33 Iowa 553 | Iowa | 1871
The application states that deponent believes the facts stated to be true, and that he. knows of no other witness by whom the same can be fully proved, and is duly subscribed and sworn to.
This application was refused by the court and defendant excepted, and now assigns this ruling as error.
The application complied in every substantial respect with the requirements of the statute. See Rev., § 3010.
So that the court must have refused the application upon the improbability that the witness, who was the real perpetrator of the crime, would appear before an officer to-give his testimony, thus exposing himself to arrest.
A majority of the court are of opinion that the court below erred in refusing the application for continuance. It fully complied with the statute, and the defendant should have had an opportunity to obtain the testimony of the witness, or at least to make an effort to obtain it, which it is clearly shown he had no opportunity to do prior to the trial. It may be reasonably taken for granted that the witness, being a brother of the defendant, will do all in his power to afford the defendant the benefit of his testimony, if he can do so with safety to himself, which it is not impossible for him to do. -The court should, therefore, have continued the cause, or required the district attorney to admit that the witness, if present, would have testified as stated in the application.
J. M. Curry testified: I live in Oskaloosa, Iowa, and know the defendant George W. Farr; on the 22d day of March, 1810, I was working at a saw-mill in Madison
C. W. Rose, for the State, testified as follows: “ I am 20 years old, on the 22d day of March, 1870, I was at work in the saw-mill mentioned by Mr. Curry, had been there only four days ; had seen A. J. Farr there several times previous to that day, but had not seen George; they
G. W. Phillips, on part of defendant, testified: I know the defendant, and have known him about ten or twelve years; he has always sustained a good character as a quiet, peaceable person; never heard any thing against him until the present difficulty; I was a justice of the peace of Mahaska county, Iowa, on the 20th day of March, 1860, which fact the defendant knew. About 12 o’clock of that day the defendant came to my house and told me what had occurred at the saw-mill; I was called to hold an inquest upon the body of the deceased Graham, and when I left my house the defendant was still there; I live about three miles from the mill, and was the nearest justice of the peace.
John Mitchell testified that he “had known defendant
Thomas Leary and Orlando Hanna each, testified: That “ they were farmers and lived in the same neighborhood with defendant; were acquainted with his character and knew he had always the character of a quiet, peaceable person; never knew or heard any thing against him until the present trouble.”
George Earr testified: “ He is the father of defendant; that defendant is now not quite twenty years old, and A. J. is four years older than George "W. and is considerably the larger and stronger of the two.”
This was all the evidence, and I am of opinion that it is clearly insufficient to support the verdict.
That A. J. Earr, the perpetrator of the act, is guilty of at least manslaughter, there is no room on this evidence to doubt, but, to convict the defendant of the same crime, it must be shown that he participated in its commission. While our statute (Rev., § 4668) abolishes the distinction between principals and accessories before the fact, and makes “ all concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet its commission, though not present, guilty as principals, and must be indicted, tried and punished as such.” Yet, unless the defendant would be guilty either as principal or accessory, as the distinction existed at common law, he cannot be held guilty under this statute. The person who was the actual perpetrator of the crime, A. J. Earr, would, at common law, have been a principal in the first degree. A principal in the second degree is one who was present aiding and abetting the act to be done. An accessory was one who, being absent at the time of the commission of the crime, has procured, counseled or commanded another to commit the crime. See
To constitute a principal in the second degree, there must be a participation in the act committed, and also a presence, either actual or constructive (see same authorities). The defendant was present, but did he in any manner participate therein ? Hid he in any manner aid or abet the commission of the act ? Any participation in a general felonious plan, provided such participation be concerted, and there be actual or constructive presence, is enough to make a man a principal in the second degree. But, although a man be present when a felony is committed, if he take no part in it, he will not be a principal, merely because he did not endeavor to prevent the commission of the crime or apprehend the criminal. Wharton’s Am. Crim. Law, supra.
H it had been preconcerted between A. J. Barr and the defendant to go to the mill for the purpose of drawing Graham, the deceased, into a quarrel with a view of inflicting upon him some bodily injury, and the killing had resulted in pursuance of such plan, then the defendant would have been alike guilty with A. J., the perpetrator of the deed. But there is an entire absence of evidence of any previously formed design, to even quarrel with the deceased, much less to do him any injury. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the defendant and his brother were in the habit of frequently stopping at the min when out hunting; that on this particular occasion they were there talking as usual; that there had been no previous quarrel between the deceased and either of the Barrs, and for a time after they came to the mill they paid no attention to the deceased. Indeed, it is not claimed, in argument, that there was any concerted plan between the
The evidence shows that in the course of a conversation, between the defendant and the deceased, they each called the. other a liar, whereupon the deceased started toward the defendant, who at the time had nothing in his hands, and, while the deceased was thus advancing, he was shot by A. J. Farr. Now this act, so far as is shown by the evidence, was entirely disconnected from, and independent of, any thing which the defendant said or did. It was apparently the independent act of A. J. Farr, without concert with any one, and not produced by the defendant’s conduct, but, so far as the evidence shows, was as much a surprise to him as to any one else. It was the criminal act of A. J. Farr, without the knowledge or assent of the defendant, for which the perpetrator may be tried and punished, but not the defendant, who had no knowledge of the intended act nor assented to or aided or abetted in committing it.
The judgment must be Reversed.