State v. FinnegeanState v. Finnegean
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Ladd
In the count charging embezzlement, it seems to have been necessary to include the allegation that the property had been stolen, apparently for that the act of Parliament, in creating the offense, designated it as larceny. Com. v. Pratt, 132 Mass. 246; State v. Fricker, 45 La. Ann. 646 (12 South. Rep. 755). This did not relieve the pleader, however, from stating the facts constituting embezzlement; and, in the absence of a statute authorizing conviction under indictment for larceny, the courts have generally, held that the facts constituting the crime must be stated with such particularity as to identify it under the statute defining embezzlement. “Bishop on Statutory Crimes, section 422. But in England, as well as in many of the States of this country, legislation has put the bailee in possession in the same attitude as servants having the naked custody of property, and authorized conviction under a charge of larceny. Bishop, Statutory Crimes, section 420. But in Texas, where the Constitution confers the right “ to demand the nature and cause of the accusation,” such a statute was condemned as an invasion of the fundamental law. Huntsman v. State, 12 Tex. App. 619. See also, Hall v. State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 125. These decisions are in point, as section 5282 of the Code contains a like provision. To constitute larceny, a trespass is essential, while in embezzlement this is not necessary, but a fiduciary relation must *290be shown. Were the only difference the absence of the element of trespass in embezzlement, it might be included in larceny; but in its stead is that of the trust relation under which possession of the property is obtained, and this clearly distinguished the two crimes as distinct and separate. The charge of one ordinarily cannot be sustained by proof sufficient to convict of the other. People v. DeCoursey, 61 Cal. 134, is directly in point. The statute of that State prohibits charging more than one offense in the same indictment; and the court, in holding these might not be so included, declared that “ the,two crim‘es are in their nature essentially different, and dependent on different facts.” See State v. McFarland, 49 Iowa, 99; State v. McCormack, 56 Iowa, 585; State v. Terrill, 76 Iowa, 149. We think that the crimes of embezzlement and larceny are so different in their character that they should be treated in an indictment as distinct and separate offenses. It follows that the State ought to have been required to elect ‘upon which count it would proceed.
Owing to the error mentioned, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.