STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. William Leroy FIELDS, Respondent.
No. A04-2474.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
May 3, 2007.
777 N.W.2d 777
Holker shall comply with the notice requirements of Rule 26, RLPR; - Holker shall pay to the director $900 in costs and disbursements, pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR; and
- If Holker seeks reinstatement, he shall also comply in all respects with Rule 18, RLPR.
So ordered.
ANDERSON, G. BARRY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Marie L. Wolf, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for respondent.
OPINION
MEYER, Justice.
In 2004, a jury in Otter Tail County convicted respondent William Leroy Fields of criminal sexual conduct for raping K.W. in the summer of 1997. In an unpublished decision, a divided panel of the court of appeals held that the prosecutor‘s inquiry into a theft by Fields, an incident unrelated to the rape and not resulting in a conviction, constituted error because the prosecutor did not comply with the procedures for the use of Spreigl evidence. State v. Fields, No. A04-2474, 2006 WL 463524, at *4 (Minn.App. Feb.28, 2006). The court of appeals failed to consider whether the inquiry was admissible under
In 1997, Fields and J.F., his wife, lived in a trailer home on a dairy farm in Otter Tail County with their two daughters. J.F. is the older sister of K.W. In March 1997, K.W., her mother, and a younger sister moved to Minnesota so K.W. could receive treatment for scoliosis from a hospital in Minneapolis. They initially resided with the Fields family. Fields was 25 years old, and K.W. was 11 years old.
K.W. testified that, about one month after she moved into the trailer home, Fields began making suggestive remarks to her and touching her in a sexual manner. She also stated that he engaged in “dirty talk,” describing sexual things he wanted to do to her. K.W. testified that one day, most likely in spring 1997, Fields lured her into his bedroom, shut the door, and raped her. K.W. said that after the rape was completed, Fields threatened her, telling her to act like nothing had happened or her family would be thrown out of the trailer and “something else” would happen. She said she thereafter avoided being alone with Fields and that the inappropriate touching and comments came to an end.
K.W. had surgery on her back in August 1997. By the time K.W. left the hospital, her family was no longer living with the Fields family. Following the summer of
K.W. did not tell anyone about the rape or Fields’ sexual advances for several years. She testified that she first mentioned Fields’ sexual misconduct in 2001, when she told her aunt, T.W., that Fields had said inappropriate things. K.W. said she first mentioned the rape in September 2003 when she told her mother. While K.W. had remained silent in part so that she could continue to have a relationship with Fields’ children, K.W.‘s nieces, K.W. decided to come forward because she was concerned about the quiet and moody behavior of one of Fields’ daughters. K.W. believed that the behavior of Fields’ daughter mirrored her own behavior following the rape. K.W.‘s mother called the police to report the crime.
A police detective interviewed K.W. on September 16, 2003. K.W. initially told the detective that Fields had touched her in a sexual manner and said inappropriate things, but did not reveal the rape. After discussing this interview with K.W.‘s mother, the detective conducted a second interview, and K.W. revealed that Fields had raped her. The detective explained at trial that victims of sex crimes “don‘t necessarily want to disclose all the information, sometimes for years, sometimes not on the first interview.”
T.W. confirmed that K.W. told her about the inappropriate touching and sexual comments in July or August of 2001. She also stated that K.W. had mentioned inappropriate comments by Fields before that time. She testified that K.W. was reluctant to talk about the issue because she was worried about her family being able to see her nieces, Fields’ daughters. T.W. also indicated that Fields had in the past directed sexually suggestive remarks at her and at K.W.‘s mother.
K.W.‘s mother testified that in July 2001 she learned of K.W.‘s revelations to T.W. and that K.W. denied them when questioned. K.W.‘s mother also stated that K.W. later admitted that the revelations to T.W. in the summer of 2001 were true. K.W.‘s mother confirmed that K.W. told her of the rape in September 2003.
Fields’ wife, J.F., testified that in 1997 she did not have a driver‘s license and was nearly always in and around the trailer home, and that this made it very unlikely that the rape could have occurred as K.W. described it. She also described several instances when she believed that K.W. had lied. She admitted that Fields sometimes made sexual comments to T.W. and to K.W.‘s mother.
Fields testified in his defense, denying the rape occurred. Fields stated that his work schedule and the presence of others living in the trailer would have made it very difficult for the incident to have happened as K.W. described. Fields said that K.W. did not appear uncomfortable in his presence and did not try to avoid him. He admitted that he had made sexual comments to T.W. and to K.W.‘s mother.
During cross-examination of Fields, the prosecutor inquired about an incident when Fields was “in trouble basically for stealing from an employer.” Fields admitted the theft and conceded that he “went to court for that.” No objection was made to the state‘s questions. Shortly after this inquiry, the district court instructed the jury sua sponte:
[T]he State has just introduced evidence of an occurrence at an earlier date * * * This evidence was offered for the limited purpose of assisting you in determining whether the Defendant, Mr. Fields, committed those acts with which he is charged in the Complaint I have
read to you in this courtroom. Mr. Fields is not being tried for, and may not be convicted of, any offense other than * * * the offenses charged in the Complaint. You are instructed specifically that you are not to convict Mr. Fields on the basis of any occurrence on an earlier date * * *.
Later, when discussing jury instructions, Fields’ counsel stated that the court
quite appropriately read the * * * limiting instruction when a prior criminal conviction is made reference to in the court, and I‘d ask the Court to consider including that also now in the final jury instructions. I wasn‘t really anticipating that. I certainly understand that once my client took the stand, that was fair game; but now that it has become a part of the trial, I‘d ask the Court to include the jury instruction that you read as a part of the written instructions that we‘re going to provide to the jury.
In response to a follow-up question from the court, the prosecutor stated: “I don‘t believe there was a true conviction. I believe he acknowledged that he had been in trouble with the law * * *” Fields’ counsel then stated that “the tenor of the * * * comments went to the fact that he had acknowledged that he was convicted of the offense.” The court ultimately instructed the jury to “be careful to consider any previous conviction only as it may affect the weight of [Fields‘] testimony. You must not consider any previous conviction as evidence of guilt of the offense for which [Fields] is on trial here.”
In addition, the prosecutor requested that the jury be instructed that K.W.‘s testimony need not be corroborated. While Fields’ counsel objected to the instruction as unnecessary and prejudicial, the court instructed the jury that “the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.” In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury of this instruction.
The jury convicted Fields of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of
On appeal to the court of appeals, Fields argued that the state‘s inquiry into the theft incident was improper, that it was error to instruct the jury that the victim‘s testimony need not be corroborated, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for witnesses and misstating the burden of proof during closing argument. The court of appeals agreed and reversed because it deemed the combined effect of multiple errors to have been prejudicial. Fields, 2006 WL 463524, at *7-8. The state sought review by this court, asserting that the inquiry into the theft was permissible for impeachment purposes under
I.
The first question we address is whether the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting evidence of Fields’ theft without having first satisfied substantive and procedural requirements for the admission of that evidence. Fields asserts that the state failed to meet these requirements, and that its failure amounted to
We have recently considered the principles that guide our inquiry when a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is asserted. The prosecutor is an officer of the court charged with the affirmative obligation to achieve justice and fair adjudication, not merely convictions. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn.2006). Generally, a prosecutor‘s acts may constitute misconduct if they have the effect of materially undermining the fairness of a trial. Id. Also, misconduct results from violations of clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state‘s case law. See id. at 301 (stating “[w]e expect that prosecutors, as well as defense counsel, are aware of our case law proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct prescribed by the ABA” and stressing impropriety of engaging in “clearly proscribed conduct“). Further, we have held that attempting to elicit or actually eliciting clearly inadmissible evidence may constitute misconduct.1 See State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544-45, 549 (Minn.1994).
Ordinarily, evidence of other crimes or prior bad acts of a defendant is not admissible to show behavior consistent with the character of that defendant. State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Minn.1991); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). However, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Accordingly, if it is clear that evidence of Fields’ theft was not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness as required by
In this case, the state elicited the following testimony during cross-examination of Fields:
Q: All right. Now, I mean, in your past, Mr. Fields, there‘s been times that you haven‘t been necessarily honest. Would you say that?
A: To a certain extent.
Q: And specifically, I‘m just talking about a time in the state of Georgia when, I believe, you were in trouble basically for stealing from an employer. Do you recall that?
A: Yeah. But I didn‘t lie about it.
Q: But you took from the employer.
A: Yeah.
Q: When was that exactly?
A: Ninety-six I think it was maybe.
Q: And you went to court for that and that—at that time?
A: Uh-huh.
Fields did not object to this line of questioning, but on appeal asserts that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting this evidence without giving notice of its intent to do so. The state counters that the prior theft was admissible as evidence of prior bad acts for impeachment purposes under
We first consider whether the defendant has demonstrated that the prosecutor erred by attempting to introduce evidence that was clearly inadmissible as substantive evidence. Because Fields did not object, we review the alleged misconduct under a plain error standard. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. At the time of Fields’ trial,
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness‘[s] credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness‘[s] character for truthfulness or untruthfulness * * *.
The rule requires that the conduct at issue be “probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” We have held that evidence of commission of a theft, while not directly involving false statement or dishonesty, may be admitted in the discretion of the district court as evidence of truthfulness or untruthfulness. See State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 359, 367-68 (Minn.1980) (holding admission of evidence of auto theft not resulting in a conviction was proper under
We next consider whether the prosecutor erred by attempting to circumvent clearly established procedural rules for the admission of
[T]he prosecutor in a criminal case generally may not cross-examine a defendant or defense witness pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 608(b) about prior misconduct unless (a) the prosecutor has given the defense notice of intent to cross-examine pursuant to the rule, (b) the prosecutor is able to provide the trial court with sufficient evidentiary support justifying the cross-examination, and (c) the prosecutor establishes that
the probative value of the cross-examination outweighs its potential for creating unfair prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Fallin, 540 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn.1995). Fields asserts that our holding in Fallin requires the state to not only give notice of its intent to cross-examine a defendant under
While Fallin describes the “proper approach” for using
We caution prosecutors that we do not approve of either the prosecutor‘s actions in this case or failure to follow our recommendations more generally, even when such a failure falls short of misconduct. In addition, since Fields’ trial,
“Erroneous jury instructions merit a new trial if it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict.” State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425, 433 (Minn.2006) (quotation omitted). Assuming, without deciding, that the district court erred in giving the instruction on victim testimony corroboration, it is clear that inclusion of the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We find it significant that the instruction was merely unnecessary rather than an inaccurate statement of law. See State v. Green, 719 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Minn.2006). The instruction did not under any circumstances mandate that the jury draw any particular inference, and the parties were free to argue for any conclusion they pleased. Moreover, the instruction was not given undue emphasis, as the prosecutor mentioned the instruction a single time. See State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn.1992) (indicating that the prosecutor‘s closing argument will be considered in determining the impact of an erroneous instruction on the verdict). Finally, the jury was instructed properly on burden of proof and presumption of innocence, and we generally assume that the jurors have followed the court‘s instructions. See, e.g., State v. Steward, 645 N.W.2d 115, 122 (Minn.2002). Therefore, we conclude that the instruction did not have any significant impact on the jury‘s verdict.
III.
Fields argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by vouching for the credibility of witnesses and by misstating the burden of proof by suggesting that Fields could not explain why K.W. would lie about the rape. The court of appeals stated that “statements made by the prosecutor * * * arguably shifted the burden to appellant to prove that he was not guilty.” Fields, 2006 WL 463524, at *7. However, the court did not explicitly conclude that the prosecutor‘s closing argument was improper, saying only that the argument “standing alone, would not warrant reversal.” Id.
“A prosecutor may not personally endorse the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn.2006) (citation omitted). However, the state is free to argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible. State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn.2003). When evaluating alleged vouching, “a court will look at the closing argument as a whole.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 656. Misstatements of the burden of proof also constitute prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.2000).
In sum, for all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the court of appeals erred when it held that numerous errors were committed and that the combined effect of these errors was prejudicial.
Reversed.
HANSON, Justice (concurring).
Although I concur with the outcome reached by the majority, I disagree with the analysis of the claim of prosecutorial misconduct that is based on the cross-examination of Fields about his prior theft from an employer. I conclude that the notice and pretrial hearing requirements set forth in State v. Fallin were intended to be prerequisites to the admissibility of evidence of other bad acts under
In Fallin, we said that a prosecutor “generally may not cross-examine a defendant * * * about prior misconduct” unless the prosecutor has given notice, provided evidentiary support, and established that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id. We further held that the district court “erred in permitting this cross-examination” where these procedures had not been followed. Id. The words “may not cross-examine” and “the trial court erred in permitting this cross-examination” make it clear that the evidence is not admissible. And those words also lead me to conclude that a prosecutor who pursues cross-examination in violation of Fallin has committed misconduct.
But, in Fallin we also held that the district court‘s decision to permit the cross-examination was harmless error. Id. I would likewise hold that the brief cross-examination of Fields on the subject of his prior theft, in which he admitted to theft in general terms, was harmless error.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. First, I disagree with the court‘s conclusion that the prosecutor‘s cross-examination of Fields about the theft from his employer was not plain error. Because Fields did not object to the questioning, we review the prosecutor‘s conduct under the plain error doctrine. State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Minn.2006). To determine whether the line of questioning was plain error, we look to the requirements of
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness * * *.
In Fallin, we explained the requirements of
In this case, the prosecutor did not follow the specific language of the rule as it was written at the time of trial, nor did she follow any of the procedures prescribed in Fallin. The record reflects that both the court and defense counsel expressed surprise over the prosecutor‘s cross-examination of Fields about the theft from his employer. The state argues that it did not have a chance to create a record of notice being given because the defendant did not object before the state could demonstrate the cross-examination‘s probative value. But both
Additionally, the record contains no evidence to support the use of the theft from Fields’ employer in the prosecutor‘s cross-examination, except the defendant‘s affirmative response to the prosecutor‘s question, “And specifically, I‘m just talking about a time in the state of Georgia when, I believe, you were in trouble basically for stealing from an employer. Do you recall that?” The state cannot depend on the defendant‘s answer and instead must have independent evidence of the misconduct. Fallin, 540 N.W.2d at 522 n. 5 (“[R]egardless of whether or not the state is allowed to prove the prior conduct by presenting extrinsic evidence to the jury, the state must be able to satisfy the trial court that there is a valid basis for the insinuation on cross-examination.“). Because the state did not follow the requisite procedures, the prosecutor‘s questioning was clearly impermissible and constituted plain error. Therefore, the prosecutor‘s cross-examination constituted misconduct.
I also disagree with the court‘s conclusion that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in her closing argument to the jury. Again, we use the plain error analysis because Fields did not object during the closing argument. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d at 785. Our case law is clear that misstating the burden of proof constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.2000). The court contends that Fields failed to point to any explicit misstatement of the burden of proof, but the prosecutor‘s statement about Fields’ inability to explain K.W.‘s motive for claiming that he sexually assaulted her erroneously suggested that Fields had the burden to explain why K.W. would lie.
Fields had no burden to explain K.W.‘s motives for claiming that he sexually assaulted her because he had no burden to present any evidence whatsoever. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). But the prosecutor implied in her closing argument that Fields had to explain why K.W. would claim he sexually assaulted her when she pointed out that, although Fields denied assaulting the victim, “[he] couldn‘t come up with why [he] thought [K.W.] would do this.” The prosecutor then immediately told the jury to think about the fact that Fields gave no explanation for K.W.‘s motives, stating, “You think about that when you go back in the room.” The prosecutor thus left the jury with a false impression of the state‘s burden of proof, implying that the defendant had the burden to explain K.W.‘s motives.
The prosecutor‘s argument also left the jury with the impression that it had to conclude that K.W. was lying in order to acquit Fields. We have held that it is plain error for a prosecutor to ask “were they lying” questions when the questions “shifted the jury‘s focus by creating the impression that the jury must conclude that * * * witnesses were lying in order to acquit [the defendant].” State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 235 (Minn.2005).
The fact that the prosecutor emphasized the importance of Fields’ testimony in the context of a misleading statement of the burden of proof only emphasizes that statement‘s problematic nature. The prosecutor began her closing by explaining that K.W. had been violated and then said that the true issue in the case was witness credibility and whether the defendant had sexually assaulted K.W. She said, “We‘ll talk about those things as credibility and why in the world would [K.W.] say such a thing if it weren‘t true.” She then discussed the elements of the case, concluded that most elements were not disputed, and explained that the disputed issue in the case was “whether or not the Defendant
Because the prosecutor‘s misconduct constituted plain error, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the misconduct did not affect substantial rights. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.2006). Error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of misconduct would have had a significant effect on the jury‘s verdict. Id. When determining whether a prosecutor‘s misconduct affected substantial rights, we examine the strength of the total evidence against the defendant. See State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn.1994). The evidence in this case came down to Fields’ word against K.W.‘s. The prosecutor‘s cross-examination about Fields’ theft from his employer was intended to and certainly could have affected the jury‘s perception of his credibility, especially in light of the fact that the court instructed the jury as if the misconduct were a previous conviction. In addition, the prosecutor‘s misstatement of the burden of proof in the closing argument presented yet another barrier for Fields. Given the record presented and misconduct involved, I conclude that the state did not meet its burden of proving that Fields’ substantial rights were not affected. See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. Rather, the totality of the evidence indicates that Fields’ substantial rights were affected and that the prosecutor‘s misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. Each instance of misconduct individually justifies reversal and a new trial; cumulatively, they demand it.
I respectfully dissent.
No. A06-1043.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
May 8, 2007.