{¶ 2} On December 5, 2006, appellant was indicted for one count of murder as a result of committing a felonious assault, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} On November 1, 2006, appellant's 80-year-old grandfather, Douglas Smith, Jr., met appellant at a storage unit in order to bring appellant some dinner, as he had often done.1 At some point during the visit, appellant attacked his grandfather, threw him to the ground, and forcefully kicked or stomped his head. Thinking that hе had killed his grandfather, appellant left the storage unit to walk around and "cool off." As Smith began to recover from the initial assault, appellant returned to the storage unit and "smacked" his grandfather in the face. Appellant then took his grandfather inside the storage unit, sat him down in a chair, took away his cell phone and closed the door behind him. Appellant walked to a nearby business to wash the blood from his hands and then returned to the storage unit, where he proceeded to push his grandfather into the unit's corrugated metal wall. Eventually the attack ceased and Smith was able to return to his home, though still suffering frоm his injuries.
{¶ 4} Three days later, Smith was found collapsed and unconscious on his bathroom floor. He was taken to the emergency room at Mercy Hospital Fairfield where he was examined by Dr. Gregory Hall, who fоund signs of trauma and bruising to Smith's head.2 Based on a CAT scan, Dr. Hall determined that Smith's condition was serious due to "bleeding on the brain." Dr. Hall transferred Smith to the intensive care unit at the University Hospital at Cincinnati, however Smith nevеr regained consciousness and died approximately three weeks later. A subsequent autopsy revealed that Smith's death was "caused by hypoxic encephalopathy due to intracranial bleeding due to blunt impact to the head." The *3 medical examiner, Dr. Michael Kenny, further opined that the death was a homicide because there was a "subdural hemorrhage" consistent with "inflicted cranial сerebral injury" that increased swelling and irritation which in turn led to poor oxygenation within the brain.
{¶ 5} In the interim, the Hamilton Police Department began an investigation into the cause of Smith's injuries. Appellant made an initial statement, after acknowledging and waiving his Miranda rights, which provided little, if any, details regarding what happened to his grandfather. The police then obtained a search warrant for the storage unit, in which they found what later proved to be blood from appellant and his grandfather. The police also went to see Smith at University Hospital and took pictures of his still visible injuries.
{¶ 6} On November 6, 2006, appellant voluntarily aрproached the police, and after again waiving his Miranda rights, made a recorded statement detailing the attack against his grandfather at the storage unit. Appellant was transported to the Fairfield Pоlice Department where he was booked and charged.3
{¶ 7} On November 9, 2007, after a two-day bench trial, the common pleas court found appellant guilty of both murder and abduction.4 Appellant was sentenced to 15 years to life and a $10,000 fine for the murder, and five years for the abduction to be served consecutively. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, alleging one assignment of error.
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL, PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE 29(A), ON THE CHARGE OF FELONY-MURDER IN VIOLATION OF R.C. §
{¶ 9} Appellant argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion for acquittal *4 because the state failed to prove the element of proximate cause.
{¶ 10} Pursuant to Crim. R. 29(A), "[t]he court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged * * *, if the evidence is insufficient to sustаin a conviction of such offense or offenses." The purpose of a motion for acquittal is to "test the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial." State v. Terry, Fayette App. No. CA2001-07-012,
{¶ 11} On review, "an appellate court `will nоt reverse the trial court's judgment unless reasonable minds could only reach the conclusion that the evidence failed to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Adams, Butler App. No. CA2006-07-160,
{¶ 12} The crux of appellant's argument is that the state failed to prove appellant proximately caused the death of his grandfather.5
The element of proximate cause is satisfied where the defendant, "sets in motion a sequence of events that make the death of another a `direct, proximate, and reasоnably inevitable' consequence." State v.Lovelace (1999),
{¶ 13} "Generally, for a criminal defendant's conduct to be the proximate cause of a certain result, it must first be determined that the conduct was the cause in fact оf the result, meaning that the result would not have occurred `but for' the conduct. Second, when the result varied from the harmed intended or hazarded, it must be determined that the result achieved was not so extraordinаry or surprising that it would be simply unfair to hold the defendant criminally responsible for something so unforeseeable." Id. at 216, citing LaFave Scott, Criminal Law (1972), Section 35, 246.
{¶ 14} Appellant inflicted serious injury to Smith's head and facе which led to his collapse three days later, and a diagnosis in the emergency room of bleeding on the brain. From Smith's autopsy, Dr. Kenny determined that intracranial bleeding from head trauma was the cause оf death. There is nothing extraordinary or surprising about the manner of Smith's death in relation to appellant's actions. Appellant beat an 80-year-old man to the point that even he believed his grandfather was dead. It cannot be considered surprising or *6 extraordinary that Smith later died considering the severity of the injuries he received at the hands of his grandson.
{¶ 15} Appellant argues that the true cause of death was a secondary bleed that only occurs in one out of five or six cases of subdural hematomas, and further suggests that a 17-20 percent chance of this happening is not a basis for finding proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant also postulates that the bleeding was caused by Smith's collapse in his bathroom prior to being taken to the hospital. We find no merit to either argument. Whilе Dr. Kenny did say the supplementary bleeding was an "additional insult," he also testified that it was "not a factor, which would have in and of itself been required for the death of Mr. Smith." In addition, Dr. Kenny's testimony regarding the percentаge of cases in which subdural hematomas lead to secondary bleeding was in response to defense counsel's question about treatment to prevent such an occurrence, and predictаbility. Dr. Kenny later clarified his statement by noting that bleeding on a subdural is "common" and "may be found * * * [or] thought to be a part of whatever injured the veins and caused the subdural, also causing injury to the brain itself causing the bleed." Dr. Kenny then reiterated his final conclusion that a traumatic impact occurred. In addition, this negates the idea that Smith's death was due to a mere fall in the bathroom, as does the fact that there werе no new bruises or injuries noted by Dr. Hall when Smith was admitted to the emergency room.
{¶ 16} The evidence in the record, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, is legally sufficient to support a finding that appеllant's actions were the proximate cause of his grandfather's death in that but for the beating, Smith would not have died. Furthermore, the medical examiner noted that additional bleeding was common and not something surprising or extraordinary. Therefore, because there was sufficient evidence to support the proximate cause element, we find that the trial court properly denied appellant's mоtion for acquittal. Appellant's assignment of error is hereby overruled. *7
{¶ 17} Judgment affirmed.
BRESSLER, P.J. and POWELL, J., concur.