State v. Ferman-VelascoState v. Ferman-Velasco
In this criminal case, defendant claims that his mandatory minimum sentences, which the trial court imposed under
I. BACKGROUND
In 1996, defendant was convicted of second-degree rape and first-degree sexual abuse for acts that he committed in the summer of 1995. The trial court sentenced defendant under
Defendant appealed, arguing that his Measure 11 sentences violated the proportionality clause of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, because those sentences exceeded penalties imposed for crimes that the legislature had deemed to be more serious than defendant’s crimes. Defendant also argued that his Measure 11 sentences violated his federal constitutional rights to
A majority of the Court of Appeals held that defendant’s challenges were without merit.
Ferman-Velasco,
We allowed review to address defendant’s state and federal constitutional challenges, and to determine whether the trial court had statutory authority to order defendant to pay the prosecution’s witness fees.
II. OREGON CONSTITUTION
We address defendant’s state constitutional challenge first.
See State v. Kennedy,
A. Sentencing Guidelines and Measure 11
In Oregon, the Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines (sentencing guidelines) serve as the primary means through which courts determine an offender’s sentence for felony offenses. The cornerstone of the sentencing guidelines is the concept that sentences be based upon a consideration of two factors: the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s criminal history.
That concept has yielded the 99-block Sentencing Guidelines Grid. This court has described that grid and its operation as follows:
“A ‘Crime Seriousness Scale’ serves as the vertical axis of the grid. Most felonies fall within one of the 11 categories on the Crime Seriousness Scale. A ‘Criminal History Scale’ serves as the horizontal axis of the grid. The Criminal History Scale is made up of nine categories, ranging from ‘minor misdemeanor or no criminal record’ to ‘multiple (3+) felony person offender.’ The appropriate sentence for a given felony conviction is determined by (1) locating the appropriate category for the crime of conviction on the Crime Seriousness Scale; (2) locating the appropriate category for the convicted offender on the Criminal History Scale; and (3) locating the grid block where the two categories intersect. Each grid block contains what is called a ‘presumptive sentence’ * *
State v. Davis,
Once a trial court has determined the presumptive sentence, the sentencing guidelines allow the court to depart either upward or downward from the presumptive sentence if there are “substantial and compelling” reasons in aggravation or mitigation.
Unlike the sentencing guidelines, which set out a multi-factor methodology for determining sentences, Measure 11 sets mandatory minimum sentences for certain felony offenses. Measure 11, codified at
“(1) When a person is convicted of one of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(a) of this section and the offense was committed on or after April 1, 1995, * * * the court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment listed in subsection (2) of this section. The person is not, during the service of the term of imprisonment, eligible for release on post-prison supervision or any form of temporary leave from custody. The person is not eligible for any reduction in * * * the minimum sentence for any reason whatsoever under ORS 421.121 or any other statute. The court may impose a greater sentence if otherwise permitted by law, but may not impose a lower sentence than the sentence specified in subsection (2) of this section.”
(Emphasis added.)
All the offenses covered by
For other Measure 11 crimes, however, the Measure 11 mandatory minimum is greater than the maximum sentencing guidelines sentence for that particular defendant.
See Huddleston,
A consequence of that situation — in which the Measure 11 sentence is greater than the maximum sentencing guidelines sentence — is that the Measure 11 sentence might be greater than the sentence that the sentencing guidelines assign to crimes with an equal, or even greater, crime-seriousness ranking. It is that disparity in sentences— between Measure 11 crimes and non-Measure 11 crimes that carry the same or greater crime-seriousness rankings — that defendant claims violates the proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16.
B. Discussion
With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the merits of defendant’s argument that his Measure 11 mandatory minimum sentences violate Article I, section 16. Article I, section 16, provides, in part:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense. * * *”
(Emphasis added.) Defendant asserts his challenge under the emphasized “proportionality” requirement of that provision. Adopting the dissent’s reasoning from the Court of Appeals’ decision, defendant argues that the proportionality clause requires the legislature to set approximately equal sentences for crimes of equal severity and to set greater sentences for more serious crimes than those sentences set for less serious crimes.
See Ferman-Velasco,
We begin our analysis by examining a necessary statutory premise of defendant’s argument. He assumes that the crime-seriousness rankings of the sentencing guidelines remained unchanged by the adoption of Measure 11 and that the sentencing guidelines represent an accurate, contemporary measure of the seriousness of his crimes for purposes of any constitutional proportionality analysis. 6 According to defendant,
“* * * Measure 11 does not by its plain terms either amend the alphabetical or numerical classifications already assigned to the covered felonies nor does it invent entirely new classifications for them. On its face, the statute focuses on punishment and it simply does not deal with niceties such as the classification of the crimes being punished.”
Therefore, defendant submits, the crime-seriousness rankings for his crimes were unchanged by Measure 11.
Defendant is correct that Measure 11 does not adjust expressly the crime-seriousness ranking of the crimes that it covers. Nonetheless, it does not follow from that observation that Measure 11 simply superimposes a new set of sentences onto the sentencing guidelines sentences without having any effect upon the existing sentencing structure. What defendant has failed to consider — which we address below — is whether the laws governing the creation, adoption, and alteration of the sentencing guidelines require reclassification in light of subsequent legislative enactments, such as Measure 11.
In 1985, the legislature created the Oregon Criminal Justice Council (Commission) 7 to develop the sentencing guidelines. Or Laws 1985, ch 558, § 2. The legislature later codified the sentencing guidelines in 1989. Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 87. That legislation (approving the sentencing guidelines as statutory law) provided:
“* * * [AJfter adjournment sine die of the Legislative Assembly, the [Commission] shall review all new legislation that creates new crimes or reclassifies existing crimes. The [Commission] shall make any necessary modifications to the crime seriousness scale of the guidelines to reflect the actions of the Legislative Assembly.”
Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 84 (emphasis added). 8
That legislation directs the Commission to modify the crime-seriousness scale
“after
adjournment sine die of the Legislative Assembly,” so as to “reflect” (emphasis added) legislative actions. It is clear from those provisions that the Commission must amend the crime-seriousness scale to reflect any subsequent legislative enactments that pertain to the seriousness of a crime.
9
Stated
In addition, we note that Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 790, section 84 directs the Commission to modify the guidelines to reflect legislative “actions” (emphasis added), not just specific enactments pertaining to the crime-seriousness scale. As such, any legislation that suggests a change in the seriousness of a crime — including the increase or decrease in the penalty for that crime — warrants a corresponding amendment to the sentencing guidelines. 10
Therefore, we conclude that the fact that defendant’s Measure 11 sentences are greater than those imposed for other crimes that carry the same or greater crime-seriousness rankings under the sentencing guidelines does not create the constitutional violation that defendant asserts. That is so, because the discrepancy among such sentences is due to the Commission’s failure to amend'the crime-seriousness scale to reflect the greater penalties that Measure 11 imposes for crimes such as defendant’s, and that failure does not create a constitutional violation. Put differently, Measure 11 is not contrary to the legislature’s crime-seriousness classification; rather, it represents the most recent legislative enactment demonstrating the seriousness with which the legislative branch views Measure 11 crimes, including defendant’s crimes.
In light of the foregoing conclusion, the premise for defendant’s proportionality argument — that the crime-seriousness rankings of the sentencing guidelines remained unchanged by the adoption of Measure 11 and, therefore, represent an accurate measure of the seriousness of his crimes for proportionality purposes — is without foundation. We therefore reject defendant’s challenge under Article I, section 16.
III. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
We turn to defendant’s federal constitutional claims. Before this court, defendant argues that Measure 11 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the right to allocution under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth Amendment; the right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, section 4.
Defendant concedes in his petition and briefing that, in
Huddleston,
Defendant is correct that this court previously has considered and rejected challenges to Measure 11 based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause.
Huddleston
Defendant is mistaken, however, respecting this court’s disposition of his remaining federal claims. Although this court has decided challenges to Measure 11 under some of the similar provisions in the Oregon Constitution, this court has not considered fully whether Measure 11 violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to allocution, or the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 11 We address each of those contentions below.
A. Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments
We begin with defendant’s argument that Measure II violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments,
12
as incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Furman v. Georgia,
The Supreme Court specifically has limited its holdings concerning the importance of mitigating evidence to capital cases.
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan,
B. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Allocution
Defendant next argues that Measure 11 violates his right to allocution under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
13
According to defendant, that right “primarily aims to provide the defendant an opportunity to plead for mitigation of the sentence.” Defendant submits that, in
Green v. United States,
In
Huddleston,
this court arguably addressed a similar federal allocution argument in the course of rejecting a defendant’s federal equal-protection challenge to Measure 11.
See
The right to allocution is rooted in the common law.
Green,
“[T]he point of [allocution] was not to elicit mitigating evidence or a plea for leniency, but to give the defendant a formal opportunity to present one of the strictly defined legal reasons which required the avoidance or delay of sentencing: he was not the person convicted, he had benefit of clergy or a pardon, he was insane, or if a woman, she was pregnant.”
Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv L Rev 821, 832-33 (1968) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). A defendant who could not establish one of those strictly defined legal reasons nonetheless would “frequently address[ ] the court in mitigation of his conduct * * * [and] cast[ ] himself upon their mercy.” Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo L Rev at 118 (quoting 1 Chit Creditor L, 700). However, even under those circumstances, “nothing more [was] done, but the proper judge pronounce[d] the sentence.” Id.
Many states have preserved the right to allocution in various forms. For example, although the Oregon Constitution recognizes a right to allocution, the right “does not carry with it a right to have the sentencing court
necessarily
be able to reduce a sentence that otherwise applies.”
Huddleston,
As already noted, defendant cites
Green
to support his argument that his Measure 11 sentence violates a federal constitutional right to allocution under the Due Process Clause. The issue in
Green,
however, was whether the trial court had violated Federal Criminal Rule 32(a), which then specifically granted to a defendant in federal court the right to speak in “mitigation” of his or her sentence.
“[t]he failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is * * * an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional.”
Hill v. United States,
Nothing, however, in either the United States Constitution or in the Supreme Court’s case law suggests that, in a mandatory sentencing scheme, the right to allocution includes, as a necessary result of that allocution, the ability of a trial court to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence that otherwise lawfully applies. Not even the allocution provided for in the rule at issue in Green affords the right that defendant claims here. Despite defendant’s argument to the contrary, the Court in Green did not suggest that Rule 32(a) included a right to any particular range of sentences or to the consideration of any particular sentencing factors; rather, the rule provided an opportunity to address whatever factors the substantive law made relevant. The same can be said, we think, of any federal constitutional right to allocution that might exist. We therefore reject defendant’s allocution argument under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Finally, defendant claims that Measure 11 violates his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
14
as incorporated and applied to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Gideon v. Wainwright,
We begin, and end, our analysis by noting the similarity between that argument and defendant’s federal allocution argument. Specifically, both arguments rest upon the notion that defendant, or someone in his behalf, has the right to plead for and, more importantly, to obtain, a lesser sentence. As we already noted, however, the Supreme Court has not held that there is a constitutional right to have an otherwise lawful mandatory minimum sentence reduced based upon the defendant’s circumstances. Because defendant, himself, was not entitled to have his sentence reduced based upon his statement in allocution, neither was he entitled to have the court reduce his sentence based upon the statements of his lawyer. Consequently, we reject defendant’s argument under the Sixth Amendment.
IV. WITNESS FEES
We turn to defendant’s final assignment of error, which raises the issue whether the trial court had authority to order defendant to pay some of the prosecution’s witness fees. Both parties rely upon the interplay (or lack thereof) between two statutes —
“Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the per diem fees and mileage and any expenses allowed [by statute] due to any witness in a grand jury proceeding, or any prosecution witness in a criminal action or proceeding in a circuit * * *court * * * shall be paid by the county in which the grand jury proceeding or criminal action or proceeding is held. Payment shall be made upon a claim verified by the witness, showing the number of days attended and the number of miles traveled, and a certified statement * * * showing the amounts due the witness.”
(Emphasis added.)
“* * * [T]he court, only in the case of a defendant for whom it enters a judgment of conviction, may include in its sentence thereunder a provision that the convicted defendant shall pay as costs expenses specially incurred * * :|; in prosecuting the defendant. Costs include a reasonable attorney fee for [court-appointed] counsel * * *. Costs shall not include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial or expenditures in connection with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law.”
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant contends that our analysis should begin with
The state responds that
Resolution of the parties’ dispute requires that we construe
As noted,
Under the foregoing reading of
Turning to
In sum, we agree with the state that the trial court had authority under
“Costs [that a defendant may be ordered to pay upon conviction] shall not include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial or expenditures in connection with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law.”
(Emphasis added.) Defendant contends that, because he has a constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face, 15 expenses associated with such witnesses fall within that statutory exception. The state responds that the statutory exception does not include expenses such as the prosecution’s witness fees.
To determine the intended scope of the phrase “expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed jury trial”
in
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor [.]”
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, * * * and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
Although worded differently, both the state and federal constitutions grant criminal defendants the right to a
“public” trial by an “impartial jury.” In light of the text of
Turning to the legislative history of
The Commentary to section 1525 of the Michigan Revised Criminal Code, in turn, cites the case of
People v. Hope,
“the defendant cannot be assessed the expenses attributable to use of the jury in the case against him; the Constitution guarantees that right, and the state cannot charge him for what he is guaranteed.”
Michigan Revised Criminal Code, Final Draft, § 1525, Commentary at 146 (September 1967) (emphasis added). In
Hope,
the defendant had challenged a cost order that included both witness fees and juror fees, in addition to other costs. The Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the order respecting juror fees, reasoning that the defendant could not be ordered to pay such fees because “[e]very person charged with a criminal offense has a
constitutional right to a trial by
jury.”
Hope,
As can be seen, the Michigan case law supporting section 1525 of the Michigan Revised Criminal Code (1967), from which
The materials from the Oregon Revision Commission are not as illustrative as the Michigan case law, but are helpful to some extent. In the course of deliberating the article of the proposed Oregon Revised Criminal Code that included what later became
The foregoing reference to “jurors’ fees” is consistent with our reading of the case law surrounding section 1525 of the Michigan Revised Criminal Code (1967), from which
Taken as a whole, the legislative history of
V. CONCLUSION
We reject defendant’s challenge to Measure 11 under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. We also reject defendant’s various challenges to Measure 11 under the United States Constitution. Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court had no statutory authority to order defendant to pay the prosecution’s witness fees.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
Notes
Measure 11 was an initiative that the voters adopted at the November 1994 general election. It became effective on April 1,1995, Or Laws 1995, ch 2, and was codified as
“(11 When a person is convicted of one of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(a) of this section * * *, the court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment listed in subsection (2) of this section.
“(2) The offenses to which subsection (1) of this section applies and the applicable mandatory minimum sentences are:
“(a)(A) ***
«sfc ;jc ;jc sji
“(K) Rape in the second degree, as defined inORS 163.365 ------------------------------------------------75 months
“(P) Sexual abuse in the first degree, as defined inORS 163.427 ------------------------------------------------------------------75 months”
The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, the agency responsible for creating and updating the sentencing guidelines, has renumbered the sentencing-guideline rules since defendant committed his crimes. We cite to the most recent version of those rules.
Under Measure 11, defendant’s mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is 75 months for each of his crimes. However, the presumptive sentence for each of his crimes, given defendant’s criminal history “(H)” designation and the applicable crime-seriousness ranking of “(8),” is 19-20 months. Therefore, the maximum sentence that a court could impose upon defendant under the sentencing guidelines, assuming that the circumstances of his crimes warranted a full departure, would be 40 months for each crime.
We note that defendant compares each of his sentences (75 months) with the presumptive sentence assigned to crimes with the same crime-seriousness ranking and same criminal-history score (19-20). The state argues that, to evaluate proportionality under Article I, section 16, courts must compare the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by law for the comparative crime. Because we dispose of defendant’s challenges upon other grounds, we do not address the state’s argument.
Defendant’s argument also assumes that Article I, section 16, allows this court to compare unrelated crimes for purposes of proportionality. Because we resolve this case by rejecting the underlying premise of defendant’s Article I, section 16, argument, we do not address that issue.
Cf. Leo v. Keisling,
The legislature later restructured the Council and renamed it the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. Or Laws 1995, ch 420, § 1.
The 1989 Legislature did not codify Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 790, section 84; however, in 1997, the legislature passed legislation with similar wording. That legislation was codified at
“The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission shall review all new legislation that creates new crimes or modifies existing crimes. The commission shall adopt by rule any necessary modifications to the crime seriousness scale of the guidelines to reflect the actions of the Legislative Assembly * *
Although the legislature used the term “Legislative Assembly,” the focus of Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 790, section 84 unquestionably was to direct the Commission respecting fulfillment of its duties in respect of future legislative enactments. In that regard, we conclude that the legislation also encompasses legislative enactments, such as Measure 11, that the people adopt as a co-ordinate lawmaking body.
See generally State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer,
Indeed, the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual, 149 (Sept 1989), provides:
“The sentencing guidelines system is based on administrative rules adopted by the State Sentencing Guidelines Board. These rules were affirmatively approved by the 1989 Legislative Assembly. Section 87, Chapt.er 790, Oregon Laws 1989. While the guidelines have been approved by the legislature, they retain their status as administrative rules. When those rules conflict with statutes, the statutory provisions control.”
See State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley,
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “No State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * *
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
We note that, for purposes of this opinion, we use the phrase from Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, “meet the witnesses face to face,” to refer to both the right to meet witnesses under Article I, section 11, as well as the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against [an accused in a criminal prosecution]” under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The 1971 Legislature generally adopted the proposed revisions set out in the Proposed Criminal Code, including what ultimately became
We note that defendant did not raise — and we do not decide — the issue whether either the state or federal constitutions prevent the legislature from allowing a trial court to impose costs associated with a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face.