STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MICHAEL C. FLOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 10CA14
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
Released: January 27, 2011
[Cite as State v. Floyd , 2011-Ohio-558.]
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Michael A. Davenport, Ironton, Ohio, for Appellant.
J.B. Collier, Jr., Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert. C. Anderson, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for Appellee.
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} This is an appеal from a plea entered, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and agreed sentence, in the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, by Appellant, Michael Floyd, to one count of assault on a peace officer, a fourth degree felony, in violation of
{¶2} Because Appellant did not separately argue or brief his first and second purported assignments of error, we decline to address them.
FACTS
{¶3} Appellant was indicted on February 13, 2009, on charges of assault on a peace officer, a fourth degree felony in violation of
{¶4} As a result, at a hearing conducted May 27, 2009, the parties stipulated that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial, but that he was alsо restorable to competency. Subsequently, by order dated June 8, 2009, the trial court ordered that Appellant receive psychiatric stabilization and restoration at Appalachian Bеhavioral Heathcare, a facility operated by the Ohio Department of Mental Heath. On July 27, 2009, Appalachian Behavioral Healthcare, drafted a letter to the trial court stating the Appellant had been restored to competency. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on July 31, 2009, wherein the parties stipulated to Appellant‘s competency based upon the report and the trial court permitted Appellant to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
{¶5} On August 19, 2009, a change of plea and sentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, Appellant waived his right to a trial by jury both in writing and orally on the record. He entered a plea of “Guilty. No contest
{¶6} On March 25, 2010, Appellant filed a motion for leave to file appeal out of time. In the motion, Appellant stated that he suffered from a lifelong mental disability for which he takes prescription medications and that at the time of his sentencing, he had not been receiving his medications in proper dosages or at all. By entry dated May 12, 2010, we granted Appellant’ motion. On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SENTENCE MR. FLOYD WHILE HE WAS PROPERLY MEDICATED AND THUS CAPABLE OF KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVING HIS RIGHTS AND ENTERING A PLEA.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ASCERTAIN THAT MR. FLOYD‘S MEDICATIONS HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY AND CONSISTENTLY ADMINISTERED DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN HIS RETURN TO THE LAWRENCE COUNTY JAIL AND HIS SENTENCING HEARING.
III. AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING, THE APPELLANT WAS NOT CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING THE PROCEEDINGS DUE TO FAILURE OF THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE
ANALYSIS
{¶7} As indicated above, Appellant did not аrgue his first and second assignments separately in his brief, as required by
{¶8} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends that at the time of sentencing, he was not capable of understanding the proceedings due to failure of the responsible authorities to provide his needed psychiatric medications and to schedule his hearing in a timely manner. Specifically, Appellant alleges that he was without his prescription medications for at least five days prior to his plea and sentencing hearing. These prescription medications were ones prescribed in connection with Appеllant‘s restoration to competency, in order to stand trial. As a result, he contends he was in a state of diminished capacity and thought he was pleading to the misdemeanor charge that was dismissed, rather than the felony charge upon which he was ultimately convicted. Thus, Appellant essentially argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights and seeks withdrawal of his plea on that bаsis.
{¶9} Initially, we question whether Appellant can pursue this appeal, considering that that
{¶10} Nonetheless, before reaching the merits of Appеllant‘s assigned error, we also note that Appellant, having never moved for withdrawal of his plea at the trial court level, is challenging the validity of his plea for the first time on appeal. In State v. Sumes, the fifth distriсt court of appeals was confronted with a similar situation, wherein the appellant, having never filed a motion to withdraw his plea at the trial court level, claimed for the first time on appeal that his plea was involuntary. Stark App. No. 2001CA00196, 2002-Ohio-1582. In Sumes, the court stated as follows:
“We note that appellant makes this argument for the first time on appeal. The record and transcript of the plea hearing indicatе that appellant never made any request in the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea prior to or following sentencing as required by
Crim.R. 32.1 . Failure to assert an alleged error in the trial court waives that error on appeal. State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 489 N.E.2d 277.”
{¶11} We are mindful that in other cases, such as State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48 and State v. Ferguson, 108 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-1502, 844 N.E.2d 806, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed requests for withdrawal pleas on appeal, with no apparent request having previously been made at the trial cоurt level. However, we note that in each of those cases, arguments were raised regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, which inquiry involves a separate test that questions whether thе plea would have been made but for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Because ineffective assistance of counsel has not been raised in the present appеal, we find the aforementioned cases to be factually distinguishable, and instead find Sumes to be more factually on point.
{¶12} We also note, for the record, that the only actual evidence Appellant offers in support of his argumеnt that he was without his medication for five days prior to sentencing, is in the form of an Appalachian Behavioral Healthcare Discharge Summary, which appears in the appendix of Apрellant‘s brief. However, we note that this document was not made part of the record below and, had we reached the merits of the
{¶13} In light of the foregoing, Appellant‘s third assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appеllee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose оf a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will tеrminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment Only.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
