In this appeal, the State challenges the reversal of defendant, Fausto Camacho’s, conviction for second-degree eluding, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b).
Defendant was charged with allegedly driving off with an Audi A4 automobile that had been left outside a restaurant in Walling-ton with the keys in the ignition. After the owner saw that his vehicle was missing, he called 9-1-1 and reported the vehicle stolen. Approximately one hour later, a Fair Lawn police officer saw an Audi being driven in a very aggressive manner. The officer turned on the patrol car’s lights and siren, and began to chase. But the Audi accelerated to 130 to 140 miles per hour and the chase was abandoned. Subsequently, a Clifton detective took up the pursuit. While seeking to avoid the pursuit, the driver of the Audi hit a curb, turned into a shopping center, struck a car, and stopped. The occupants of the vehicle ran out of the car. The detective chased and captured the driver, who is the defendant.
On July 7, 2009, defendant was charged with third-degree theft of an Audi A4 automobile, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3, and second-degree eluding by fleeing from a police officer, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b). At the end of the trial, the judge inadvertently failed to provide the jury with the no-adverse-inference charge that was requested by defendant and his counsel. Defense counsel did not object to the failure to provide the requested charge. A jury found defendant not guilty of third-degree theft, and guilty of second-degree eluding.
The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred when, after defendant requested the no-adverse-inferenee charge, the court failed to instruct the jury that it could not draw an adverse inference from defendant’s failure to testify. The panel concluded that the trial court’s failure to provide a no-adverse-inference jury instruction after a defendant requests such an instruction is of *537 such constitutional magnitude as to warrant automatic reversal and remand for a new trial.
The failure to provide the no-adverse-inference charge is of constitutional dimension.
Carter v. Kentucky,
450
U.S.
288, 302-03, 101
S.Ct.
1112, 1120, 67
L.Ed.2d
241, 252 (1981). Accordingly, this Court has mandated the trial court’s use of the no-adverse-inference instruction when requested at trial.
State v. Daniels,
182
N.J.
80,
We now address whether the failure to provide the charge is a per se error requiring automatic reversal, or whether the failure to provide the charge requires a harmless-error analysis;
see State v. Adams,
194
N.J.
186,
We disagree. For reasons that follow, we conclude thаt when there is a failure to provide the no-adverse-inference charge, the error constitutes trial error and does not mandate automatic reversal. In this case, we find that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
I.
On April 27, 2009, between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Derrick Blonski drove his blue Audi to a restaurant in Wallington. Before entering the restaurant to place a food order, Blonski turned off the engine but left the key in the ignition. At that time, Emil Baez was making repairs to his vehicle in the same parking lot. Baez observed a light-colored Altima slowly pull into the parking lot. The driver of the Altima exited the vehicle, peered into the Audi and gave a thumbs-up signal to the passenger who remained in the Altima. According to Baez, the driver had a long beard and was wearing a white T-shirt. In contrast, Baez described the passenger of the Altima as bald or having short hair. Subse *538 quently, Baez heard a ear “peel out” of the parking lot and observed that both the Audi and Altima were gone.
While waiting for his food order, Blonski stepped out of the restaurant to smoke a cigarette, noticed that his vehicle was missing, and called 9-1-1 to report it. Later that morning, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Fair Lawn Police Officer Luis Vasquez was driving his police vehicle on Route 21 when he observed a blue Audi “cutting off othеr vehicles [and] almost causing accidents.” Officer Vasquez was accompanied in his patrol vehicle by Auxiliary Police Chief Nick Magiarelli. Officer Vasquez pulled up next to the Audi and observed that the driver had a long beard and was wearing a white T-shirt.
The Audi accelerated, passing Officer Vasquez and nearly causing Officer Vasquez’s vehicle to crash into a concrete divider. Officer Vasquez decided to attempt a motor vehicle stop and, therefore, turned on his lights and siren. Auxiliary Chief Magiarelli called police headquarters to report the Audi’s license plate number and give a description of the vehicle. The Audi began tо accelerate quickly to a speed of approximately 130 to 140 miles per hour. Officer Vasquez determined that it was too dangerous to continue the pursuit. Accordingly, he terminated it and radioed his location to the dispatcher.
Detective Joshin Smith of the Clifton Police Department received a radio communication advising officers to be on the lookout for the blue Audi. Approximately five minutes later, Detective Smith observed a vehicle matching the dispatcher’s description on River Road and began to pursue it. While in pursuit, Detective Smith reported the sighting to the dispatcher and radioed in the license platе number of the vehicle. The dispatcher confirmed that the blue Audi was the suspect vehicle. At this time, the Audi began to accelerate rapidly. Detective Smith turned on his lights and siren to signal the driver to pull over. The driver of the Audi ignored the signal and quickly proceeded down an entrance ramp onto Route 3 where the Audi’s rear tire struck a curb. The vehicle’s tire began to lose air pressure as a result of the impact. *539 Nevertheless, the driver continued to drive erratically onto an area of the highway where several roads merged. The driver then went over a curb, slid down a grassy grade and into a shopping center parking lot, where the Audi struck a parked vehicle.
As the vehicle slowed, Detective Smith observed two individuals, one from the driver’s seat and one from the front passenger’s seat, open their respective doors, exit the vehicle, and begin to run. Detective Smith pursued the driver who later was identified as defendant. During the pursuit, Detective Smith observed that the driver had a heavy beard. Detective Smith also observed that “the passenger was taller than the defendant with a thin build, a low haircut and no beard.” Smith chased the defendant on foot, caught up to him in a ravine behind the shopping center, tackled him, and placed him under arrest. Another officer brought defendant into police headquarters.
A.
A Bergen County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with third-degree theft of a motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3, and second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A 2C:29-2(b). 1
At trial, Detective Smith and Officer Vasquez testified on behalf of the State. They each identified defendant as the driver of the Audi in spite of the fact that at the time of trial, defendant no longer had a beard. Baez, on the other hand, was unable to identify defendant with certainty. He maintained, however, that the person whom he witnessed exit the Altima and give the thumbs up had a beard.
Defendant did not testify or call any witnesses on his behalf at trial. As a result, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he was requesting a no-adverse-inference instruction, or Carter 2 *540 charge, based on his client’s decision not to testify at trial. Defense counsel answered affirmatively, and defendant expressly agreed with counsel’s statement. 3
However, the trial court failed to include the charge when instructing the jury. Defendant did not object when the instructions were given. After the trial judge completed his charge to the jury, he specifically asked the attorneys whether there were any exceptions to the charge. Defense counsel replied, “No. Thank you, Judge.”
The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree eluding, and acquitted him of third-degree theft by unlawful taking. Defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, аrguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because there had been an insufficient showing that Detective Smith properly identified defendant as the driver of the Audi during the chase. The trial court denied the motion but allowed defendant to renew his application prior to sentencing.
At sentencing, defendant renewed his motion to set aside the verdict. The court denied defendant’s motion. On March 26, 2010, defendant was sentenced to a seven-year term of imprisonment.
On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to provide the jury with a Carter instruction. Defendant maintained that the failure to рrovide a Carter instruction should not be analyzed under the harmless-error rule because of its constitutional significance. Defendant further contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. Its decision
*541
was based on the trial court’s failure to charge the jury that it could not draw an adverse inference from defendant’s failure to testify, despite defendant’s request for the charge.
4
The appellate panel recognized “that although ‘somе constitutional errors may be harmless, ... others are of such constitutional magnitude that they are always reversible error.’” (quoting
State v. Fusco,
93
N.J.
578, 587,
In reaching its decision, the Appellate Division rejected the State’s reliance on
State v. Oliver,
133
N.J.
141,
We granted the State’s petition for certification.
State v. Camacho,
216
N.J.
14,
II.
The State argues that the Appellate Division improperly reversed defendant’s conviction. In particular, the State contends that the Appellate Division erroneously created a rule of per se *542 reversal for a trial court’s inadvertent omission of the no-adverse-inference charge.
While the State concedes that the trial court was obligated to give the Carter instruction to the jury after defense counsel requested it, it maintains that a trial court’s inadvertent omission of the no-adverse-inference charge cannot be considered structural error subject to automatic reversal. Rather, the error is a trial error that is subject to harmless-error analysis.
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the Appellate Division correctly determined that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to include the Carter instruction in its jury charge. Defendant points to Haley, supra, and maintains that the Carter instruction is of such significant constitutional dimension that a trial court’s failure to give the instruction should always qualify as reversible error.
III.
The no-adverse-inference jury instruction, or
Carter
charge, is grounded on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
U.S. Const.
amend. V. That provision, which is known as the privilege against self-incrimination, is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Malloy v. Hogan,
378
U.S.
1, 6, 84
S.Ct.
1489, 1492,
Ultimately, the privilege against self-incrimination protects “ ‘the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence.’ ”
State v. P.Z.,
152
N.J.
86, 100-02,
A.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed whether a jury charge violated a defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against self-incrimination in a case where the trial court informed the jury that it was permitted to draw an unfavorable inference from the defendant’s failure to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1230, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 107 (1965). There, the trial court’s jury instruction explained that “a defendant has a constitutional right not to testify,” but nevertheless stated that
[a]s to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, thоugh he does testily, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of *544 such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.
[Ibid, (emphasis added).]
The Supreme Court set aside the defendant’s conviction and held that the trial court’s instruction to the jury that it may draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to testify was improper. The Court observed that
comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the inquisitorial system of criminal justice, ... which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege____What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.
[Id. at 614, 85 S.Ct at 1232-33,14 L.Ed.2d at 109-10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).]
In a footnote, the Griffin Court explicitly stated that it would “reserve decision on whether an accused can require ... that the jury be instructed that his silence must be disregarded.” Id. at 615 n. 6, 85 S.Ct. at 1233 n. 6, 14 L.Ed.2d at 110 n. 6.
Subsequently, in
Lakeside v. Oregon,
435
U.S.
333, 334, 98
S.Ct.
1091, 1092,
The Lakeside Court concluded that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bar a court from instructing a jury that they may draw an adverse inference, but that the rule was inapplicable to the reverse situation. Ibid. The Court emphasized that “a judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify is ‘comment’ of an entirely different order.” Ibid.
The Court stated that “[sjuch an instruction cannot provide the pressure on a defendant found impermissible in Griffin.” Ibid. Rather, “its very purpose is to remove from the jury’s deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences. It would be strange indeed to conclude that this cautionary instruction violates the very constitutional provision it is intended to рrotect.” Ibid. The Court also noted that the defendant’s argument rested on two very doubtful assumptions:
First, that the jurors have not noticed that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore, draw adverse inferences on their own; second, that the jurors will totally disregard the instruction, and affirmatively give weight to what they have been told not to consider at all.
[Id. at 340, 98 S.Ct. at 1095, 55 L.Ed.2d at 325-26.]
The Court concluded that “[f]ederal constitutional law cannot rest on speculative assumptions so dubious as these.” Ibid. Notably, the Court explicitly declined to reach the issue of whether a trial court must provide a no-adverse-inference instruction to the jury when requested to do so by a defendant. Id. at 337, 98 S.Ct. at 1093, 55 L.Ed.2d at 324.
This issue, however, was addressed fifteen years later in
Carter, supra.
In
Carter,
a trial court refused a defendant’s request to instruct the jury that it may not draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s election not to testify at trial.
Id.
at 290, 101
S.Ct.
at 1114, 67
L.Ed.2d
at 244. The Court held that the failure of a court to instruct a jury that it may not draw any adverse inferences based on a defendant’s failure to testify is of constitutional
*546
dimension.
Id.
at 305, 101
S.Ct.
at 1122,
[t]he principles enunciated in our eases construing this privilege, against both statutory and constitutional backdrops, lead unmistakably to the conclusion that the Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a “no-adverse-inference” jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so.
[Id. at 300, 101 S.Ct. at 1119,67 L.Ed.2d at 251 .]
Because “[jjurors are not experts in legal principles,” the Court concluded that “to function effectively, and justly, they must be accurately instructed in the law.” Ibid.
Such instructions are perhaps nowhere more important than in the context of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, since “[too] many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are ... guilty of dime....”
[Ibid, (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426, 76 S.Ct. 497, 500, 100 L.Ed. 511, 518 (1956)).]
This Court has consistently mandated the trial court’s use of the
Carter
instruction when it is requested by a defendant. In
Daniels, supra,
182
N.J.
at 90,
IV.
While it is well-established that the failure to provide a requested Carter instruction is an error of constitutional dimension, neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court have addressed whether a trial court’s failure to issue a requested Carter instruction constitutes trial error or structural error. We must now determine whether the trial judge’s inadvertent failure to provide the Carter instruction was harmless.
*547
The United States Supreme Court in
Chapman v. California,
386
U.S.
18, 22, 87
S.Ct.
824, 827, 17
L.Ed.2d
705, 709 (1967), noted that “there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportаnt and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.” However, the Court also recognized that “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless-error.”
Id.
at 23, 87
S.Ct.
at 827, 17
L.Ed.2d
at 710;
see also Fusco, supra,
93
N.J.
at 587,
The Court divides federal constitutional errors into two categories: 1) trial errors, and 2) structural errors. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 330, 331 (1991).
A.
A trial error is defined as an “error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury,” and therefore may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether it was hаrmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
at 307-08, 111
S.Ct.
at 1264, 113
L.Ed.2d
at 330;
see also State v. Macon,
57
N.J.
325, 338,
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “most constitutional errors can be harmless,” and are therefore not subject to automatic reversal. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 306, 111 S.Ct. at 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d at 329; see also Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61, 129 S.Ct. 530, 532, 172 L.Ed.2d 388, 392 (2008) (stating that “ ‘while there are some errors to which [harmless-error analysis] does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule’ ”) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106, 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 (1986)). The Court further stressed that
*548 [i]n applying harmless-error analysis to these many different constitutional violations, the Court has been faithful to the belief that the harmless-error doctrinе is essential to preserve the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.
[Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 308, 111 S.Ct. at 1264,113 L.Ed.2d at 330 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).]
The Court has addressed whether the harmless-error rule is applicable in the context of the Fifth Amendment.
Chapman, supra,
involved comments made by a prosecutor regarding a defendant’s failure to testify at trial, which, at that time, was permitted by a state constitutional provision. 386
U.S.
at 19, 87
S.Ct.
at 825,
Similarly, in
United States v. Hasting,
461
U.S.
499, 502-03, 103
S.Ct.
1974, 1977, 76
L.Ed.2d
96, 102 (1983), the issue was whether a trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor made impermissible comments in summation regarding the defendants’ election not to testify at trial. The Court dеtermined that the trial court’s error in allowing the comments was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record in its entirety and the overwhelming evidence of the defendants’ guilt.
Id.
at 512, 103
S.Ct.
at 1982,
B.
A structural error, on the other hand, is a “structural defeet[ ] in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which deffies] analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”
Fulminante, supra,
499
U.S.
at 309-10, 111
S.Ct.
at 1265,
The United States Supreme Court has found structural error to exist “only in a very limited class of cases.”
Johnson v. United States,
520
U.S.
461, 468, 117
S.Ct.
1544, 1549,
In
Chapman, supra,
the Court specifically noted three constitutional errors that could not be categorized as harmless and would thus call for automatic reversal of a conviction: (1) using a coerced confession against a defendant in a criminal trial; (2) depriving a defendant of counsel; and (3) trying a defendant before a biased judge. 386
U.S.
at 42-43, 87
S.Ct.
at 837,
Since the Court’s decision in
Chapman,
other errors have been classified as structural errors, including “unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury, ... [violation of] the right to self-representation at trial ... and [violation oí] the right to public trial.”
Fulminante, supra,
499
U.S.
at 309-10, 111
S.Ct.
at 1264-65,
V.
Importantly, the United States Supreme Court has not chаracterized the failure to provide a jury instruction as a structural defect. “Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”
State v. Concepcion,
111
N.J.
373, 379,
With respect to a court’s failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, the Court applied a harmful error standard in
Kentucky v. Whorton,
441
U.S.
786, 99
S.Ct.
2088,
Relying on its understanding of
Taylor v. Kentucky,
436
U.S.
478, 98
S.Ct.
1930,
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Ibid.
It recognized that in
Taylor,
it had reversed a criminal conviction that resulted from a trial in which the judge had refused to give a requested jury instruction on the presumption of innocence.
Id.
at 788-89, 99
S.Ct.
at 2089-90,
The
Whorton
Court declared that “the failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution.”
Id.
at 789, 99
S.Ct.
at 2090,
must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances — including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors — to determine whether the defendant rеceived a constitutionally fair trial.
[Ibid.; see State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 145,586 A.2d 85 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993).]
The Court ultimately reversed the judgment and remanded for a “determination of whether the failure to give such an instruction in the present case deprived the respondent of due process of law in light of the totality of the circumstances.”
Id.
at 790, 99
S.Ct.
at 2090,
VI.
A trial judge’s failure to provide the
Carter
instruction, on request, is undoubtedly of constitutional dimension. However, with the aforementioned principles in mind, we agree with the State and conclude that the failure to give a
Carter
instruction does not constitute a per se reversible error. It is a type of error that concerns the evidentiary value the jury may give to a defendant’s election not to testify on his or her own bеhalf.
*552
Therefore, it is a trial error that has an effect that may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Fulminante, supra,
499
U.S.
at 307-08, 111
S.Ct.
at 1264,
We find that the failure to give a Carter instruction is therefore subject to the Chapman harmless-error analysis.
A.
Here, the Appellate Division held the opposite, and concluded that the failure to provide the Carter instruction is a per se reversible error.
In reaching its decision, the panel interpreted this Court’s opinion in
Oliver, supra.
In
Oliver, supra,
133
N.J.
at 149,
Although both the majority and the dissent agreed that the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s request, their opinions differed on whether or not the error was harmless.
Id.
at 159-60,
In its opinion, this Court explicitly stated that “[bjecause both the majority and dissent agreed that the trial court’s refusal to give the charge was error, the issue of the propriety of that refusal (as opposed to its harmfulness) is not before us on appeal.”
Id.
at 160,
The appellate panel in this case noted that the Oliver Court applied the harmless-error standard “only because the dissenting Appellate Division judge had determined that the error was harmless.” We reject the Appellate Division’s conclusion that this Court applied a legal standard merely because the Appellate Division decision it was reviewing applied that same standard.
Additionally, contrary to the panel’s statement, the dissenter was not the only member of the appellate panel that reached the conclusion that the harmless-error rule applied to a
Carter
violation. Both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the harmless-error rule was applicable.
Oliver, supra,
133
N.J.
at 159-60,
B.
The Appellate Division also relied on
Haley, supra,
a case factually similar to this one. In
Haley,
although the pro se defendant requested the
Carter
charge, and the judge agreed to provide the instruction, the judge inadvertently omitted it.
Haley, supra,
295
N.J.Super.
at 475,
Insofar as Haley stands for the proposition that all failures to provide the Carter instruction require reversal, we overturn Haley.
C.
In this ease, because defendant did not object to the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the requested charge, and even acquiesced to the failure, we consider this issue under the plain error rule.
R.
2:10-2. Therefore, we may reverse only if the unchallenged error wаs “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.”
R.
2:10-2. In the context of jury instructions, plain error is “‘[l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.’ ”
Id.
at 207,
From our examination of the record, we find that the trial court’s inadvertent failure to give a Carter instruction was harmless. We are satisfied that “in the context of other evidence,” the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”; the results of the trial would have been the same if the constitutiоnal error had not been made. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. at 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d at 330.
Here, despite the judge’s failure to provide the
Carter
instruction, the record reveals that considering the trial in its entirety, the judge’s omission did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Both the court’s instructions and counsel’s statements provided the jury with the functional equivalent of the
Carter
instruction. They explained the State’s burden to the jurors and informed them that defendant had no obligation to testify.
See State v.
*555
Burris,
145
N.J.
509, 531,
Moreover, the State presented overwhelming evidence that defendant was the driver of the blue Audi when it eluded police. Although at the time of trial defendant no longer had a beard, both Detective Smith and Officer Vasquez tеstified and identified defendant as the driver of the Audi. Most significantly, Detective Smith testified that he arrested defendant after observing him exit the driver’s side door of the vehicle.
In light of the repeated statements to the jury concerning the State’s burden and defendant’s constitutional right not to testify, as well as the overwhelming evidence produced by the State, the trial court’s omission of the Carter instruction did not affect the outcome of the trial or deprive defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, the trial court’s inadvertent omission of the Carter instruction was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result” and was harmless. B. 2:10-2.
VII.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter is remanded to that court for consideration of the remaining issue raised by defendant that the panel did not reach.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZVINA and Judge RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) — 6.
Not Participating — Judge CUFF (temporarily assigned).
Notes
Initially, due to a clerical error, the second-degree eluding charge was mistakenly identified as a third-degree offense in the indictment.
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981).
The trial court also had defendant and his counsel sign a form reflecting their decision.
The Appellate Division reversed and remanded based on defendant's Carter-related argument; it did not consider defendant's argument regarding his motion to set aside the guilty verdict. It stated: "As defendant will receive a new trial, we need not address his second argument.”