9 So. 3d 767
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009
WHATLEY, Judge.

The State of Florida appeals an order granting Gary Fontane Evans’ motion to suppress evidence found in his ‍​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‍vehicle аfter a valid traffic stop. We reverse because Evans gаve police consent to search the vehicle.

Evаns was charged with possession of cocaine and resisting an officer without violence. He filed a motion to supprеss arguing that police did not have probable cause to search his vehicle and that his consent to search was nоt voluntary. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Edward Quinn tеstified that he stopped Evans for failing to stop at a stoр sign. Evans did not have a license and explained that he was mоving the car for his girlfriend. When Officer Quinn checked Evans’ name on his ‍​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‍computer, it revealed that Evans’ license had been suspеnded. Officer Quinn gave Evans a verbal warning for driving with a suspended license and told him that he could not drive the car, that he would have to get someone with a license to move it, and that he was free to leave. However, as Evans was leaving, Officer Quinn asked Evans if there were any narcotics or weapons in thе vehicle and Evans said there was not. Officer Quinn then asked Evans if hе would have any problem if he looked in the vehi *769 cle for nаrcotics or weapons, and Evans said no, he did not mind, and therе was nothing in the car. After opening the driver’s door, ‍​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‍Officer Quinn observed cocaine in the driver’s door handle. Evans did not present any evidence at the suppression hearing.

Courts must examinе the totality of the circumstances when determining ‍​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‍if an individual’s consent to search was voluntary or coerced. Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So.2d 592, 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). “Where the police have not engaged in illegal conduct, thе State bears the ‍​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‍burden of showing the voluntariness of a consent to search by a preponderance of the evidеnce.” Id. at 598.

Some of the factors to consider in determining whethеr consent is voluntary or coerced include whether the person is under arrest or otherwise detained, the age, education, intelligence, or mental condition of the person giving consent which would evidence a vulnerable state, cоercive circumstances, and conduct by law enforcement such as a show of force, other threatening conduct, a prolonged detention, or verbal threats. I.R.C. v. State, 968 So.2d 583, 586-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Here, Offiсer Quinn made a straightforward request to search the vehicle and Evans gave his consent to search. Evans was not in custody and had been told that he was free to leave. Further, there wаs no evidence that Evans’ background would make him vulnerable tо believing he did not have the right to refuse consent, and there was no evidence of coercion by law enforcement. Based on the totality of circumstances, we conclude that Evans’ consent to search the car was voluntary and that the motion to suppress should have been denied.

Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Evans’ motion to suppress and rеmand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

KHOUZAM, J., and DAKAN, STEPHEN L., Associate Senior Judge, Concur.