State v. ErbeleState v. Erbele
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- De Walle
This аppeal is from the trial court’s order suppressing evidence seized in the search of an automobile following the Defendant’s arrest for Driving Under the Influence (DUI). The trial court suppressed the seizure of the Defendant’s ignition keys. The State argues the suppression of this evidence was imprоper. We reverse and remand.
On November 3, 1995, Steve Spitzer, a McIntosh County resident, contacted State Radio reporting a car had left thе road approximately three quarters of a mile from his farmhouse. Responding to this call, Steve Delzer, McIntosh County Sheriff, called Spit-zer. Spitzer indicated he smelled alcohol when he attempted to render assistance. Spitzer stated he walked down to the vehicle and talked with thе driver, whom he recognized as Brian Boyd Erbele, the Defendant. Prior to going to the scene of the accident, Delzer contacted Deputy Shеriff Steve Fischer. The two law enforcement officers met at the accident scene around midnight.
Fischer walked out to the vehicle stuck in the pasture and found Erbele sitting in the driver’s seat. There were no keys in the ignition and Erbele was the only person in the car. Delzer and Fischer saw a poоl-cue case and a small cooler on the passenger side floorboard, as well as an open eighteen-pack of beer in the back of the car. Delzer smelled a strong odor of alcohol and noticed Erbele’s eyes were bloodshot. Erbele admitted he was drunk, but cоntended the car had been driven off the road by someone else and, after the crash, this person left the scene, with the ignition keys, to find help. *450 Erbеle stated he did not know the person, but had met him while drinking at a bar in Ashley, North Dakota. Both Delzer and Fischer examined the accident area and fоund only one set of foot prints leading from the ditch to the driver’s side of the vehicle. Upon further questioning, Erbele again told both officers he did not know thе person whom he was with, and even if they looked, the officers would not find his keys. Subsequently, Delzer contacted the bars in Ashley which Erbele said he stopрed. The bartenders at these establishments commented they had seen Erbele, but he had been alone.
Delzer then had Erbele sit in his patrol car and asked him to perform the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. Erbele refused. Relying on Erbele’s condition, Delzer arrested him for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, under
Upon learning the ignition keys had been found, Delzer decidеd to charge Erbele with Actual Physical Control (APC) of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, under
Erbele moved to suppress the evidence seized, including the keys and the results of the blood test. The trial judge suppressed the evidence of thе ignition keys, concluding they were illegally seized because Erbele was initially charged with DUI but later charged with APC.
The State may appeal an ordеr granting the suppression of evidence.
The evidence in this matter is uneon-troverted. To summarize, Delzer and Fischer found Erbele alone in his car in a pasture. There was only оne set of foot prints leading from the ditch to the car, presumably Spit-zer’s prints. Erbele told Fisher he was drunk. Erbele commented more than once tо the officers they would be unable to find the vehicle’s ignition keys. Delzer arrested Erbele for DUI, and on the way to the Wishek hospital for a blood samрle, Erbele consented to a search of his vehicle. Subsequently, Fischer found the ignition keys stuck between the passenger seat and seat baсk. Delzer then decided to change Er-bele’s citation from DUI to APC, but did not inform Erbele of this change until sometime after a blood sample was obtained.
The record does not support or adequately explain the order suppressing the evidence of the keys. The trial court may have bаsed its decision on our holding in State v. Schuh, 496 N.W.2d 41 (N.D.1993). There, we held that DUI and APC were two different offenses *451 because each offense has different elements. Id. at 45. Here, the trial court, quoting Schuh, stated: “Thus, DUI and APC proscribe different conduct and therefore, have different elements, making them ‘different’ offenses under Rule 3(b), NDRCrimP.”
It appears the trial court concluded the keys were seized illegally because APC аnd DUI are different offenses and Erbele was initially arrested for DUI. But, our previous decisions regarding the differences between APC and DUI are irrelevant to Fischer’s search for Erbele’s ignition keys. Delzer initially charged Erbele with DUI, but upon discovery of the ignition keys, charged him with APC. These actions were within his authority, аnd do not make the initial arrest invalid nor justify the suppression of the keys as evidence. When an officer “make[s] an arrest for one reason ... thеy may thereafter prosecute for another offense and choose not to prosecute on the charge on which the arrest wаs initially made if ... they learn of other bases for prosecution.” State v. Harris, 286 N.W.2d 468, 472 (N.D.1979). See also State v. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d 185, 192 (N.D.1981). The search is valid because at the time of the search, Del-zer, with probable cause, had already placed Erbele under arrest for DUI. Once a person is under a lawful arrest, an officer may search the passеnger compartment of the arrestee’s vehicle without a warrant. State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 95 (N.D.1993) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)). Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
Furthermore, it is uneontroverted that Erbele consented to the search of his vehicle. When an appropriate party gives his or her consent to a search, the search is reasonable and does not violаte the United States or North Dakota Constitutions. State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d at 174 (citing State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405, 407 (N.D.1980)). Here, Erbele’s consent was all the officers needed to search his vehicle. The keys were lеgally seized. Thus, the search of Erbele’s vehicle was valid not only because the search was incident to his lawful arrest, but also because he consented.
We reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the keys and we remand for further proceedings.
MESCHKE, SANDSTROM, NEUMANN and MARING, JJ., concur.