{¶ 1} Aрpellant Gary D. Fanti appeals the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Tuscarawas County, which imposed previously suspended sentences after finding appеllant had violated his probation terms. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶ 2} On November 22, 1989, appellant pled guilty to eight of the nine counts in an amended indictment, including robbery and aggravated burglary. He was thereupon sentenced on the various counts as follows: Count One, robbery: four to fifteen years; Count Two, aggravated burglary: ten to twenty-five years; Count Three, aggravated burglary: ten to twenty-five years; Count Five, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle: six months; Count Six, unauthorized use of a motor vеhicle: six months; Count Seven: robbery, eight to fifteen years; Count Eight: forgery, eighteen months; Count Nine: forgery, eighteen months. (A fourth count was apparently dismissed.) The court sentenced аppellant to actual incarceration of four years, consecutive to an unrelated Stark County sentence, on Count One, robbery. In regard to the remaining counts, the court “deferred” imposition of sentence, but ordered five years’ probation on the counts, with the probationary period “to begin after the completion of defendant’s incarceration.” Judgment Entry, January 31,1990.
{¶ 3} Appellant was released from prison in 2000. On March 22, 2000, the court filed a judgment entry that set the parameters of appеllant’s probation, with certain terms and conditions. However, since that date, appellant has caused his probation to be revoked on two separate оccasions.
{¶ 4} The first probation revocation commenced on May 4, 2000, when a motion to revoke probation was filed by the state after a representative from the Adult Parole Authority alleged that appellant had consumed alcohol, operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, cаused physical harm to another person, and failed to comply with the order of a police officer. The court subsequently revoked appellant’s probаtion and imposed the suspended time on Counts Five and Six (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle), to run consecutively for a total of one year of incarceratiоn. On December 8, 2000, appellant was again released and placed on five years of community control. (The court, in a nunc pro tunc entry, later corrected the references to “community control” to instead read that appellant had been placed on probation.)
*29 {¶ 5} The second probation revocation commenced on January 26, 2001, when the state again filed a motion to revoke probation. The state therein alleged that on January 2, 2001, appellant broke the window of a parole authority automobile, escaped detention, and illegally entered a private residence. On March 5, 2001, appellant filed a motion tо dismiss the pending probation violation proceeding, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose additional sanctions. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss. On April 2, 2001, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to revoke, during which appellant orally moved to dismiss. The trial court overruled appellant’s оral motion. At the close of evidence, the trial court found that appellant had violated his probation based on the aforesaid events. In a judgment entry dated Aрril 6, 2001, the court imposed the remainder of appellant’s suspended sentence, ordering that appellant serve prison time on Counts Two and Three (aggravated burglary) of the 1989 convictions, i.e., ten to twenty-five years, to run consecutively. The court also ordered the eighteen-month sentences on Counts Eight and Nine (forgery) served conсurrently therewith. In addition, appellant entered pleas to and was convicted of escape and burglary based on the events of January 2, 2001, and sentenced to two years on those charges.
{¶ 6} Appellant filed a notice of appeal on May 1, 2001. He herein raises the following sole assignment of error:
{¶ 7} I. “The trial court erred in imрosing prison time for a probation violation where the court lacked jurisdiction.”
I
{¶ 8} Appellant first argues that the applicable provisions of the Revised Code do not specifically provide for a prison sentence to be followed by an order of probation. He essentially argues that the pre-1996 statutory scheme for sеntencing and probation allowed merely two options: either a suspended sentence with probation, or the imposition of actual incarceration time. If a trial court were to choose the latter option, he contends, the authority to monitor a defendant upon release from prison is solely granted to the Adult Parоle Authority, pursuant to R.C. 5149.03. Appellant also cites
State v. Griffin
(1998),
{¶ 9} The state in response urges the applicability of R.C. 2951.07, which reads:
{¶ 10} “* * * If the probationer absсonds or otherwise absents himself or herself from the jurisdiction of the court without permission from the county *30 department of probation or the court to do so, or if the prоbationer is confined in any institution for the commission of any offense whatever, the probation period ceases to run until such time as the probationer is brought before the court for its further action.”
{¶ 11} We observe the Griffin court specifically emphasized that R.C. 2951.07 pertains to probation and is not viable in community control cases, as the two concepts are different. Id. at 697-698,
{¶ 12} It is well established in Ohio that the General Assembly has the plenary power to prescribe crimes and fix penalties.
State v. Morris
(1978),
{¶ 13} The sentencing provisions set forth in the Revised Code are to be strictly сonstrued against the state and liberally construed in favor of the accused. R.C. 2901.04(A);
State v. Marine
(2001),
{¶ 14} The remaining issues raised by appellant are hereby rendered moot. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 15} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Tuscarawas County, Ohio, is hereby reversed and vacated.
Judgment reversed.