State v. Evans

is, Comm., there- 72 Ariz. The making ler order award v. Industrial fore, and the cause remanded reversed P.2d 457. proceedings herewith. in accordance further testimony to the de There is as no appellant against appellant Costs to Oliver basis, gree percentage or extent on Exchange Compensation Workmen’s permanent otherwise, partial claimant’s Compensation cross-respondents and Idaho disability, except testimony the above Company, proportion to the amount as is insufficient to Dr. Burton. evidence ultimately two Board the ac- found support apportionment the Board’s of 75% permanent partial claimant’s cidents bear to hip leg at loss of 15% divided, disability; against if not costs to the herniated thereof due disc 25% employer and liable. insurer congenital anomaly, to a because due while testimony congenital was there anom TAYLOR, PORTER, THOMAS, existed, appraisal aly there was no thereof SUTTON, Judge, District JJ., concur. basis; comparative percentage or like on a wise, testimony apportioning there was no partial disability of such 75%

85% to the second. The

first accident 15% must, therefore, remanded for the

cause evidence to take determine

Board responsibility percentages

correct 245 P.2d 788 Cavanagh, 61 Watkins

therefor. Potlatch McCall v. For v. EVANS. STATE Special Indemnity ests, supra; Fund of No. Hunt, Okl.Sup., 190 of Oklahoma Supreme Court of Idaho. Special Indemnity Fund P.2d 16, 1952. Okl.Sup., 191 June Wright, of Oklahoma v. P.2d against award Caldwell Company and Mfg.

Lumber & Box any, Company, if should

Compensation week accordance rate of $20

at 43- of then Section

with the amendment Laws, Chapter I.C.A., 1949 Session page such amend page at the time of the being effect accident.

second Gen., M. Robert Smylie, Atty.

Robert E. Blackfoot, for Atty.,

Kerr, Prosecuting Jr.,

appellant. Blackfoot, Anderson, Blaine for re- J.

spondent. 1 of the Section 14th Amendment to the''Federal Constitution. “b. provides Section 18-6607 cruel and unusual in vio- lation of Section 6 of the Ida- Article ho Constitution.

TAYLOR, “c. Section 18-6607is indefinite and Justice. uncertain and the Indictment under the charges indictment defendant this unconstitutional act defendant is felony committing lewd and with the liberty threatened the loss of without upon body with of a acts the lascivious process of law due in violation of Ar- years age of 16 child under the female ticle Section of the Idaho Con- I.C., which defines violation stitution.” as follows: the crime The court sustained demurrer and the person wilfully “Any who shall discharged ap- the defendant. The State lewdly any commit lewd or lascivious peals. upon body acts the or act or or with equal protection clause of part of a minor or member thereof right 14th Amendment .the establishes the years, age child under of sixteen or equal of citizens of the several states to appealing arousing, intent with the recognizes state law. treatment passions to, gratifying lust or or state, right through legisla its desires of sexual such classify persons ture, property, guilty minor or child, shall be of a n based upon distinc reasonable natural felony imprisoned shall accomplish pur tions, legitimate Prison for term of not more power. police of its If the classifica poses than life.” unreasonable, arbitrary or ca tion is Defendant’s demurrer is as follows: persons and under all in like pricious, “That the facts stated in said Indict- enjoy privileges circumstances same public do not constitute a offense burdens, the and bear same classifica 18-6607, Idaho Code in that Section equal protection deny tion does not ’49, 455) 214,p. Ch. is unconstitu- (S.L. Calloway, Idaho law. initio for therefore void ab tional Mallon, L.R.A.,N.S., 109; 27, In re P. following reasons: 374, L.R.A.,N.S., P. Idaho denies the de- Horn, Section 18-6607 “a. equal protection Bottjer,

fendant In re Lindstrom, 68 Ida rel. Nielson v. guaranteed the State State ex laws

55 1009; People George, by persons ho v. 191 P.2d in different status 404; 42 or Cal.App.2d 109 P.2d Cheno classifications set forth than those in § Examiners, Medical point v. 18-6607. The in weth State Board of nearest of defini- 958; tion, 132, L.R.A.,N.S., similarity 57 51 Colo. and from the of the acts State, crime, may S. which Ratcliff 106 Tex.Cr.R. v. constitute is assault 1072; Pennsylvania rape ex rel. W. Com. of with intent to (18-907) commit involv- ing as it Ashe, simple 58 S.Ct. does the as- Sullivan v. 302 U.S. definition Law, sault, 43; which C.J.S., 82 L.Ed. Constitutional is as follows: which rec “An page attempt, assault 954. Classifications is an unlawful § coupled present ability, with a to com- special safeguards and ognize the need of mit a person violent on injury universally protection for are rec children another,” 18-901 I.C. § Walton, Cal.App.2d ognized. People v. When coupled such an assault is with the 498; C.J.S., Supp. Consti 161 P.2d intent rape, to commit then the crime de- Law, Am.Jur., Const. tutional § fined 18-S07 is committed. The acts § Law, § enumerated in this are definition not nec- urged inequality here that essarily the same as those in described § specific in the charged indictment as acts 18-6607. When the intent the two sec- inferentially are violation § tions is taken into consideration in connec- charge the crime of assault sufficient to acts, with apparent becomes that I.C.) rape (§ 18-907 with intent to commit distinct crimes are defined. urged If it is punishment for or sex crime other some that the rape synonymous intent with provided by the stat which is less than the intent pas- of “gratifying the lust or is found. which indictment ute under desires,” sions sexual the answer is that may Hence, the defendant urged that it is may entirely the two also be different. We imprison subjected of life to a sentence conclude that the statute does not make an which, if committed an acts arbitrary or classification, unreasonable — n does charged circumstances other like equal not deny protection defendant prosecut arbitrary discretion the laws. statute, would another officer—under ing General, The Attorney 18- defending § only years fourteen penalty of incur a against defendant’s claim that it is of in like circum Thus, persons two less. fensive to the Amendment, Fourteenth ad penalties, and different may suffer stances proposition vances the that insofar as it is protection equal therefore, are, denied repugnant to, overlaps, or is inconsistent defining the statutes reading of with statutory law. A definition of assault with apparent is, makes rape, intent to commit crimes sex other where the as alleged different acts sault is to have against distinct occurred with deals each ” 253,. Dingman, sixteen, hibited.’ a female under Burns, Idaho. State v. (1949 18-6607, S. enactment being a later Casselman, su impli 214) repeals L. earlier law p. pra; 408, 219 Campbell, said, particularly have cation. What we P.2d 956. distinction to with reference the acts with which drawn as the intent to words; Respondent contends that the committed, two stat that the are indicates general “lewd” and “lascivious” are of such inconsistent. Stor necessarily are utes import range cover of ac and such a wide 1004; re State, Idaho, In 236 P.2d seth v. the as to render statute uncertain. a Dalton, Idaho, In doubt 243 594. P.2d wanton, Lascivious is defined to mean which statute question as to ful case the lewd, lecherous, lustful, licentious, libidi proof the be applicable would determined nous, salacious. Lewd is defined to mean Then, specific intent. as to available licentious, lecherous, dissolute, sensual, de distinction were such if facts bauched, impure, obscene, salacious, porno drawn, be the later statute not thus could graphic. Websters Dic New International Gallet, 35 v. Idaho Herrick control. would tionary, Ed., Unabridged. 2d Lewd and Martinez, 477; 43 v. Idaho 13, State lascivious are words in common use and 239; v. Hollar, Poston 64 Ida 180, indicate with definitions cer reasonable Casselman, 142; 322, 132 P.2d ho tainty the kind and of character and acts 1131; P.2d v. Tenin Idaho legislature conduct which intended 1, 212 P.2d 412. ty, prohibit punish, person so of provision ordinary understanding may constitutional' know what * * * part deprived conduct be on his person shall is condemned. Lewd “No process property due liberty without ness a crime at common life, Although, law. law, Constitution, law,” open Art. under that it is limited to § public defining indecency, a crime it acts of requires that the statute bans same- explicit inhibited persons that all sub conduct Hence, statute. sufficiently may may conduct on common law know what looked to ject for thereto fur subject penalties. of terms. them its definition Black’s part ther Law Dic will their “ Ed.; sufficiently to show 3d Ballantine’s tionary, certain Dic Law ‘be It must Am.Jur., Lewdness, 2; prohibit tionary; 33 intended § Legislature what “ Lewdness, certain, Barnett, sufficiently C.J.S., § ‘is punish’ terms, 69 P.2d The require if the 60 Okl.Cr. general use may although creating a law crime person that- a ment must be convey to toas defined so offense is explicit sufficiently subject to inform those adequate de understanding an ordinary it, part their conduct on will render pro to be intended evil scription of particular prohibiting constitution cruel penalties, has liable them to its punishment, more Both creating new is a one. applied statutes serious when force parties provisions at bar assume the law and to the common unknown offenses applicable reason, gov 19-2513 I.C. are which, may generally not be to and for that § upon understood, source ern the to be entered a con without a and are accepted pertinent of viction Some I.C. The generally construction. § provisions such statutes 19-2513 are cited deal with as follows: the cases controlling here. State (cid:127)are therefore not period imprison- “The minimum Menderson, 111 P.2d 57 Ariz. penitentiary heretofore S., U.S. Nash v. U. S.Ct. provided by law for the 1232; Connally v. Const. 57 L.Ed. General felonies, pe- and each such minimum Co., 70 L.Ed. 269 U.S. S.Ct. felonies, riod of for Bell, parte Ex Cal.2d hereby is abolished. Whenever convicted of having commit- * * Moreover, * the forbidden acts felony, ted the court shall further are limited and defined sentence such offender to specific required by intent the statute. penitentiary an indeterminate is, prohibits only That such lewd and period time, but stating and fixing lascivious acts as are committed with the in such and sentence the intent therein certainty detailed. So the re maximum term of pro- quired by process present. due State v. therefor, vided law and judgment Omaechevviaria, 280; 797, 152 P. given sentence shall be according- Idaho, Omaechevarria v. of State 246 U.S. ly, and such sentence shall be known 343, 323, 62 763; 38 S.Ct. L.Ed. v. ” Screws * * * sentence; as an indeterminate S., 91, 1036, 1031, U. 325 U.S. 65 89 S.Ct. Prior to its amendment in 1947 this section 1495; People Sims, 238, L.Ed. v. 393 Ill. 66 provided for the fixing the court of both Dingman, See : N.E.2d 86. also State 37 v. the minimum and maximum sentence with 253, 760; Mead, v. 219 State 61 in certain limits. As it now stands the 449, 915; Joseph 102 P.2d Triner penalties minimums in criminal are abol 929, Corp. McNeil, 559, Ill. 2 v. 363 N.E.2d ished and the maximum in all cases to which 1435; Bevins, A.L.R. 104 State v. 210 Iowa applies the statute must be that fixed 865; 1031, Prejean, 216 230 N.W. State v. the legislature. Applied 18-6607 it § 1072, 627; C.J.S., La. 45 So.2d 22 Criminal would mean that lewd or lascivious Law, 24.§ act committed therein described, as no mat trivial, objection punished the statute in ter how must by life 1, 6, imprisonment. question Art our state violates Cruel and punish- § 58 874; wealth, 322, 173 53 referring Mass. N.E. originally regarded as

ments were 273; Kimbrough, 212 348, 46 impositions pillory, v. S.C. S.E.2d to such barbarous 584, State, wheel, 151 10 So.2d stake, Nowling v. Fla. breaking burning on Whitaker, 130; Garvey rel. v. 48 quartering, like. But ex drawing and the 527, 457, 19 L.R.A. Note impris La.Ann. So. 35 recognized generally 'it now 561, seq; 349, S., Weems v. U. U.S. et length time as to be 217 onment for such 544, 793; Am.Jur., 30 S.Ct. 54 L.Ed. 15 proportion gravity out of all Law, 524, 525, Criminal 535. committed, §§ offense and such as shock men, reasonable is cruel the conscience of statutes, proscribing Similar statutes of the con meaning within and unusual conduct, varying language, similar Stephens State, v. 73 Okl.Cr. stitution. many are in effect the states. Ross, from, 349, 326; 55 Or. punishment provided a fine varies 596, L.R.A.,N.S., 450, 1022, 106 P. 42 county jail in the and/or D.C.Nev., Henrichs, F. Mickle v. 262 years penitentiary. a term These Wall, D.C.N.J., F.Supp. 687; Harper together statutes are listed in the note foot 792, prison Politano, provided,, with 146 Misc. the maximum terms Politano Except California,. Common exclusive of fines.1 McDonald v. N.Y.S. Dart, 1939, Louisiana. Law Annotated Criminal 1. Arizona 43-407. Code Code years. and Procedure. 1942. Title 5. Chapter Deering’s 740-81, I. Article of Cal LSA-R.S. Penal Code California. year. ifornia, One 14:81. 288. Life. § Statutes, 1944, II, Chap. 65, 48, Maine. Revised Vol. § Laws Colo. Colorado. years. Chap. 121, years. (1935 Stat.Ann.) § 6. 10 Maryland. 27, 8564, Article 1 Anno- § 1949 Revision § Gen.Stat. Connecticut. years. (V Code, years. III). tated Michigan. Compiled Laws, ol. Chap. Delaware, 1948, 750- § Laws Delaware. County year. Jail, years. 145a. one 1949. 3 Vol. Code, 1947, Montana. Vol. Revised 1943, Chap. § § Acts of Florida. years. 94-4106. 5 by Chap. 26580, 1, amended Compiled Supp. Nevada Laws. 1943-1949 Florida, Laws F. Number years. Chap. 14, § 10143. 10 years. 800.04. § S.A. Georgia Jersey Revised New Statutes. approved Number Laws. 1950, Chap. Supp. Cumulative p. years. 387. 5 Feb. 2.T17-6.1, Sec. Misdemean (1945) N.J.S.A. Laws of Hawaii Revised Hawaii. or. years. § 11666. Mexico New Statutes. Annotated! Chap. 38, Illinois, Ill. Re Vol. One. Supp. years. Vol. 341-3421. years. 1951 5 20 Stat.1951. vised McKinney’s York. New Chap. Consolidated Session, 87 1951 Acts Indiana. York, 40, 39, of New c. Laws Book years. 5 277. Supplement. Section Chap. 725, 1951 483-b. Iowa, One 1946. Code Iowa. year. County 725.2, 6 Jail months. I.C.A. § 1948, Dakota Kentucky North Revised Code of § 435. 1943. Revised Statutes Chap. years. 1, years. 12-3011. 2 Vol. punishment. than twen would cruel and unusual greater maximum (cid:127)none allows rape require máximums Even our such not ty It the does years. is to be noted punishment. penal State, Storseth 72 Idaho mandatory. the v. In California (cid:127)are not when P.2d 1004. year ty to life.” In “from one is less than “not in that state was penalty the are, therefore, the We faced with Appeal up year” the District Court of (cid:127)one declaring alternative of unconstitu the act that contention against act held the as comport with construing tional or it as to so People punishment. authorized duty that instrument. It is the of the courts Camp, Cal.App. P. 845. v. uphold constitutionality legislative present provides for California statute when rea enactments that can be done by the Board of the maximum fixing sonable construction. Scandrett Sho Paroles, mini Prison Terms and after County, shone Deering’s term mum or after months. six Wright Headrick, State ex rel. Code of Calif. 1168. have no Penal We § 148, 139 P.2d 761. were con provision. such So if our statute To construe requiring as § assume, parties as make strued it would permitting judge imposing district mandatory only greater, maximum, fix that it jurisdic greater, any but far than in other may life, be less than is a con reasonable di which our attention has been presumption struction. The is penalty argued rected. need not be that a legislature intended act within the limits imposed than has greater ever before been Casselman, of the constitution. State v. Driver, 78 N.C. unusual'. State v. at least Therefore, 205 P.2d 1131. give order effect to the act we hold justification urged it is considerable With be construed is to as permitting dis comparatively innocent of a trict fix judge to maximum mature, “necking” “petting”, such life. less than involved, may, in under 16 a child where officers, con- We enforcement are not of some eyes unmindful that the purpose 19-2513, Be that this statute. as amended, a violation of § stitute is to permit pardons of more board may, it obvious that state acts as it to deter n orless period its broad mine the actual nature are within trivial confinement in However, given offenses case. Life neither our terms. Remington Chap. 45, Washington, Stat., Laws Session Revised § Oklahoma. (2) Supp. years. years. O.S.1951, 2442 Wyoming 1123. 5 § § 103-7-9, Compiled Statutes, 1933, Statutes §§ Revised 58— Utah. years. 102 and 58-104. Co. Jail 12 months. 103-7-8. Assembly, General Acts Vermont. years. No. 211. 5 sumption the board will any statute has the hoard observe the constitution nor in of corrections mandate of the constitution all cases. pardons state hoard or the pronounce judg authority to- given been “Pardon, parole or commutation is impose criminal sentence in cases. ment or grace an act and a matter of discre- legislature could do so Whether or not the tion, just may refused. A and sen- Up to the determination. is not here for imperative tence is and must not be belongs that function present time Kimbrough, denied.” State v. 212 S.C. function of the board is to The courts. page 46 S.E.2d at clemency. deal with Moreover, the consider board cannot even belongs to the pardons “The board parole person releasing on a life serving a state, department and executive sentence until he has at least ten served prerogative is privilege its years. I.C., Chap. by as amended 20-223 clemency. It a board of granting is 75 1st ’50. The constitutionality E.S. body. clemency punitive than a rather by statute to what is be determined not judgment and pronouncing Instead of done, by by has may 'been be done imposing punishment, its authority. its State ex Haworth v. rel. authority is prerogative Berntsen, 539, 200 P.2d 1007. penal remitting forgiving offenses appealed from reversed. judgments wiping out and sen ties— of conviction either whole tences GIVENS, PORTER, J., J.,C. concur. un such board Whenever in part. increase or extend the dertakes to KEETON, (dissenting). imposed upon Justice penalty court, they by decree convict chal- constitutionality statute of the their beyond realm of pass once here, lenged (lewd con- Sec. 18-6607 I.C. infringe authority and jurisdiction 16) duct with minor or child under set power of the state.” judicial upon the majority opinion argued was to forth Prout, appeared, un- parties In re this who Court all L.R.A.,N.S., 1064. assumption der the that life upon mandatory sen- conviction was is not State, supra. The board Storseth imposed. This in- also tence competent under our tribunal judicial placed on it terpretation different district questions or constitutional determine law had judges who occasion to court consider constitu- provisions construe subject I view the statute to no other in- Ziebarth it. Wanke cases. doubtful one terpretation; who and that is con- 384. We Co., Const. must, its victed violation unless question the as- court on determine cannot The maximum life im- term fixed sentenced suspends judgment, be I.C., consideration, Sec. 18-6607 prisonment. inmprisonment. life it nec- seems me (indeterminate sen- I.C. Sec. essarily follows that life opinion) majority cited in tence statute imposed should be on a convicted subject being now certainly applicable to the provisions. of violating its mandatory, governs the discussed, and is so, opinion If majority this be the upon holds a conviction. be entered judgment to rule, unconstitutional, that is the statute but con- exceptions general to this are There strues the fixing the statute so as to term example, the statute leave the where for imprisonment by of to provides that a life be fixed the specifically district penalty judge. of the It does not seem to be in the discretion me that Sec. sentence shall per- intended, 18-6607 rape, 18-6104 so I.C. I.C. was be Thus Sec. can so court. sentencing construed. missively judge the authorizes punishment year. at not less than one the fix general attorney also contended that imposed by judge district the

The sentence provision of the challenged law was rape, though even on a conviction be inconsistent with other offenses, defined sex life, penalty. is the than maximum less and which were therefore impliedly re- State, Storseth v. pealed, so far as covered the statute 1004; Linebarger, discussion; under and contended that if 232 P.2d 669. statutes, such inconsistent particularly those I.C., provided now under that Sec. considera- penalty a lesser for their vio- lation, provision tion, impliedly contains no were repealed, for not a then minimum was, course, sentence, statute unconstitutional, its terms fixes as life im- equal affording protection prisonment law to imposed. as the sentence be persons. all With this agree. contention I clearly provides 19-2513 I.C. Sec. that the majority opinion further concludes: period imprisonment minimum “ penitentiary abolished, felony a is ** * that compara- aof whenever a felony, convicted nature, tively innocent such as ‘neck- the court shall sentence such offender to ing’ ‘petting’, where a child under penitentiary for a involved, may, 16 is eyes of some period time, stating fixing in officers, enforcement constitute a viola- such the maximum sentence of this statute. Be that as may, imprisonment provided law, term of such it is obvious that acts of a more or less sentence to known as an indeterminate trivial nature are within its broad sentence. terms. Life for such long A penitentiary and unusual be cruel offenses would disproportionate which is so punishment.” serious- prohibited ness of act recog- has been words, years age, boy In other nized cruel less, could, holding, under the or even Driver, numerous decisions. See State v. statute, in within terms coming 78 N.C. In this case the court said court, be the trial sent the discretion “It would seem be clear engaging in for life for penitentiary than greater has pre- ever before been years, girl with á “necking party” inflicted, scribed or known or must be ‘ex- no There is days old. months and cessive, also, cruel and unusual’.” See States, or in the United anywhere S., U. Weems v. 217 U.S. 30 S.Ct. to our else, called has been anywhere L.Ed. Ann.Cas. and note and in- gross attention, that contains 725; cases collection of McDonald v. age and dis- mature justice. man of A Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 53 N.E. girl rape with a committing cretion D.C., Henrichs, Mickle v. 262 F. cited, could, cases above age same Am.Jur., p. Politano Sec. of one term imprisoned a maximum 'for Politano, 146 Misc. 262 N.Y.S. 802. State, 72 Idaho year. Storseth See opinion my because of the comparisons ma- similar P.2d 1004. Other but jority holding nothing confusion will given. be could arise, conditions follow. Under that will exactly persons committing different Two can with say any no one certainty what statute, could, under the the same offense prosecuted for, should be crime a im different terms to be sentenced guilty, crime he is or of what when con- depending penitentiary in the prisonment victed, imposed. sentence should what be en the wish of the law whim or on the Facts would defendant bring within officers, no reason or for at all. forcement provisions act, the lewd conduct Sec. sentences would disparaging grossly Such I.C., might 18-6607 under certain circum- protec equal persons with all provide not subject pros- stances conditions to him general A statute which law. tion of the rape 18-61011.C.), ecution for (Sec. assault by pre distinction arbitrary an makes attempt rape commit (Sec. with 18-907 for the penalties commis scribing different I.C.), sodomy (Sec. I.C.) prob- persons, act by same different sion apparent. other crimes now ably not one severe sentence on a more imposing clearly unconstitutional In circumstances numerous the other cannot on than visualized,. Art. Sec. be with now would be practically direct conflict in Mallon, impossible a prosecuting In See re for officer to de- Constitution. 374, L.R.A.,N.S., just offense per- termine an offending what committed, majority opinion son had crime he The or for what construes the stat- prosecuted. should be . ute provide so as not to cruel and un- usual and hence not violative impossible, It seems to me it is practically any certainty, I, degree determine of with Article Section 6 of the Con- just supposed pro- what conduct to be stitution. agree. With this I cannot hibited Sec. 18-6607 No one I.C. who statute, 18-6607, I.C., provides Sec. presented has the Court has matter that one found guilty of its violation shall anyone sup- on agreed what it is with else imprisoned in state penitentiary for a posed mean, pro- just term not more provides than life. It no made criminal. The statute it- hibited and minimum sentence and clearly standards, makes life nor no does it give self fixes mandatory. its definition terms. Whether the While it is not bind- in lieu of crim- is meant to be other ing court, this on attorney general’s terms, its coming offenses within inal office presentation conceded in the of the say. not statute does case before this court that life imprison- Only perpetual confusion will at- wás follow mandatory under the statute. tempts to reconcile the statute in question With this I in am accord.

with criminal other laws. If such confusion While it is the duty of the court to save can harmonized ever be cannot now be rather than statute, destroy and thus foreseen. sustaining the de- where it can reasonably done, without to the indictment murrer should be affirmed. doing violence plain language of the statute or province invading THOMAS, (dissenting). Justice Legislature, the court should construe a join I conclusions reached statute so as to save it being from declared KEETON, dissent of deem Justice unconstitutional. explain my to further advisable grounds for hand, On the other where the language dissent; doing so I am not unmindful clear, of the statute is as I believe it to be objective worthy meritorious in this instance, the court speculate cannot mind; Legislature had such ob- upon the intention Legislature, much jective is commendable and there is urgent less read something into the statute that is legislation with for further need reference there, accept but must the interpretation crimes, apparently which is not now- to sex appears of the Act as it plain its from provisions adequately provided other unambiguous language. State ex Ha rel. however, statutes; it is equally impor- our Berntsen, worth v. 200 P.2d enactment, no tant matter 1007. objective, its worthy conform to the how provided by standards opinion both invaluable The majority construes the stat- Constitutions. permit the Federal ute to the District Judge imposing 64= than the maximum at less fix

life, language plain while 19- para with Sec. materia

construed in life mandatory for a provides

2513 I.C. no other language will bear

sentence. construction; moreover, under the

rational opinion majority con- holding of also See Judge could sentence District that the ceded imprisonment. life the defendant recognized by well-recognized principle, opinion, that the constitution- majority decided, is to be

ality a statute law, under the done has been

what it. State done under might

Berntsen, the statute be- supra. testing So considered, the court could sentence

ing and, life

the offender opinion, life im- majority

conceded con- this statute would

prisonment punishment. The cruel

stitute Judge District should be

affirmed. P.2d 785 v. O’BRIEN.

O’BRIEN

No. Idaho.

Supreme Court 18, 1952.

June

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Evans

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 16, 1952

Citation: 245 P.2d 788

Docket Number: 7849

Court Abbreviation: Idaho