State v. EvansState v. Evans
Lead Opinion
A writ was granted to review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the offense of cruelty to a juvenile in violation of
Defendant initially entered a plеa of not guilty. After plea bargain negotiations, involving the trial judge, were conducted and an agreement was reached defendant changed his plea to guilty. As a part of the plea bargain the trial judge, with the state’s approval, agreed to give defendant a probated sentence. The guilty plea was accepted at a hеaring held October 22, 1984. The sentencing hearing was held February 25, 1985. Defendant was given a five year suspended sentence and was
The disposition of criminal charges by the process known as plea bargaining has been characterized as an “essential component” of the criminаl justice system. Santobello v. New York,
In order for a guilty plea to be valid the record must show that the plea was a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of the defendant’s right to a jury trial, his right to confront his accusers and his privilege against self incrimination. State v. Galliano,
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea the trial judge refused to allow defendant or his attorney to testify to their understanding of the pleа bargain agreement. The judge felt that since defendant testified at the time the plea was accepted that he had not been promised anything in return for the plea, this court’s opinion in State v. Thomas, supra, precluded the admission of such testimony.
The facts in Thomas are distinguishable from those in the instant case and it should not have been applied to preclude defendant’s or his attorney’s testimony. In Thomas there was absolutely nо evidence in the record to indicate that a plea bargain agreement had in fact been reached. During the course of that opinion we recognized that the entire record, not just the sentencing colloquy, must be reviewed to determine if an agreement has been reached. In the instant case the trial judge’s comments at the sentencing hearing and the hearing on the motion to withdraw clearly reveal that an agreement was reached, the terms of the agreement and the judge’s participation in the bargaining process. At the sentencing hearing the judge stated:
All right, sir. The Court ordered a presentence investigation. As part of the plea bargain, the Court agreed to give the defendant a probated sentence which the Court is going to do.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the judge stated:
At the Boykinization, Mr. Evans testified under oath that he had not been promised anything, in order for him to plead guilty. This Court will acknowledge that in conversations with the District Attorney and with Mr. Minor, in chambers, this Court advised Mr. Minor that his client would get a probated sentence.
We conclude that where the record clearly indicates a plea bargain agreement was reached, defendant and his attorney have the right to testify at the hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prediсated on the agreement, as to their understanding of the agreement even if the defendant previously testified at his sentencing colloquy that no promises were made in exchange for the plea.
In rejecting the motion to withdraw on the merits the judge obviously found that
We find that the imposition of the one year jail time as a condition of probation breached thе plea bargain agreement. When a defendant agrees to plead guilty in return for a probated sentence he is entitled to assume that the entire sentence will be suspended and he will not be required to serve jail time as a condition of probation. In order for the trial judge to have the option to order jail time as a condition of probation in such cases, he must inform defendant of this fact prior to accepting the guilty plea pursuant to the plea bargain wherein the defendant has been promisеd a probated sentence.
The writ is made peremptory and defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is granted.
Notes
. Because of the trial judge’s comments establishing the existence and terms of the agreement we find it unnecessary tо order a full hearing on the motion to withdraw.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the failure to grant a rehearing in this case. As I appreciate it, the holding here is that when a defendant bargаins for a probated sentence, he may not receive jail time as a condition of that probation unless he is so advised at the time of his guilty plea.
Jail is a potentiаl condition of probation established by law in felony cases. LSA-C. Cr.P. Art. 895 B. As with any condition of probation, that condition may be added,
The real issue here is, as counsel pleads in thе application to withdraw the guilty plea, whether defendant was indeed misled by counsel’s statements to him that the defendant would not receive jail time as a result of the plеa negotiations. I would simply remand for a hearing on that issue with instructions to vacate the plea if subsequent to the hearing the trial court is convinced that defendant was indeed misled by counsel.
Rehearing
PER CURIAM DENYING REHEARING.
In our original opinion, we noted that the trial court rejected defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea obviously because the defendant’s complaint was thаt either or both he and his attorney did not understand that a jail sentence could be imposed as a condition of a probated sentence.
In a per curiam attached to the State’s application for rehearing, the trial court has confirmed what we deduced was the obvious reason for the trial court’s denying the motion to withdraw. In that рer cu-riam, the trial court suggests that we too broadly stated that a plea bargain between the court and defendant had been breached. In retrospect, we agree that it was within the trial court’s prerogative to impose jail time as a condition of probation as in the circumstance where there is no bargain for a probated sentence. CCrP Art. 895(B).
In the first sentence of the penultimate paragraph of our opinion we said the imposition of the one-year jail time breached the plea bargain agreement. We accept the premise that the trial court in this instance did not agree that defendant would not have to serve time. What we should have said, to be mоre precise, was that if a trial court desires to reserve its option to order jail time as a condition of a probated sentence that is agreed to, the defendant must be informed of this reservation in the guilty plea colloquy. Otherwise, the guilty plea will not be voluntarily and intelligently made as the law requires.
As modified in the specifics mentioned, we adhere to our original opinion and deny the application for rehearing.