State v. Fain

Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE FAIN, Defendant-Appellant. I.

Charles

No. 18463.

Supreme Court of

Boise, Dec.1990 Term.

March 1991.

Rehearing May Denied Bishop, Nampa, defendant-ap-

Van G. for pellant. Jones, Atty. Lynn

Jim Gen. and E. Thom- as, Boise, (argued), plaintiff- Sol. Gen. for respondent.

McDEVITT, Justice. I. Fain convicted of first

Charles murder, degree lewd and lascivious conduct minor, degree kidnapping. with a and first ap- an He was sentenced to death. After Court, peal the case remanded to this findings on the issue of for factual whether process rights due the defendant’s pre- as a result of the failure to violated potentially exculpatory evidence tak- serve during autopsy. en from the victim On appeal the next to this convic- affirmed the death sentence tions were but for resentenc- vacated and remanded reimposed ing. The district penalty. appeal, we are death On reimposition asked to examine penalty. interpret- The Court Charboneau of review in cases where standard Our 19-2515(c), provides: which ing I.C. imposed has been is dic- § 19-2827: by Idaho Code tated § of an of- person a is convicted Where death, may punishable sentence of death (c) regard to the fense which With imposed not be determine: a sentence of death shall shall the court (1) at least one unless the court finds of death was (1) the sentence Whether aggravating circumstance. statutory passion, the influence imposed under aggra- statutory Where the court finds factor, arbitrary other or prejudice, shall sen- vating the court circumstance to death unless tence the defendant (2) supports the evidence Whether mitigating circumstances finds that finding statutory aggravat- judge’s presented outweigh the may be among enu- those ing circumstance any aggravating circumstance gravity of Code, in section merated un- make of death found and just. (3) the sentence of death is Whether Here, aggra- district court found two pen- excessive spoke present, and vating factors to be cases, considering imposed in similar alty resentencing hearing: them at the about and the defendant. the crime both espe- I then that this was an ... said manifest- cially and cruel crime heinous THE DISTRICT COURT WHETHER depravity, relayed and I ing exceptional APPLIED I.C. 19-2515 PROPERLY § offered. [sic, it to the evidence related] ADEQUATELY DISTIN- AND you, was that The evidence offered BETWEEN AGGRAVAT- GUISHED age, thirty-five years of ab- man of—of ING FACTORS street; nine-year girl old off the ducted a site; sexually as- her to a remote took district court Appellant asserts that the and killed her. In mind saulted light improperly applied I.C. aggravating circum- Charboneau, is an holding in 116 — of our kill- talking not about a stance. You’re P.2d oth- equals, physically or of—of two -, talking a homicide You’re about erwise. judge did not and that the district man, grown under the evi- in which a aggra distinguish adequately between dence, girl after an innocent little killed vating found in this case. factors I find kidnapping her off the streets. refers to in appellant present factor still is aggravating states: Charboneau And the evidence this case. under 19-2515(c) life presumes that a I.C. § me, also, shows to clearly the evidence degree first sentence is the sentence for aggravating other factors ag- Only if at least one of the murder. still exist. found then gravating listed I.C. circumstances beyond exist 19-2515(g) is found to Considering Findings of the Court may a sentence specif- reasonable doubt Penalty, the district court the Death only then that a death be It is ically these enumerated coming for- 19-2515(g): has the burden present I.C. § mitigating circumstances. ward with following aggra- finds that the The Court beyond at a rea- vating P.2d circumstances exist 116 Idaho at 324. sonable doubt: heinous, especially a. The murder us require Both of these assertions cruel, excep- manifesting atrocious or if the 19-2515 to determine to look at I.C. § depravity. tional correctly applied the statute murder, circumstances sur- By the holding in b. in accordance with the Char commission, the defen- rounding its boneau. disregard exhibited utter for hu- manner.” at dant cious Id. types present of information are here. life. Both then went to find that the The court statement con ag- outweigh presentence investigation factors did mitigating tained re imposed port factors and reads as gravating follows: compliance I.C. with (parents Mr. and Mrs. Dennis Johnson of mitigating I find the stating, “... that victim) the feel that all evidence was I have do not out- enumerated satisfactorily presented by expert testi- these aggravating factors when weigh the mony. They jury came stated the back against weighed factors are mitigating just a feel that with verdict. Both local aggravating factors individual- of the thorough each law a enforcement conducted ly.” investigation Mr. Fain the and are sure and murdered their who assaulted Although expressed the dis district daughter. family The Johnson stated repre with defendant counsel’s agreement they family lost a unit in their have vital holding in of the State Charbo sentation through though this offense. Even the neau, principles set out the em he guilty, they found jury has Mr. Fain will correctly. case We hold that bodied in that experience the hurt the rest their district court understood They ap- lives. realize this case will be applied and I.C. v. Charboneau They on behalf the defendant. pealed correctly. sorry daughter’s their brutal death relating examined the evidence We have appealed. They strongly cannot be be- factors, and and aggravating mitigating to rights lieve the has more transcript of the sen- have reviewed system or judicial than the victim the tencing hearing and the record family. also stat- victim’s The Johnsons In required by Idaho 19-2827. as Code § has they truly totally Mr. Fain ed believe examination, have deter- light of this reality disassociated himself and sufficient mined that the record contained that he is innocent has convinced himself finding of support the court’s evidence charges. They recommend of all the two factors. pass a strict sentence. the court down addition, of the victim parents In IMPACT VICTIM STATEMENT original testify sen- were allowed at tencing hearing. Daralyn’s mother testi- turn to We now the issue fied: presen impact statement contained Q: you tell the Mrs. John- Could report. Maryland, tence Booth v. son, Daralyn Johnson has how loss of you personally? affected impact prohibits the introduction of victim say devastation is phase probably A: I would during sentencing description. I think someone Eighth the best capital case as of the a violative my right off probably have cut Constitu could Amendment to the United States arm, have missed it as Booth, types of and would not two tion. there were daughter. We impact I have have much as presented victim information a very relationship family close as of “a had a type statement. The first consisted family of us as a suf the loss of one and description of the trauma emotional devastating as it would has char member family personal fered and the losing Daralyn. It has victims,” the second acteristics counseling. It has opinions psychological “family contained members’ there, being good lot of friends quired This a and characterizations of the crimes.” family. I know we would because, ad don’t what “its information is excluded times, personally, at constitutionally unac have done mission creates I— friends to personally, without impose the me—me jury may risk that the ceptable on, you say, capri- over “Come come arbitrary in an to, got you state- get out. You have court considered victim got to Rather, rou- know, living.” resentencing. I think the go on Because ment on put attorneys to assure you question want to first choice that tine first —the they given adequate opportunity child. make is to die with that ****** state their case. carefully The trial court in this case Q: your feelings regarding What are evidence, including aggravat- weighed the morn- going happen here this what is no mitigating There is factors. ing? state- indication that Well, very I feel that difficult A: it’s by the court ments were even considered it’s to be in. I—I realize that situation resentencing, they diverted situation, catch-22 and some- kind of a its function of primary trial court from hurt, I going to be and for that body is considering person being the sentenced However, it very sorry. I feel that am family. not the victim or the victim’s beyond that Mr. proven a doubt has been life of guilty taking of the Fain is not make Obviously, the trial court does penal- daughter, ... feel that the death By judge in a time a decisions vacuum. that penalty, fair I believe ty sentence, is a upon is called to decide on a under the law should be administered judge testimony heard the and evidence has in a ease such as this. trial, impact has put on at seen the of family crimes on the and communi- victim’s the kind This information ty, closely has been with the involved in contemplated Booth and years. details of the case sometimes for It such, it the district and as was error for findings from the of the trial is evident initially to admit it. court that the nature of this crime was court inquiry The next level of is to deter statements, impact that the victim if such impact if the victim consti mine statement all, not they were considered at were harmless error tutes under the State impose the factor in the decision to decisive Paz, ex penalty. death facts recited Paz, ception. This in relied on are facts that passing sentence Chapman California, 386 U.S. the trial have been known to would and Sat impact the victim statements. without Texas, terwhite case, reviewing the in this record beyond convinced a reasonable doubt impact that victim statements included that the victim could, error, presentence report while investigation presentence report, describ- circumstances, appropriate harm family of their rec- ing the the victim and less error. did not influence ommendation apply The test to if the use determine in its sentence. trial court of such statements is wheth was harmless er this Court is assured “it harm PROPORTIONALITY beyond Chap less reasonable doubt.” 19-2827(c)(3)requires this 18, 24, California, Idaho Code case, capital to determine in each Court is excessive the sentence of death “whether only evidence in the record that imposed penalty the information considered cases, considering the crime in similar both com- statement is one the defendant.” defense at the attorney ment to the made history hearing, any- perusal legislative resentencing you have Our “Do proportionality of sentences thing you garding want to offer addition guidance. much The State- as far does not offer already what the record establishes min- Purpose the committee alone ment of as the State is concerned?” This eventually passed for the bill enough to the district utes not establish expressed proportionality and codified as I.C. This Court looked at the Creech, of death sentences in only a concern that the Idaho statute be (1983), and re- updated rulings by to reflect recent viewed several cases Supreme Court: United penalty imposed had been or could compared the This Court STATEMENT OF PURPOSE facts of these crimes with the facts of the they reviewing to determine Only years ago, the United States few dispropor- whether or “rules” con- Supreme Court made new tionate. cerning imposition of the death case, kidnapped In this Charles Fain for serious crimes. So that we con- Johnson, nine-year Daralyn sexually as old Supreme formed with this U.S. Court saulted and then killed her. The atroc Constitution, interpretation of the federal ity by of this crime can best be shown Legislature in 1973 the Idaho enacted mate, testimony Bobby of a former cell present our Sections 18- Roberson, Allen the follow who attributed Then, 4003 and Idaho Code. ing to Fain: year, last the United States At this time he told me she was relating again changed the rules get pants car and he was able to her and states, capital punishment many —after down; panties her torn and he was able Idaho, response like had acted in to its her, go finger molesting into and she Court, in previous decision. The five him; got got away from and when she cases, new, set forth more definitive away, got and took off she out of car concerning sentencing rules where the running. caught He and went back sought was to be molesting doing in he do- what was — purpose codify is to into The this bill her; words, taking he ing to and his present requirements im- Idaho law these putting underneath her and his hand posed by on the states these most recent up head. He raising and her at the back Supreme decisions United States Court said, way it in “This he was able to stick capital punishment on so that we will way It get and all of the to the bottom. expression conform this latest with better,” again him felt and she made [sic] the law. got away. got away, This time when she head, hit her tripped she and fell and she proportionality, There no mention of said, up forehead. He “A knot come her expression by legislature that we golf ball.” He on her about size proportionality are to review and finished with what wasn’t satisfied special of sentences with a standard or doing, got and he was so he went back requirement test. The that the death sen- Then he took her and his satisfaction. penal- tence not to “the her put her in the ditch. He carried to a cases,” ty imposed in similar is one of water; ditch, and held her head this must ex- several considerations got he in his car and and then he said case. The amine each death left. legislature not see fit to establish a did separate proportionality considering for this crime and this defen- standard dant, crimes and sim- compared 19-2827 was similar view of sentences when I.C. § defendants,1 record in this case and ilar enacted. State, 1125, 742, (1989); Pizzuto, McKinney v. 115 Idaho 299 v. 810 P.2d 680 1. State 119 392, (1991), Enno, (1989); Fetterly, 807 P.2d 115 Ida State v. 119 Idaho State v. 772 P.2d 1219 320, Sivak, (1991), 231, (1988); Scroggins, 119 Idaho 806 610 State v. State v. ho 766 P.2d 701 542, Paz, (1991); 118 Idaho 380, P.2d 413 State cert. de 110 Idaho 716 P.2d 1152 Smith, (1990); 117 Idaho 798 P.2d 1 State 989, 582, nied, U.S. 107 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 585 891, (1990); Lankford, State v. 792 P.2d 916 410, Windsor, (1986); 110 Idaho State v. 860, 197, stay granted, U.S. 781 P.2d P.2d 1182 (1989); (1986); v. Fetter- State Charboneau, 116 Idaho impos- adequate an basis for findings there existed and conclusions court’s the district penalty, and that this decision ing hold that imposing under the influence dispro- reached is not excessive death sentence impo- prejudice. affirm the passion or We portionate. of the death sentence. sition OTHER ISSUES BAKES, C.J., and and JOHNSON The issue whether the BOYLE, JJ., concur.

adequately distinguished the two between aggravating factors was raised decided Justice, BISTLINE, dissenting: appeal to this in the first Court. State that the vic- correctly in a of the death is it of death. Nowhere Booth de- case in the defendant has been which reviewing court make suggested that process nied of law constitutes cruel Booth, due The rule of such a determination. punishment. This and unusual court has heretofore declared which this I, Fain did not find the defendant’s follow, that when a itself is denied, rights process due therefore into impact statement introduced victim appellant’s argument is without merit. procedure yields sentencing which eighth amendment violated; the defendant must be resen-

CONCLUSION proceeding subsequent at a tenced transcript reviewing After record Booth, extraneous matters. excludes such defen- describing both the and the crime 509, 482 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. at dant, im- assessing and after Indiscriminate use of harmless error posed in this with other compared danger grave rights poses doctrine cases in of death was which the sentence 1939, defendant. Unit- hold that of a criminal imposed, could been Creech, 3591, (1984); 766, (1985), v. State ly, cert. 82 L.Ed.2d 887 Idaho 710 1202 109 P.2d 362, (1983); 239, denied, 870, P.2d 463 State v. 105 Idaho 670 U.S. 107 93 L.Ed.2d 479 S.Ct. 4, 616, (1983); Beam, (1986); Major, v. Idaho 665 P.2d 703 State Idaho 710 105 164 State v. 109 493, 1336, 163, Mitchell, Stuart, (1985); 660 104 Idaho P.2d cert. 110 Idaho P.2d v. 526 State 934, 2101, denied, 77 (1985); Bainbridge, U.S. 103 S.Ct. 108 461 715 833 State v. P.2d Carter, 917, (1983); 273, (1985); Aragon, State v. 103 Idaho 655 308 698 State v. Idaho P.2d 335 391, Olin, (1981); 358, (1984); v. 103 Idaho v. P.2d 434 State State 107 Idaho 690 P.2d 293 Osborn, (1982); 180, (1984); 102 Idaho 648 P.2d 203 405, State McKinney, 570 107 687 P.2d Idaho (1981); Griffiths, 117, Paradis, 101 P.2d 187 State v. 676 P.2d 31 631 State v. 106 Idaho Padilla, 163, (1980); 1220, denied, 610 P.2d 522 State S.Ct. Idaho 468 104 cert. 713, (1980); Gibson, 3592, (1984); P.2d 286 State v. 101 Idaho 620 State v. 82 L.Ed.2d 888 341, (1979); denied, Fuchs, 54, P.2d 227 State Idaho 597 cert. 100 106 883, Needs, (1979); 591 P.2d 468 U.S. 104 S.Ct. Sivak, Lindquist, (1984); 99 Idaho P.2d 105 Idaho (1979). 468 U.S. ed Court commented on Code, Judiciary

Section 269 of the the fed which instituted the harmless

eral statute Act

error doctrine: was intended to “[The]

prevent concerned with the mere matters

etiquette trials and with the formalities procedure touching

and minutiae of

the merits of a verdict.” Bruno v. United 287, 294, 198, 200,

States, 308 U.S. S.Ct. scope

84 L.Ed. 257 has since

harmless error doctrine to include constitutional

broadened errors.

Chapman California, (1967). Chap to note that

man took care the California issue, error statute there at like

harmless statute, “empha federal harmless error

sizes an intention not to treat as harmless

those constitutional errors that ‘affect sub rights’ party.”

stantial 386 U.S. at at 828. case, the error in this the use of

Because statements, impacted defen- right eighth

dant Fain’s amendment

against arbitrary punishment, the error

cannot be deemed harmless. COMPANY,

RIM VIEW TROUT

Plaintiff-Appellant, RE

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER

SOURCES, Higginson, Di and R. Keith Department

rector of the Idaho of Wa Resources, Defendants-Respon

ter

dents.

No. 18704.

Boise, February 1991 Term.

April notes majority Fain, 116 Idaho in this case tim statements used decision, the Court discussed In that exactly type of statements constitute meanings of two Maryland, prohibited Booth on the and declined to reverse great detail 96 L.Ed.2d overlap grounds that these factors correctly the trial concluded that ruling. indistinguishable. We reaffirm admitting But them. rather court erred jury sentenc- The issue of versus resentencing, remanding case for than disposed of raised and requires, majority diverts it- as Booth analyzed United cen- with a harmless error discussion self federal case law tering analysis and as on its determination reject argument. We also rejected this (or sentencing judge may extent previous our appeal based on issue not) upon may have relied Charboneau. concluding final assertion is defendant’s qualified the ultimate was a candidate for

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Fain

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Mar 7, 1991

Citation: 809 P.2d 1149

Docket Number: 18463

Court Abbreviation: Idaho