THE STATE v. ROBERT EVANS and JOHN BLANKENBAKER, Appellants.
Division Two
December 11, 1929.
23 S. W. (2d) 152
Appellant relies upon Fooxe v. State, 7 Mo. 502, and State v. Gilbreath, 130 Mo. 500, 32 S. W. 1023, to support his contention that the action of the court was erroneous. Those cases were considered in State v. Hubbs, 294 Mo. 224, 242 S. W. 675. For the reasons there stated we think they do not support appellant‘s contention. This subject has recently been considered by this court in State v. Hubbs, supra, and in State v. Nave, 285 S. W. 723; State v. Levan, 306 Mo. 507, 267 S. W. 935, and State v. Schmittzehe, 3 S. W. (2d) 235, and it would serve no useful purpose to discuss it further. The decisions referred to dispose of this contention adversely to appellant.
There are some other alleged errors complained of in the motion for new trial, some of which are not sufficiently specified to bring them here for review and some of which are not stressed in the assignment of errors and brief. Such of them as merit discussion are included in the points hereinabove discussed. We find no reversible error in the record. The judgment is affirmed. Davis and Henwood, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Cooley, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. Blair, P. J., and White, J., concur; Walker, J., absent.
R. M. Robertson and Louis J. Rasse for appellants.
The prosecuting witness, W. T. Windsor, testified, in substance, as follows:
Buford Gibson testified: He was charged with this robbery and arrested, but thе charge against him was dismissed. He lived “about a quarter” north of Windsor‘s place and about three miles southwest of Chapel Hill, with his grandmother and his uncles, Gene and Sam Gibson, and his cousin, Roy Gibson. He served two years in the soldiers’ prison at Leavenworth for desertion from the United States Army. He and the defendant Blankenbaker were “in Leavenworth together.” Blankenbaker lived at his house both before and after they were at Leavenworth. On January 30, 1928, between six and seven o‘clock in the evening, he and Blankenbaker drove to Chapel Hill in a Ford roadster. On the way to Chapel Hill, Alan Longacre came out of his house and stopped
Alan Longacre testified that he lived on the road between the Windsor place and Chapel Hill; that, the evening of the rоbbery, he stopped Blankenbaker and Gibson at his (Longacre‘s) gate and asked them to bring him some tobacco from “town;” and that, “afterwards,” he found the tobacco in his mail box.
John Glote and Floyd Prater testified that they saw Evans and Blankenbaker together at the sale near Chapel Hill about three o‘clock in the afternoon on the day of thе robbery.
In behalf of the defendants, three witnesses, Miss Ollie Bartlett, Russell Markwell and Odell Barnett, testified that they saw Evans at the skating rink in Oak Grove, three miles from Bates City, the evening of the robbery. Miss Bartlett said Evans was there “something like an hour, something between eight and ten o‘clock.” Markwеll said he saw Evans there “at various times from eight to ten o‘clock.” He admitted that he had been convicted and fined “for disturbing the peace.” Barnett said he saw Evans there from “about eight until about nine-thirty.” He admitted that he had been convicted, sentenced and paroled, “for stealing curtains off a car;” also, that he was convicted and “paid a fine for passing bad checks.”
Buford Gibson, being recalled for further cross-examination, admitted that he had been convicted “for giving bad checks.”
I.
It is said that the evidence fails to show robbеry by force, the offense charged, because the element of force is lacking. There is no merit in this connection. The proof that one of the defendants grabbed Windsor and held him while the other took his money, in his presence and against his will, is amply sufficient to show that they committed robbery by force and to sustain their conviction for that offense. [
II.
It is also said that the trial court erred in permitting the State‘s witnesses, Gibson and Prater, to testify that the defendants were together at a sale on the day of the robbery, and in permitting another one of the State‘s witnesses, Webb, to testify that he saw the defеndant Evans driving south, in the direction of Chapel Hill, at eight o‘clock in the evening of the robbery. The record shows that no timely objection was interposed to the testimony of these witnesses along this line. However, this testimony was clearly admissible. The proof that the
III.
It is seriously urged that the trial court erred in refusing to give the defendants’ instructions marked “A” and “B,” or a similar cautionary instruction relating to the testimony of an accomplice, and in failing to give a cautionary instruction relating to the alleged oral statements and admissions of the defendants.
No accomplice testified in this case. True, Gibson was originally charged with participation in this robbery, but the charge against him was dismissed prior to the trial of the defendants, and there is no evidence tending to show that he was, in fact, an accomplice. On the contrary, there is evidence tending to show that he advised and warned the defendants not to commit this robbery. Obviously the charge against him was dismissed because no evidence was found to support it. Thereforе, the trial court properly refused the defendants’ instructions A and B and properly refused to give any cautionary instructions relating to the testimony of an accomplice. [State v. Merrell (Mo. Sup.), 263 S. W. 118; State v. Buckley, 318 Mo. 17, 298 S. W. 777.]
A cautionary instruction relating to the alleged oral statements and admissions of the defendants involved a collateral matter and was not necessary for the information of the jury in giving their verdict, within the meaning of
IV.
Finally, it is urged that the jury was prejudiced by improper remarks of the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument. The defendants assert, in their motion for a new trial and in their brief, that the prosecuting attorney referred to their failure to testify in this case; that he referred to them as “criminals;” and that he said they ought to be in the penitentiary “where many of their like were.” But, our review of the prosecuting attorney‘s argument discloses that he did not refer, directly or indirectly, to the failure of the defendants to testify, and that, while he did make the other remarks now complained of, no objection was interposed to such remarks at the time they were made. However, in view of the nature of the offense charged and the undisputed evidence of the defendants’ guilt, it is our conclusion that the jury was not prejudiced by any of the prosecuting attorney‘s remarks, although some of his remarks were improper. In this connection, see State v. Harmon, 317 Mo. 354, 296 S. W. 397.
We find no prejudicial error, either in the record proper or the trial proceedings. The judgment entered against each of the defendants is accordingly affirmed. Davis and Cooley, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by HENWOOD, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. Blair, P. J., and White, J., concur; Walker, J., absent.
