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State v. Fillman
223 P.3d 827
Kan. Ct. App.
2010
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*1 (223 827) P.3d 100,075 No. Barry Kansas, Fillman,

State of P. Appellee, Appellant. *2 filed 2010. Opinion January Office, Folsom, III, Kansas Defender

Carl Appellate appellant. Foulston, district Ñola Tedesco district at- Matt assistant attorney, Maloney, J. Six, and Steve attorney torney, general, appellee. Caplinger, Standridge, Buser and Before P.J., JJ. P. Fillman was convicted of two counts Standridge, Barry J.: assault and one count of This is aggravated aggravated battery.

his direct appeal.

Facts 3,2007, On to an amended January pursuant complaint, alia, was inter with two counts of charged, committing aggravated assault and one count of These were aggravated battery. based on an incident at Gannon’s taking place Tammy apartment 28, 2006, on where Fillman .22 fired a caliber rifle at September times, Gannon three her once and her hitting intentionally missing 2, 2006, twice. On October arrested Fillman. police During arrest, discovered that Fillman two flaskscontain- police possessed fuses, a tin can that was ing explosive powder protruding like a in blue with a shaped hockey puck wrapped tape pro- fuse, ammunition, of .22 caliber and a .22 caliber truding bag Fillmаn, (10th rifle. See United 2009 WL 1164731 States Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion).

Prior to his trial on the assault and jury aggravated Fillman was and convicted in the United battery charges, charged States District Court for the District of Kansas of two counts of destructive device and three counts of possessing unregistered (found a felon in of a firearm and ammunition being possession him and used at Gannon’s Each of the five counts for apartment). which he was convicted carried a maximum sentence of statutory 924(a)(2) (2006); See 18 U.S.C. 26 U.S.C. years’ imprisonment. § §

Fillman’s reflected that his total presentence investigation report offense level under the federal was 38 and sentencing guidelines III, that his criminal was fed- history category making advisory eral 292 to 365 months’ sentencing guideline range imprisonment. level, the offense services officer calculating pretrial assigned to Fillman’s case took into account that Fillman unlawfully pos- sessed the firearm in with an assault and conjunction Gannon. Pursuant to the United States aggravated battery upon (USSG) Commission Guidelines 2K2.1(b)(6) Manual Sentencing *3 (2003), these circumstances added four levels to the attenuating total (2006). offense level. See 18 U.S.C. On July Fillman was sentenced to a term of 292 months’ im- controlling His convictions and sentence were later affirmed on prisonment. Fillman, See 2009 WL 1164731. appeal.

After sentence, he received his federal Fillman filed a motion in district court to dismiss the state assault and aggravated motion, him. In of this aggravated battery pending against support Fillman maintained he had been for these already prosecuted par- ticular crimes when the federal court relied on them to enhance his total offense level at facts, Based on these Fillman sentencing. 21-3108(3)(a) that K.S.A. the State from argued prohibited pros- him. The district motion, court denied Fillman’s ecuting holding that because the elements of the federal crimes and state crimes different, 21-3108(3)(a) were K.S.A. did not bar the State from its case Fillman. pursuing against

A convicted Fillman of two counts of jury ultimately aggravated assault, 21-3410(a), K.S.A. and one count of aggravated battery, 21-3414(a)(2)(B). K.S.A. trial, filed a motion for a new within which he raised his that K.S.A. 21- again argument 3108(3) (a) the State from him. The district prohibited prosecuting court denied thе motion and sentenced Fillman to a controlling 29-month sentence. The district court ordered Fillman’s prison state sentence to run concurrent with his federal sentence.

Analysis (1) Fillman raises three of error on The district points appeal: court erred to dismiss the assault and fading aggravated aggra- vated him based on tire battery charges against previous prosecu- court; (2) tion in federal the two convictions of (3) Gannon were ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍the district court erred upon multiplicitous; him ato based sentence on a criminal highеr history that was not to the a reasonable doubt. We proved jury beyond address each of these in turn. points I. Previous Prosecution 21-3108(3)(a), on K.S.A. Fdlman the district

Relying argues court erred when it did not dismiss the assault and him based on the aggravated battery charges against previous pros- ecution in federal court. Whether the district court erred apply- 21-3108(3)(a) to the facts of this case raises a ing question law Schroeder, to unlimited review. See State v. 279 Kan. subject 104, 108, 105 P.3d 1237 matter,

As a we note that Fillman relies preliminary exclusively on K.S.A. and not on the federal or state constitu- tional his guarantees against support argument end, on this issue. To that we find it particular helpful distinguish between the two before Fillman’s concepts addressing argument.

The Double Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Jeopardy United (1) States Constitution a second protects against prosecu tion for the same (2) offense after a second acquittal, *4 for the conviction, (3) same offense after and multiple punishments See, for the same Schoonover, offense. 453, State v. 281 Kan. e.g., 463, (2006) 133 Pearce, P.3d 48 Nоrth Carolina v. 395 U.S. (citing 711, 717, 656, 23 L. [1969], Ed. 2d 89 S. Ct. 2072 overruled on other Smith, 794, 104 865, Alabama v. 490 U.S. L. Ed. 2d grounds [1989]). 109 S. Ct. 2201 The Kansas Court Supreme has.recog nized that the of the Fifth Amendment to the United language States Constitution no double guarantees greater jeopardy protec tion to an than accused does 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill words, in other are coextensive. See Rights; provisions Schoonover, 474; 324, 281 Kan. at State 271 Kan. Thompkins, 248 Williams, State v. 1, 6, (2001); 268 Kan. 988 P.2d 21 P.3d (1999). the United States Court has determined that

Notably, Supreme not the Fifth Amendment does prohibition against for the same crime apply by separate sovereignties. prosecutions Alabama, See Heath v. 82, 87-89, 474 U.S. 88 L. Ed. 2d said, (1985). S. Ct. 433 With that the Kansas enacted Legislature federal and state statute specifically prohibiting prosecutions crime certain circumstances. See K.S.A. 21- same under 3108(3). states, That statute pertinent part; “A is barred if the defendant was in a district formerly prosecution prosecuted court of the United in a court of of a or States or sister state jurisdiction general in the court of of this state for a crime which is within the municipal any city statе, concurrent if of this such former jurisdiction prosecution: “(a) Resulted either a conviction or an and the acquittal, subsequent prose- conduct, cution is for the same unless each prosecution requires proof of fact in the other or the offense was not consummated when prosecution, added.) 21-3108(3)(a). the former trial began.” (Emphasis 21-3108(3)(a)

To determine whether K.S.A. the State prevents from a defendant who has been pursuing charges against previously our Court has prosecuted by government, Supreme stated that where statute an one offense factual describing requires not, elements that another statute does “then the offenses are not same, and a conviction or under one does not bar acquittal under the other on the of double ground jeopardy.” Worth, State v. 393, 398, 217 Kan. 537 P.2d 191 Worth, the defendant was convicted in federal previously firearm, court of unlawful of a unlawful transfer of a possession firearm, a false statement in the unlawfully making purchase that had been explosives, unlawfully explosive receiving in interstate commerce. The defendant transported subsequently was convicted state ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍court for the sale of cocaine charged from the same incident. The defendant arising underlying argued that K.S.A. the State from appeal prevented pur- its case him because of his convictions in suing against previous federal Our court. Court defendant’s rejected argu- ment, that the federal factual elements not noting *5 in the state and vice versa. The court held that required did not the State from prevent prosecuting the defendant cocaine. 217 Kan. at 397-98. selling

The State contends Worth is on with the facts precisely point in this case. the State out that Fill- presented Specifically, points man was convicted in federal court of two counts of possessing destructive device and three counts of a felon unregistered being of a firearm and ammunition. The State further possession points that assault, out Fillman was in state court with charged which is defined as using deadly weapon intentionally place another in reasonable of immediate person apprehension bodily harm, and which is defined as aggravated battery, intentionally harm to another or causing great bodily person disfigurement that, another The State concludes like the facts in person. just Worth, the federal of Fillman factual ele- required ments to be that were not in his state proved prosecution, and his state factual elements to be prosecution required proved that were not in his federal prosecution. Worth, both the acknowledges analysis holding Nevertheless, Fillman maintains that when his were used thе federal court to aggravated battery charges enhance the base offense level for those purposes sentencing, crimes became facts the elements of his firearm con- constituting victions We prosecution. disagree.

The United States Court has held that the facts con the elements of a crime are those that increase the max stituting imum to which the defendant is under punishment exposed gov v. New law. See 466, 490, 147 530 U.S. Apprendi Jersey, L. erning 435, 120 Ed. 2d S. Ct. 2348 The Court’s was based holding deductive A crime is defined as conduct simplе reasoning. the State. Conduct is the State when punishable by punishable by it the individual Therefore, to new or additional exposes penalties. conduct that increases the maximum to which he any punishment or she is otherwise must be deemed a crime. The exposed predicate “ ” facts of such conduct constitute the ‘elements’ of the “crime.” States, v. United 530 U.S. at 483 Apprendi, n.10 (citing Jones *6 311, [1999]); 227, 244-48, 119 Ct. 1215 143 L. Ed. 2d S. see U.S. (Thomas, at 500-01 530 U.S. also J., concurring). Apprendi, (to the relevant determine if Based these principles, inquiry of a base level offense constitute facts enhаncement supporting crime) whether those facts the defendant elements of a expose authorized a than the maximum to punishment greater punishment relevant to the en- verdict. Where the facts jury’s guilty tire maximum not have the effect of hancement do pun- increasing the facts do not which the defendant is con- ishment to exposed, a crime under the rationale. stitute elements of Apprendi Fill- In determine the maximum to which order to punishment convictions, we turn to man as a result of his federal was exposed Boоker, 543 U.S. 160 L. Ed. 2d of United States v. case (2005). Booker, 738 In the United States 125 S. Ct. maximum set forth in the federal Court held that the punishments were no but mandatory, only advisory; sentencing guidelines longer thus, the United courts would now be to look to States to determine the maximum Code punishment particular in crime. See 543 U.S. at 246-68. Booker holding Applying then, here, assault and did not be aggravated battery elements of the federal convictions come necessary against to which Fillman was unless the maximum exposed punishment exceeded the maximum a result of his federаl convictions statutory in sentence set forth the United States Code. the facts and the

At this we find a brief review of both point, in Booker instructive. Booker was arrested after of- holding police in duffle He later ficers found 92.5 of crack cocaine his grams bag. in which he admitted to a written statement to the gave police crack cocaine. A an additional 566 ultimately grams jury selling to distribute at found Booker with an intent guilty possessing 841(b)(l)(A)(iii) least 50 of crack cocaine. U.S.C. pro- grams with vided for a minimum sentence of statutory yeаrs prison a maximum sentence of life. statute, set forth

Notwithstanding sentencing range federal at that time were impose punishment judges forth within the of sentences set range sentences, In range calculating applicable guidelines. take into account both the seriousness of the offense guidelines and the offender’s criminal Each of crime is history. type assigned level, a base offense which is the starting point determining seriousness of a offense. addition to base offense lev- particular els, each offense it carries with a number of type typically specific offense These characteristics. characteristics from offense to vary offense work increase or decrease the base offense level and, the sentence an offender receives. ultimately,

At Booker’s found sentencing, judge by preponderance (1) the evidence that Booker distributed 566 over and above grams the 92.5 that the had to have found in order to return grams jury (2) verdict and Booker had obstructed Under the guilty justice. *7 federal this factuаl the mandatory sentencing guidelines, by finding increased base Booker’s offense level from to32 which ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍judge increased his sentence from a (21 maximum 262 of months years, months) 10 to a 30of to life. range years

Booker vi- appealed, arguing sentencing guidelines olated his to a trial. More Booker right jury specifically, alleged that the an increase in his base offense level guidelines required and an thus in enhancement the based on facts sentencing range, determined a rather a than a by sentencing judge jury. compre- hensive the United States Court two-part opinion, agreed with Booker. In the first of the the Court held that part opinion, it was unconstitutional to use fact to enhance a base offense any level, and thus the under the federal sentencing range, sentencing unless that fact was to a guidelines reasonable proven juiy beyond doubt. In the second of the the Court part opinion, provided for these unconstitutional enhancements the remedy by deeming nature, federal in be sentencing guidelines advisory opposed 543 See U.S. at 245-68. mandаtory. The fact the that federal are now sentencing guidelines only means that the maximum to which a defend- advisory punishment ant is under law is no number exposed governing longer high in the base Instead, under the sentencing range guidelines. maximum to which a defendant is nowis punishment exposed maximum sentence in the section prescribed applicable United States Code.

252 case, court’s consideration die federal

In Fillman’s aggravated increased sentence of resulted and assault battery aggravated federal under months’ 292 advisory imprisonment however, 292 did not months imposed Notably, guidelines. sentence the maximum exceed imprisonment statutory 50-years’ United States Code. section applicable prescribed 26 each 924(a)(2); U.S.C. 5871 18 U.S.C. See (establishing § carried maxi- Fillman was convicted five for which of die counts maxi- of 10 sentence mum making years’ imprisonment, statutory mum sentence years). exceed the sentence did not 292-month federal

Because the of 50 sentence maximum aggravated years’imprisonment, statutory elements did not become assault necessary battery aggravated (facts U.S. at convictions. See of the federal Apprendi, those that increase maximum elements of crime are constituting law). under to which defendant governing exposed punishment not become did Because assault battery aggravated convictions, the federal of the federal elements prose- necessaiy state factual elements cution prose- such, 21-3108(3)(a) does not K.S.A. bar and vice versa. As cution Fillman for subsequent against prosecution court. state See and aggravated battery in federal barred if defendant formerly prosecuted (prosecution conviction, and state court, resulted in federal prose- conduct, is for “unless each cution same proof prosecution requires *8 fact in the other of a not prosecution”).

II. Multiplicity two that his convictions

Fillman argues he did Gannon were acknowledges multiplicitous. upon Nonetheless, he issue at trial. raise the properly multiplicity issues raised courts consider *9 Gannon found to Gannon’s bedroom. then went Fillman sleep Fillman’s hid in her couch and the under her purse. pistol pistol he to leave. and him that needed Fillman told then woke She up looked underneath his he While was up things, gathering was there. Fillman that his no and discovered the couch longer gun was, like she did and Gannon acted Gannon where the asked gun walked out was about. Fillman know what he eventually talking rifle, a .22 walked back into his vehicle where he to apart- got to his ment, Gannon what resumed and then asking happened Fillman, Gannon, he a while fired to questioning pistol. According to her attention” because a inside the shot at wall “get apartment to inside the was he Gannon grab pistol. purse thought reaching Then, later, at the wall when he he fired another shot 10 minutes a second time. Gan- was for the Gannon reaching pistol thought incident, son, at the time of the was non’s who inside apartment the shots were minutes. about 10 also stated that separated facts, the Schoonover factors two to we find these sep- Applying As first to the fac- acts inside Gannon’s arate occurred apartment. were Given tor, into the wall 10 minutes the two shots fired apart. of assault between was no other conduct there charge supporting shot, we not believe the evidence second do the first and clearly at or the other whether the conduct occurred one establishes way factor, however, the facts the same time. As the second or near at the same two fired into the wall occurred that the shots establish location. factors, that was an we find there

As to the third and fourth shot that there the first and second event between intervening shot into wall. fresh which motivated second was a impulse fired that Fillman the evidence demonstrates More specifically, for he Gannon was first shot into the wall when believed reaching then, time A 10-minute according passed pistol. period Fillman, time. a second reached Gannon pistol allegedly a fresh mo- there was that These facts impulse finding support the wall— times he shot into Fillman for each of two tivating two was Fillman’s belief Gannon sep- pistol reaching 10 minutes arate occasions apart. *10 factors, the four Schoonover we conclude Fillman’s balancing

two convictions of did not arise from the same conduct; thus, his convictions were not See also multiplicitous. Hawkins, 10, 17-18, 188 State v. 40 Kan. 2d (2008), P.3d 965 App. (2009) (defendant’s rev. denied 287 Kan. 767 convictions of aggra vated assault and assault of law enforcement officer were not fact that both crimes involved same multiplicitous despite victim; defendant shot at victim to victim ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍himself prior identifying officer; as defendant later acted like he was to shoot police going at victim victim while chase and identified himself as gave police officer).

III. Criminal History Fillman contends the district court erred

Finally, him to a sentence based a criminal that was not higher history to a a reasonable doubt. Fillman proved concedes that jury beyond our Court has this in State v. Supreme rejected argument Ivory, 44, 41 (2002). 273 Kan. P.3d 781 This court is bound to follow duty Court absent some indication the court de Supreme precedent, from its Merrills, State v. 37 Kan. parting previous position. App. 81, 83, 149 869, 2d P.3d (2007). rev. denied 284 Kan. 949 Because our Court has followed its consistendy position Ivory, this court is unable to Fillman relief on this issue. See State grant Brinklow, 288 Kan. 200 P.3d 1225 ¶Syl.

Affirmed.

# # * I with concur decision J., concurring: majority’s Cаplinger, However, Fillman’s convictions. I with the ma- affirming disagree rationale Fillman’s double jority’s rejecting jeopardy challenge and, with the failure to its extension specifically, majority’s explain of the 21-3108(3)(a) K.S.A. to sentenc- protection provided by of a former ing phase “prosecution.” notes, As the the Double Clause the Fifth majority Jeopardy Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against for the same offense well as second multiple punishments pros- ecutions for the same offense after cоnviction or Slip acquittal. op. Further, Bill the Kansas Constitution guar-

at 5. Rights either If Fillman were same antees the relying upon protection. his double to or state Constitution our federal jeopardy support claim, of the extended discussion sentencing phase majority’s be Fillman’s federal appropriate. prosecution might

However, because the Fifth Amend- as the majority recognizes, does ment pros- apply jeopardy prohibition against the same crime ecutions for sovereignties, by separate fоr his double as the basis must rely upon discuss then claim. The extensively majority proceeds *11 and whether the facts supporting process of constituted elements level offense enhancement Fillman’s base I believe It is at this that a crime in his federal point prosecution. an the overlooks issue the scope regarding majority’s analysis claim. of Fillman’s statute which is our dispositive in 21-3108(3)(a) relevant K.S.A. provides part: in a if district the defendant was prosecuted “A barred formerly prosecution the a crime which is within concurrent of the United States ... for juris- court state, if of this such former diction prosecution: “(a) and the prose- in either a conviction or subsequent Resulted acquittal, conduct, of a fact is for the same unless each requires proof cution prosecution added.) in the other not prosecution.” (Emphasis required that the term refers The assumes “prosecution” majority simply if we were the a federal to Again, sentencing phase prosecution. of the federal Constitution the Double Clause Jeopardy applying be аccurate. How- that or its Kansas might counterpart, assumption 21-3108(3)(a) ever, and we concerned here with are only in K.S.A.2008 as used that statute. the term Supp. “prosecution,” “all 21-3110(18) defines proceedings by “prosecution” legal an in- is determined.” Once which a crime person’s liability crime, that crime of a dividual has been convicted liability determined, has not. has been although punishment 21-3108(3)(a) when the does bar That K.S.A. not prosecution of a former at issue was used conduct only sentencing phase It of the statute. does seеms evident from language prosecution aof fact if “each not bar proof prosecution requires This does in the other not clearly prosecution.” provision required when the conduct at issue was not to be apply proven court, federal as was case here. And in that I would find it in the regard, unnecessary engage as to whether the facts majority’s lengthy analysis constituting elements of the crime increased the maximum federal punishment to which Fillman out, was As the exposed. majority points United States Court has hеld that the “facts” constituting a crime are those that increase the maximum to which punishment the defendant is under law. v. New exposed Apprendi governing 530 U.S. 147 L. Ed. 2d 120 S. Ct. 2348 Jersey, However, the does not state the majority fully holding Apprendi, i.e., conviction, than other the fact aof fact that prior any increases the for crime penalty beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a a rea- jury, proved beyond sonable doubt. U.S. at 490. if the facts related Fillman’s conduct had increased

Clearly, his in the maximum, federal case penаlty beyond statutory those facts would have been submitted to a jury proven beyond case, reasonable doubt. had ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍And that been the then would only we consider the of K.S.A. and determine application whether each a fact not prosecution required proof the other prosecution.

Thus, I would find that the federal court’s use of Fillman’s simply *12 conduct to enhance his sentence in federal court was underlying not a 21-3108(3)(a). “prosecution” contemplated notes our multiplicity appellate the of or time оn to serve ends for the first prevent justice appeal Simmons, See, 282 State a denial of a fundamental right. e.g., 728, 743, 148 (2006). are mul 525 Whether convictions P.3d Kan. to unlimited review. Schoon law is a subject tiplicitous question over, 281 at 462. Kan. 253 is of a offense in several counts Multiplicity single charging or a information. create a complaint Multiplicitous charges po- tential for for one offense. Such mul- multiple punishments single are the Double Clause tiple prohibited punishments Jeopardy of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of State v. 284 Rights. Conway, 37, 54, Kan. P.3d Schoonover, our Court established an analytical framework for issues. The court stated: determining multiplicity issue, “In a double is analyzing jeopardy whether the overarching inquiry convictions are for the same offense. There are two to this components inquiry, (1) both of which must be met there to be a double violation: Do jeopardy (2) the convictions arise from the same conduct? and definition are By statutory there two offenses or one? Under the the conduct only component, is first if discrete, e., i. committed and do separately severally, convictions not arisefrom the same is no there violation. If the arise jeopardy offense transaction, from same or act the conduct is and the second unitary component must be to see if the convictions arise from the analyzed same offense. Under the second it be must determined whether component, the convictions from arise a statute or from statutes. If single the double issue multiple arises from jeopardy statute, convictiоns for violations of multiple the unit of test single is If the double applied. issue arises from convictions of differ- multiple statutes, ent issue, in other it words is a multiple description same-elements added.) test is applied.” Kan. 15. (Emphasis Syl. ¶ issue, With to the first whether regard parties dispute course of conduct Fillman s two convictions for supporting aggra- vated assault were of the same act or were actions. part separate Schoonover identified four factors to be considered in resolving this dispute: “(1) [Wjhether time; (2) acts оccur at or near the same whether the acts occur location; (3) acts, at same whether there is a causal between the relationship event; (4) whether particular there was an and whether intervening there fresh some the conduct.” 281 at impulse Kan. 497. motivating factors, In order to consider these we find it properly necessary to review the evidence at trial to the two counts presented support summarized, assault. the evidence Highly presented at trial establishes that Fillman inside Gannon’s brought pistol it underneath her couch her room. apartment placed living

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Fillman
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Kansas
Date Published: Jan 29, 2010
Citation: 223 P.3d 827
Docket Number: 100,075
Court Abbreviation: Kan. Ct. App.
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