74 Mo. 199 | Mo. | 1881
The defendant, William Henry Erb, was
The principal objections made by defendant’s counsel, in their motion for a new trial, are to the action of the court giving certain instructions on its own motion, and refusing others asked by defendant; in admitting improper and illegal testimony for the State, and excluding competent and legal testimony for the defendant, and the action of the court in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard certain alleged improper statements made by the circuit attorney in his address to the jury.
The facts disclosed by the evidence on the part of the State to establish the corpus delicti are that the defendant, having heard that the deceased, who had been divorced from him for some years, was about to marry again, went to his home, procured a knife and proceeded to the house of deceased, where she was engaged in washing, and asked her “ if that was true,” to which deceased made no response, whereupon defendant stabbed her twice in the back, the knife penetrating the left ventricle of the heart, and inflicting a wound of which she immediately died; that defendant, after committing the homicide, threw the knife, with which he inflicted the wound, into the vault of a water-closet, and walked away up Spruce street, and upon being arrested said he did not cut any woman; that about three
The only defense relied upon at the trial was that of insanity. This defense was sought to be established by showing that defendant had been addicted to strong drink for a number of years; that previous to 1865 he lived in Paducah, Kentucky, and while there had drunk to such excess as to produce on several occasions delirium tremens; that he had attempted, while in Kentucky, on one occasion, to jump out of a two-story window, on another occasion to poison himself, and on another attempted to kill a man with a knife, which he was trying to take from him; that when sober he was peaceable and quiet; when drunk, dangerous and quarrelsome ; that he removed to St. Louis in 1865, where he continued his habit of drinking. As to the extent to which he indulged in this habit after his re
Instructions numbers three and six- were properly overruled, for the same reasons which apply to the second instruction. In all cases where insanity is interposed as a defense, whether such insanity be denominated alcoholism in its chronic form or in its acute form of delirium tremens or dypsomania, affective or emotional, ideational, or whether it be designated by any other of the various technical terms denoting peculiar forms of insanity, the question, according to the uniform course of decisions in this State, is, whether such insanity rendered the person, laboring under it incapable of distinguishing between right
The fourth and fifth of defendant’s instructions were properly refused, as they asked the court to tell the jury that if they had a reasonable doubt as to the insanity of the accused, they would acquit. Instructions containing the above principle have been repeatedly condemned by this court. State v. Redemeier, and cases there cited.
It is also urged, as a reason for reversing the judgment of the trial court, that after the argument of the case before the jury had been closed, the court was asked to instruct the jury to disregard the following language used by the prosecuting attorney in his closing speech. The circuit attorney, in his closing argument, said: “ Where a man is really insane, from whatever cause, he shall be protected by the State whose representative I am. Eor instance, take the case of Heuman, which startled the community the other day, and which, doubtless, you have all read about. He had fits and delirium tremens, and while so suffering he killed his little infant, whom he loved, and his wife by his bedside, in his insane delusion that his little infant and his wife meant to kill him. Now that is alcoholism or insanity resulting from it, which the law recognizes wherever it exists. There is nothing of this kind in Erb, the case before you. He had no delusion or insanity of any kind, and none that any person swears to. * * That there was no murder in the second degree in the case; that the testimony proved murder in the first degree, and this was not denied, as insanity was the defense ; that if this was so, the jury ought not to convict of murder in the second degree, as this would be virtually pardoning the accused, and the pardoning power belonged to the governor and not to juries; that they should do their duty, and if they thought there were any mitigating circumstances they could write to the governor.” We cannot say that these utterances were not fully warranted by the facts disclosed in the evidence. It is true that the
The remark of the prosecuting attorney “ that there was no murder in the second degree; that the testimony proved murder in the first degree, and that this was not denied, as insanity was the defense,” could have been understood by the jury in no other sense, than if they did not believe that defendant was insane at the time he committed the act, they were bound under the evidence and the law to find him guilty of murder in the first degree. The principle thus announced in the remarks of the prosecuting attorney was directly sanctioned by this court in the case of the State v. Baldwin, supra. There was no mistake of law or fact, and the case does not come within the principle announced in the case of State v. Lee, 66 Mo. 167.
Nor do we think the appeal made to the jury to do their duty would warrant an interference with the judgment. It amounted to nothing more than an assertion of what every juror in the box, if intelligent enough to sit on a jury, knew to be a fact, viz: that their function was not to bestow mercy, but to do justice between the State and the accused. Perceiving no error, the judgment of the St. Louis court of appeals is reversed, and that of the criminal court is affirmed,