted to remove expeditiously. In the light of his observations at the police station, and the fact that he knew she had just seen defendant being arrested next to his car, his suspicion became even more reasonable.
Faced with a true emergency and the need for prompt identification of the drug that defendant had consumed, Sawyer searched the car for information that he believed could save defendant’s fife. His entry into the car was lawful under the “Emergency Aid Doctrine.” The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Notes
The opinion did not discuss the state’s argument that the searches were also valid incident to an arrest.
We also recognize that Miller was decided under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Miller, supra,
See Gallmeyer v. State,
We need not now decide whether the doctrine is applicable to entries made for the purpose of protecting property, as opposed to saving a life.
Defendant presents no cognizable argument that his conviction for driving while suspended should he reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), ORS 475.992, driving under the influence of intoxicants, ORS 813.010, and driving while suspended. ORS 811.175. He assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his car, which resulted in his conviction for possession of cocaine. The majority correctly states that the question is whether that warrantless search was permissible under the “emergency exception” to the warrant requirement. Because I disagree with its conclusion that it was permissible under that exception, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
The trial court found, as the state contended, that the purpose of the search was to find out what substances defendant might have ingested. The evidence supports that finding, and we are bound by it. Ball v. Gladden,
“[W]hen police act in a capacity other than criminal law enforcement, entry into protected areas may only be made pursuant to ‘statutory or other authority from a politically accountable body.’ State v. Bridewell, [306 Or 231 , 239,759 P2d 1054 (1988)]; see also State v. Pidcock,306 Or 335 , 341-42,759 P2d 1092 (1988); Nelson v. Lane County,304 Or 97 , 101-06,743 P2d 692 (1987). Only if that authority exists and if discovery otherwise meets the plain view exception to the warrant requirement is the evidence admissible. Nelson v. Lane County, supra,304 Or at 104 n 5; see also State v. Pidcock, supra. When presented with situations not directly related to a criminal violation investigation, police may still enter protected areas to render aid or assistance, notwithstanding a lack of statutory authority, but, under Article I, section 9, any evidence discovered is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. State v. Bridewell, [306 Or 231 ], 239-40, 759*683 P2d 1054 (1988); see also State v. Okeke,304 Or 367 , 373,745 P2d 418 (1987).”
That statement of the law is a fair summary of State v. Bridewell, supra, and the state accepts it as such. The majority, however, does not. It treats the statements in Bridewell as dicta that we may ignore. In Bridewell, the Supreme Court analyzed the various related exceptions to the warrant requirement that might be applicable in this state: emergency/exigent circumstances; emergency aid doctrine and community caretaking function. Its analysis was relevant to its decision and was intended to articulate the circumstances in which those exceptions apply in Oregon. None of those exceptions applies here. The court recently quoted part of the above quote from State v. Watson, supra, with apparent approval; it held, however, that the law as we stated it was not applicable in that case, because the police allegedly had entered with the consent of the occupant. State v. Paulson,
As indicated, the state accepts our summary of the applicable law in Watson, and it argues that the search in this case is authorized under that statement of the law. It contends that, because defendant was a prisoner who required medical treatment while in custody, Oregon law requires that treatment be provided him. ORS 169.140.
If the state is correct, Sawyer would have been justified in searching, not only defendant’s car, but also any place, including defendant’s home, where evidence that might be helpful in treating defendant might be found. I find no such implied authority under that statute. Accordingly, without
Instead of responding to the state’s only argument in support of the emergency exception, the majority goes off on a frolic of its own and, in modified form, adopts the emergency exception applied in New York and in several other states.
First, it is noteworthy that, in all of the cases cited by the majority,
Second, regardless of whether the Oregon law as enunciated in Bridewell or the majority’s new “rule” is applied, there must be a true emergency. The majority concedes that. The trial court did not expressly conclude that there was a true emergency that could justify Sawyer’s searching defendant’s car. The majority emphasizes that “defendant’s condition was consistent with what Sawyer knew to be the symptoms of cocaine overdose.”
Because Sawyer recognized defendant’s symptoms as relating to cocaine overdose, the record tells us that defendant should have been taken immediately to a hospital or alternative medical aid should have been sought immediately. In that sense, there was no true emergency that justified Sawyer’s search for what he already knew. No one contacted the hospital or any medically trained personnel.
Third, the majority holds that the officer must have “a reasonable basis that approximates ‘reasonable suspicion’ ” to associate the emergency with the place to be searched.
Accordingly, I would conclude that, under Bridewell or under the new test that the majority adopts, Sawyer was not authorized to search defendant’s car.
In the trial court, the state contended, alternatively, that the search can be justified as incident to defendant’s arrest for DUII to search for evidence of that crime and to prevent destruction of the evidence. A search incident to arrest is permissible if it is close in time and space to the arrest and if the intensity of the search is commensurate with the crime. State v. Caraher,
Finally, the state contends, for the first time on appeal, that the search can be justified, because Sawyer had probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime of DUII would be found in defendant’s car and because there were exigent circumstances justifying the failure to obtain a warrant. Probable cause under the Oregon Constitution has both subjective and objective components. State v. Owens, supra,
Furthermore, even if Sawyer had testified that he had probable cause, it is doubtful that the objective component is supported by the record. The burden is on the state to
Because evidence obtained as a result of the search of defendant’s automobile must be suppressed, the conviction for possession of a controlled substance must be reversed. However, I would affirm the conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants. Trial was to the court and the only evidence consisted of police reports, defendant’s driving record and a laboratory report. The trial judge expressly limited his finding of guilt on the DUII charge to the observations of defendant in the police report relating to his arrest at the parking lot. There is no mention of what intoxicant defendant might have ingested. I would also affirm the conviction for driving while suspended, because evidence of defendant’s suspension would inevitably have been discovered by the “proper and predicable investigatory procedure,” State v. Miller,
Accordingly, I dissent only from the affirmance of defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine.
ORS 169.140 provides:
“The keeper of each local correctional facility shall furnish and keep clean the necessary bedding and clothing for all prisoners in the custody of the keeper, and shall supply them with wholesome food, fuel and necessary medical aid.”
Arguably, Gallmeyer v. State,