133 A. 683 | Conn. | 1926
In State ex rel. Foote v. Bartholomew,
In the Bartholomew case (p. 615), in pointing out the necessary limitation upon the issuance of the writ of mandamus as applied to officers whose duty requires the exercise of judgment or discretion, we quoted as follows: "A better statement of the law seems to be, that while a judicial officer, or one exercising discretion, or authority, may be compelled to act and to proceed to the performance of his duty, he cannot be controlled in his judgment or compelled to exercise his discretion in a particular manner by means of this writ. . . . Applying these general principles, the law is well settled that where assessing officers fail and neglect in the performance of their duty, they may be compelled to act, but where it is necessary to exercise judgment and discretion as to valuations and the like, the court will not decide such questions for the officers and direct by mandamus what the judgment is or should be." For a court to attempt to determine in advance the conclusion to which an officer ought to come in the exercise of his judgment or discretion would be to preempt the very function which the law has reposed in him. Whitney v. New Haven,
Where an owner of property subject to taxation fails to give in a tax list, it is made the duty of the assessors to fill out a list for him, putting in the property "at the actual valuation thereof from the best information they can obtain," buildings and house lots to be set in the list "at their present true and actual valuation," and lands other than house lots "at their average present and actual valuation by the acre." General Statutes, §§ 1138, 1183. However men might disagree as to the application of these rules in a particular case, they are definite and certain, and it is the clear duty of the assessors to follow them. The determination as to the value of property reached by applying them is not a matter which a court can control by mandamus, but it may require that in making that determination the assessors shall obey them. The distinction is well made in State Board of Equalization v. People,
Section 1138 of the General Statutes has a further provision that the assessors when called upon to make out a tax list for a property owner who has failed to file one "shall make a separate description and valuation of each parcel of real estate." This imposes upon the assessors the same obligation which, in the same section, is made to rest upon property owners who file their own lists. We cannot accede to the argument of the respondents that this provision is for the sole benefit of the property owner; rather, we regard it as a requirement imposed by the legislature that thereby more accurate valuations may be reached than would be the case if tracts of land not even contiguous or in any respect of like kind and use, might be lumped into a single item, and that the right of lien for unpaid taxes may be aided, and the requirements of the statutes as to the certificate necessary to continue it may be more easily met. General Statutes, §§ 1300, 1308. The application alleges that the respondents propose to list the land "otherwise than by parcels, to *548
wit: in large tracts, one of which tract is two hundred acres more or less." The latter part of this allegation may be disregarded, because the number of acres included within a tract of land in no way determines whether or not it constitutes a single parcel within the meaning of the statute, but under the first part of the allegation facts might be shown which would establish a plain breach of duty by the assessors. In itself, there is nothing in the requirement of the statute that lies outside the proper field of control by mandamus;State ex rel, School District v. Bradley,
The respondents contend that mandamus may not issue in this case, because there is other adequate remedy open to the applicant. In the Bartholomew case, we said (p. 618), that "any other relief, the existence of which will preclude the resort to the remedy by mandamus, must not only be adequate, but it must be specific, that is, . . . adapted to secure the desired result effectively, conveniently, completely and directly upon the very subject matter involved"; and we pointed out that in such a case as this, even though the proceeding be nominally taken upon the relation of an individual, the State is itself the real party plaintiff, and modes of redress subject to the control of the individual may not be adequate for the protection of the public interests. Any person claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors is given a right by statute to appeal to the board of relief, and that board may also, of its own motion, equalize and adjust the valuations of property, and otherwise *549
revise the list. General Statutes, § 1232. Passing the question whether this statute gives to the State a right of appeal, it is apparent that such a right is not adequate to secure that to which the State is entitled, to wit, the honest judgment of the assessors as to the value of property in the first instance. A remedy to be adequate, must be one "which will place the relatorin statu quo, that is, in the same position he would have been had the duty been performed. . . . Indeed, it must be more than this: it must be a remedy which itself enforces in some way the performance of the particular duty, and not merely a remedy which in the end saves the party to whom the duty is owed unharmed by its nonperformance." State ex rel. Brickman
v. Wilson,
It was error to grant the motion to quash and the action should proceed to a hearing upon the merits. The trial court also granted a motion to expunge and that action is made a ground of appeal. The application *550
is brought by the State's Attorney in his own right and does not purport to be upon the relation of any individual, but it alleges that one Foote owns property adjoining the lands in question, which was properly listed, and that he with other taxpayers would be adversely affected by the failure of the assessors to value the lands upon the proper basis. Even where, as here, the issues involved are such that the State's Attorney acts in the public interest and not to assert an individual right, allegations that an individual or individuals are adversely affected by the acts of which complaint is made are not improper, and in some instances may serve a useful purpose. Stateex rel. Coe v. Fyler,
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the cause remanded to be proceeded with according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.