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State v. Fisher
574 P.2d 354
Or. Ct. App.
1978
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*1 7, 16, 1977, resentencing February Argued November remanded for 15, reconsideration denied March. OREGON, Respondent, STATE OF FISHER, Appellant. MARILYN K. 8628, (No. 76-3698, CA 76-3697, No. CA 8630) 77-2284, CA 76-3699, CA No. No. consolidated) (Cases P2d 354 [465 ] A. Stephanie Smythe, Defender, Deputy Public Salem, argued cause With her on the appellant. *2 briefs was Babcock, D. Gary Defender, Public Salem.

John W. Burgess, General, Assistant Attorney Salem, him argued the cause for respondent. With on the brief were Redden, James A. General, Attorney and Al J. Laue, General, Solicitor Salem. Schwab,

Before Chief Judge, and Lee and Joseph, Judges.

JOSEPH, J.

JOSEPH, J. of ORS to four violations guilty pled On she 165.013, degree. in the first forgery and of her probation one of the conditions challenges "excessive.” sentence was three-year asserts a involved of checks charges forgery Three of the defendant’s The fourth involved totalling charge $373. totalling of a credit card to charge purchases use stolen claimed that At her sentencing $134.50. of lack of and each situation arose because her to three because of use.1 The court sentenced then her on charge, placed on a check years $33 the two check charges for five on other years years. restitution within four required $340 sus Defendant was subsequently given two-year and was charge sentence on the credit card pended that she restitu pay on on condition placed tion of within four a half years. $134.50 instances in placed probation, which defendant was *3 the court further as a condition of probation that "* * * the Defendant shall consent to the search of may operat-

her she be person, premises, any or vehicle or ing any day night by police at time of the or officer whether probation purpose determining officer for the any drugs possession or not the Defendant has in her any use of drugs.” to submit contends that requirement to warrantless search for "was not drugs related to the offenses she was convicted or to of which and, further, her rehabilitation” the condition un violates her Fourth Amendment right against response reasonable searches. The state has made no 1 sentencing At the counsel said: "* * * primarily I would submit that these are situations that have result, supervision, occurred when she’s not been under and as a in part, due to involvement. It would be Defendant’s recommenda- probationary period tion that the be instituted with strict Defendant, involvement, any drug as far as her as far as * * associates are concerned brief, to these chosen to having contentions its 138.050, cannot, that defendant under argue only ORS a condition of on an after a challenge probation appeal That has never been guilty plea. question squarely court, decided this but we have considered chal- to conditions of where no issue of our lenges probation Fuller, v. so has been raised. See State to do 12 power rev den v. State 152, 1393, (1973); Or 504 P2d App (1973). Allen, rev den 455, 528, 12 Or 506 P2d App Gates, State v. 84, (1962), 230 P2d 605 properly read, would only an where preclude imposition of sentence was suspended probation granted. Whether Gates is still the law is doubtful. See ORS 138.050, 1977, 372, § by Oregon as amended Laws ch State, Stacey 1075, 14. In 569 P2d 640 30 Or App (1977), we held that order is within the probation 138.530(l)(c) meaning of the word "sentence” ORS term, because ORS 138.040 so defined the and we could see no reason to construe the word more narrow- we Similarly, relief ly post-conviction purposes. can see of reviewing no reason our why practice not conditions of in cases such as this should be continued. Culbertson, 369, State v. 563 P2d 29 Or App (1977), we to reconsider the stand- had occasion relationship

ards the Fourth Amendment regulating enunciated in of a and a officer probationer Davis/Travis, rev State v. 412, 496 P2d 9 Or App (1972). In den middle which way for "a searching interests,” by saying, better satisfies all we began "a probationer is a free of all civil person possessed rights those except which are taken from him for away * * *” probationary purposes. say We went on to a court has "the broadest possible to formulate power appropriate case,” conditions in each (emphasis sup- *4 but noted that plied) the discretion is not granted shapeless. to attempt to necessity

In that case there was no that the limits on conditions circumscribe precisely fairly and it cannot be on may imposed probationers, [468] words used here. Culbertson posits be for the authority conditions must aid the objectives of Police officers are supervised probation. not, se, per Moreover, of the part probation process. Culbertson implies that where the conditions diminish constitutionally protected expectations of privacy they should be tested by the necessities making proba- tion effective. The broad terms of the condition here seem not to be in demonstrably aid of probation or required to make probation effective.

It might be argued that the infirmities in the condition imposed here could be met by interpretation, i.e., it should be read ifas it said something like "by police officer called to assist a officer or probation officer.” Such a reading might achieve the court’s intention, actual but to on the place defendant the risk of testing that interpretation would be funda unfair. mentally Justice should not await the event. Recognition of the competing interests the practi cal requirements of supervised could proper ly require consent to searches reasonable furtherance of probation supervision by her probation officer or by a officer police or assisting at acting the request or with the knowledge consent of the probation officer. contends that her three-year sentence

was I, §§ "excessive” under 16,3 Art 152 and Oregon Constitution and ORS 138.050.4 The sentence

2 Const, I, provides: § Or Art punishment "Laws for the of crime shall be founded on reformation, principles justice.” and not of vindictive 3 Const, I, § provides: Art required, imposed. "Excessive bail shall not be nor excessive fines inflicted, penalties punishments Cruel and unusual shall not be but all ** proportioned shall be to the offense judgment pertinent part: provided 138.050 the time of OES at may guilty an pleaded or no contest take "A defendant who has imposes judgment it an excessive from a where conviction * * *” excessive, punishment. fine or cruel unusual *5 was within au five-year the maximum sentence thorized find "exces nothing under ORS 165.013. We sive” about it.5 resentencing.

Remanded for LEE, J., dissenting.

At the argued time of sentencing, were drugs of the reason the offenses had been part committed and the court close urged require of the defendant’s own conten- supervision. light tions that lack of use precipi- crimes, tated her condition of the warrantless search was, the sentence related to my opinion, the reformation of defendant and the of the protection Mason, so we v. 5 Cal public, People should affirm. Cf. 759, 762, (1971), 3rd 97 Cal 488 P2d 630 Reptr (1972), cert den 405 US 1016 in which a condition of offender to "submit his probation requiring narcotics residence, vehicle, of to search and person, place seizure at time with or without any day night, warrant, do so the search whenever to requested officer” was Probation Officer or law enforcement Culbertson, held valid. We went too far State (1977). 563 P2d 1224 App I find remanded no reason this case should be why for resentencing. concerning imposing propriety the No issue is raised on this express opinion imprisonment, we to follow a term of no question.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Fisher
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Oregon
Date Published: Feb 7, 1978
Citation: 574 P.2d 354
Docket Number: 76-3697, CA 8627, 76-3698, CA 8628, 76-3699, CA 8629, 77-2284, CA 8630
Court Abbreviation: Or. Ct. App.
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