[¶ 1] Gаylord Gene Evans appealed from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of negligent homicide. Evans argues there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, that the district court permitted a lay witness to testify as an expert, and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm the judgment.
I
[¶2] In July 2011, Evans was towing an empty utility trailer on a Ward County road heading eastbound near Minot when the trailer completely decoupled from his pickup truck. The trailer veered into the westbound lane and collided with an oncoming car. The driver of the car, Denise Hoffert, was killed in the collision.
[¶ 3] The State charged Evans with, negligent homicide. Prior to trial, Evans filed a request for discovery and inspection under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16. In its response, the State did not disclose any expert witnesses. At trial, North Dakota Highway Patrol Officer Huston, among others, testified for the State. Officer Huston, who was not qualified as an expert witness, testified hе investigated the crash as an accident reconstructionist. Officer Huston testified he prepared a report and limited collision analysis of the accident and that he had previously received additional training in accident investigation and reconstruction.
[¶ 4] Evans objected when the State asked Officer Huston if he prepared a report and analysis of the accident. The judge instructed the jury to leave the courtroom. Outside the presence of the jury, the parties argued whether the State
[¶ 5] The next morning, a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. The court indicated it wоuld not allow Officer Huston to testify as to what he thought caused the trailer to decouple. The trial resumed. Officer Huston testified, “[t]ak-ing the totality of all the evidence that I put together, in my opinion the only thing that happened was the trailer came unhooked. It wasn’t attached to the pickup properly, came off, and unfortunately went into the oncoming lane and struck the [victim’s] vehicle.” At the close of the State’s case, Evans moved for a judgment оf acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29. The court denied the motion.
[¶ 6] In his own defense, Evans testified he attached his trailer, aired up the trailer tires, verified the ball was on, hooked up the safety chains, lifted the trailer jack and plugged in the lights. Evans averred he did not know what caused the trailer to decouple. Evans testified his trailer may have been rear-ended from behind prior to detachment, but that he did not feel the impact. Evans stated that after the accident, he removed the ball from the receiver hitch of his truck. Evans also testified he used a proper fitting ball. The defense finally asked, “[w]ere you driving the pickup towing this trailer with no safety chains whatsoever?” Evans replied, “No.”
[¶ 7] On rebuttal, the State questioned Officer Huston about the effects braking would have on an improperly connected trailer. The defense objected, claiming that Evans did not testify as to braking just prior to the accident. The court sustained the objection, ruling that Evans hаd not testified as to braking just prior to the accident. The jury was instructed to disregard the question and answer as to braking at the time of the accident. The court stated it would allow questions of a general nature about braking or decelerating.
[¶ 8] After the State rested, Evans renewed his Rule 29 motion. The court denied the motion. The jury found Evans guilty of the crime of negligent homicide. After trial, but before sentencing, Evans again moved for a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal or, in the alternativе, a new trial. The court denied his motion.
II
[¶ 9] Evans argues the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motions because there was insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Evans alleges the State failed to prove all the elements of the crime, namely, that Evans caused the death of another human being by engaging in conduct with an “unreasonable disregard ... of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standаrds of conduct.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(1)(d). Evans contends that, at best, the State’s evidence merely demonstrated: 1) an accident happened; 2) after the accident, the ball from the hitch was located in its case in the back of Evans’s pickup; 3) the hitch and trailer receiver had damage marks which may or may not be relevant to the cause of the accident; and 4) based on observations of Highway Patrol officers who have no special training regarding metal forensics, the safety chains did not appear to have been stressed.
[¶ 11] The jury convicted Evans of negligent homicide in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-03. The statute states, “A person is guilty of a class C felony if he negligently causes the death of another human being.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-03. The criminal code further provides a person engages in negligent conduct “if he engages in the conduсt in unreasonable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02—02(1)(d).
[¶ 12] In support of the verdict, the State points to a series of photographic exhibits, testimony by Highway Patrol officers, and Evans’s own testimony. Officer Roark testified he photographed the accident scene, observed the trailer hitch locking mechanism was down in the loсked position, and noticed the absence of a pin or cotter key in the trailer hitch locking mechanism “to keep the trailer locked on to the ball.” Officer Roark also interviewed Evans at the scene and testified that Evans said he removed the ball from his truck shortly after the accident because he did not want to lose it. Upon further questioning, Evans told the officer to “build your own case.”
[¶ 13] Pertaining to the exhibits, the State asserts a photograph deрicting “underside scoring of the coupler” was caused by an “improper size ball or no ball attached to the receiver hitch pin.” The jury also viewed a photograph showing “marring” on the receiver hitch allegedly caused by movement and impact of the trailer. The jury was also presented photographs and testimony indicating the safety chains were free of stress, fatigue, and wear and tear. The State postulates the lack of damage shоws the chains were not properly engaged when the trailer detached. The jury also viewed photos of the undamaged rear-end of the trailer. The State contends this undermines Evans’s claim he may have been rear-ended by another vehicle prior to detachment. Evans testified he removed the ball from his receiver hitch after the accident before police arrived. The State argues the removal of the ball supports the theory Evans failed to properly hook up his trailer.
[¶ 14] We conclude the defendant has failed to show that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, permits no reasonable inference of guilt. Under the sufficiency standard, a reasonable jury could find Evans negligently caused the death of another human being by engaging in conduct that consti
Ill
[¶ 15] Evans argues the district court erred “when it allowed Huston to provide еxpert testimony over [Evans’s] objections.” Evans specifically argues Officer Huston, a lay witness, was allowed to give expert opinion testimony over his objection 1) concerning the affects of having an improper fitting ball connected to the trailer’s coupler; 2) the affects of braking when using an improper fitting ball; 3) how safety chains would be affected by using an improper fitting ball; 4) the affects of braking if no ball was used to connect the hitch to the trailer’s coupler; and 5) whether the markings on the hitch could have been caused by the trailer’s coupler “lunging” forward.
[¶ 16] The determination of whether to allow opinion testimony from a lay or expert witness is within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
State v. Saulter,
[If 17] Rule 701, ND.R.Ev., is adopted from Fed.R.Evid. 701. N.D.R.Ev. 701, explanatory note. “When a state rule is derived from a federal rule, the federal courts’ interpretation of the rule is persuasive authority. The federal rule was amended in 2000 to include a requirement that lay opinion testimony could not be based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.”
Saulter,
[¶ 19] The heart of Evans’s argument under this section concerns Officer Huston’s rebuttal testimony. On rebuttal, Offiсer Huston testified to his experience towing a boat trailer and his familiarity with balls, hitches, and locking mechanisms. He testified an improperly fitting ball “[is] not going to fit snug and secure like a proper fit should.” Officer Huston testified the purpose of safety chains, is that, “[if] the trailer comes off of the hitch ball [the chains are] to keep that trailer from, one, swaying back and forth; and, two, the obvious from being disconnected from the entire vehicle.” Officer Huston further testified a properly fitting ball and coupler would maintain the connection between trailer and truck when there was a heavy or light application of the brakes. Evans objected. The court responded it would “allow questions of a general nature if one brakes or slows down ... that’s common sense.”
[¶ 20] Under this instruction, Officer Huston was asked, “in your personal experience do you know what would happen if you were to hit the brakes or brake suddenly without a ball on therе while towing a trailer?” He replied the trailer would detach. Officer Huston was then asked, “if you are pulling a trailer where the receiver hitch, no ball, and riding on a pin, if you were to slow or apply any braking, where in relation to the trailer would it cause, what would that cause the trailer to do?” Officer Huston stated the trailer would surge forward.
[¶ 21] In light of all the circumstances in this case, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by acting in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner when it allowed Officer Huston to testify from his personal knowledge and familiarity with trailers and from his own observations of the trailer. Although Officer Huston had received additional training in accident reconstruction, his testimony did not refer to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” under Rule 702. The line of questioning on rebuttal concerning braking and an improperly fitting ball elicited lay opinion responses. Based on Officer Huston’s own personal knowledge and experience towing trailers, he was able to opine that an improperly fitting ball or attachment would cause the trailer to shift or surge in transit. Additionally, his observation that the safety chains and the safety chain attachment points did not appear damaged was not technical. The information was helpful to the jury in determining whether the chains were properly engaged at the time of detachment.
[¶ 22] The instant case is also distinguishable from our decision in
Sautter
in which we held a detective’s specialized testimony regarding strangulation was not lay testimony. In
Saulter,
the detective
There are a variety of things that a person could experience: Light headedness, difficulty breathing, blacking out, seeing stars, having ringing in their ears. Physical manifestations could be redness, swelling, finger marks, bruising. If a ligature object was used, ligature marks, hoarseness, a change in voice afterwards, the appearance of pe-techiae, small red dots.
Saulter,
[¶ 23] This Court also recognizes that we previously indicated in
Sautter
that when an officer simply relies on information gathered by other officers to formulate and present his opinion, the testifying officer is not offering the fact-finder with any unique insights of an eyewitness’s personal perceptions as Rule 701 intends.
See Saulter,
[¶ 24] Assuming, for the purposes of discussion only, that the district court erred in allowing Officer Huston to testify as an expert, the error in the аdmission of his testimony was harmless. Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(a) “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” “If evidence was admitted in error, this Court will consider the entire record and decide in light of all the evidence whether the error was so prejudicial the defendant’s rights were affected and a different decision would have occurred absent the error.”
Saulter,
[¶25] We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Officer Huston to testify because he did not give expert testimony under N.D.R.Ev. 702 and his opinions were based on his personal experience, perception, and helpful to the jury’s determination of whether the trailer was properly attached.
IV
[¶ 26] Evans argues the district court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial duе to prosecutorial misconduct. In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must “first determine whether the prosecutor’s actions were misconduct and, if they were, then
[¶ 27] Evans argues that during the State’s rebuttal with Officer Huston, the State mischaracterized Evans’s testimony in two ways. Evans alleges “[t]he Prosecutor falsely claimed [Evans] had testified that immediately prior to the accident he had suddenly applied the brakes and that [Evans or his wife] testified that the safety chains were attached to their pickup at the time the accident occurred.” A review of the record supports Evans’s contention that the prosecutor mischaracterized Evans’s testimony as to the chains being attached at the time of the accident. However, our review of the record does not support Evans’s assertion that the State claimed Evans applied the brakes and we conclude the State’s misstatement pertaining to the safety chains does not constitute misconduct.
A. Statement about the Chains
[¶28] While questioning Officer Huston on rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, “[s]o accepting Defendant’s testimony as true that he had safety chains on at the time that this [accident] occurred being placed on the side of the plates, do you have — .” Evans did not actually testify the chains were attached at the time of the accident. Instead, Evans testified he properly hooked up thе safety chains and that, in between the time he first attached the chains and the time of the accident, he did not notice that the safety chains were ever detached.
[¶ 29] Applying the facts to the two-part misconduct inquiry, the prosecutor’s statement about Evans braking does not qualify as misconduct under the first prong as the mischaracterization of Evans’s testimony is negligible. Although Evans did not directly state the chains were connected at the time of the accidеnt, his testimony could reasonably be inferred to support that fact. The State may have made an unwarranted logical leap in assuming Evans testified that the chains were attached during the accident, but the State’s misstatement did not deny Evans a fair trial. Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, generally do not justify a reversal of a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair trial.
State v. Montano,
B. Statement about the Brakes
[¶ 30] Evans also argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by falsely claiming Evans testified he hit the brakes just prior to the accident. The State argues it did not make such a statement. Upon our review of the trial transcript, we find no evidence the State claimed Evans testified as to braking when the accident occurred. Furthermore, Evans fails to cite the location of the purported comment in the record. “Judges, whether trial or appellate, are not ferrets, .obligated to engage in unassisted searches of the record for evidence to support a litigant’s position.”
State v. Witzke,
2009
[¶ 31] Even though we conclude the State did not mischaracterize the statement, the district court sustained Evans’s objеction and instructed the jury to disregard the question and response and give them no weight whatsoever. This Court has stated, “[c]laims of improper argument are generally not grounds for reversal because it is presumed the jury will follow the trial court’s admonition and disregard improper statements.”
Pena Garda,
V
[¶ 32] We affirm the district court judgment.
[¶ 34] The Honorable ALLAN L. SCHMALENBERGER, S.J., sitting in place of Kapsner, J., disqualified.