STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee -vs- DREW ELKINS, Defendant-Appellant
Case No. 17 CA 59
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
March 30, 2018
[Cite as State v. Elkins, 2018-Ohio-1267.]
Hon. John W. Wise, P. J., Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J., Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Mansfield Municipal Court, Case No. 17 CRB 163; JUDGMENT: Affirmed
For Plaintiff-Appellee
MICHAEL J. KEMERER ASSISTANT LAW DIRECTOR 30 North Diamond Street Mansfield, Ohio 44902
For Defendant-Appellant
RANDALL E. FRY 10 West Newlon Place Mansfield, Ohio 44902
Wise, P. J.
{¶1} Appellant Drew Elkins appeals following his conviction, in the Mansfield Municipal Court, Richland County, for obstructing official business and criminal trespass. Appellee is the State of Ohio. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} On January 10, 2017, appellant and Victoria Chapman were at the Richland County Children Service‘s (RCCS) offices in Mansfield for a scheduled visit with their infant child.1 The agency’s family support specialist assisting with the visit, Erica Denham, specifically advised them prior to the commencement of the visit that no cell phones were allowed, and that if during the visit a cell phone or similar device were discovered, the event would terminate.
{¶3} At some point, appellant and Chapman discovered a red mark on their child, which caused concern to them. However, a cell phone rang during the visitation time, at which point Denham and some of her co-workers immediately let them know that their visit was ending and that they needed to exit the building. Tr. at 59. Appellant refused to leave, and he asked to speak to a supervisor.2 RCCS employees thereupon decided to request law enforcement assistance. Furthermore, an ambulance was requested for Chapman, even though two of the State’s witnesses later testified that they observed no medical conditions requiring such assistance. See Tr. at 68-69 (Denham), 77 (Gordon).
{¶5} Sgt. Gordon thereafter came into the hospital waiting room and began writing a summons for criminal trespass. Deputy Amber Alfrey also arrived on the scene. As further analyzed infra, while Sgt. Gordon was attempting to write the summons, appellant engaged in actions to attempt to delay the officer in his duties. Sgt. Gordon therefore additionally charged the appellant with obstructing official business.
{¶6} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on May 22, 2017. Appellant was found guilty of one count of obstructing official business,
{¶7} On June 1, 2017, appellant was sentenced as follows: a fine of $200.00 and ninety days in jail for obstructing official business, and a $100.00 fine with thirty days in jail on the offense of criminal trespassing. The jail sentences were ordered to be consecutive to each other and were set to begin on July 11, 2017. Appellant was also ordered to obtain a mental health assessment.
{¶8} The trial court subsequently suspended all jail time and imposed one year of probation.
{¶9} Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 30, 2017. He herein raises the following two Assignments of Error:
{¶11} II. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WAS INSUFFICIANT [SIC] AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND AS A RESULT, THE APPELLANT‘S RIGHTS AS PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED.
Appellate Standard of Review
{¶12} In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, [t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus. It is well-established that the State bears the burden of establishing each and every element of a charged crime and must do so with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re L.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93356, 2010-Ohio 15, 2010 WL 27862, ¶ 11.
I.
{¶13} In his First Assignment of Error, appellant contends there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him of the offense of obstructing official business. We disagree.
{¶15} Ohio courts have generally required an affirmative act for the offense of obstructing official business. State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700, 2009–Ohio–372, 906 N.E.2d 1203 (1st Dist.). An affirmative act is defined as any conduct, physical or verbal, that hampers or impedes a police officer in the performance of his or her duties. State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007–Ohio–2953, 879 N.E.2d 215 (1st Dist.). We have recognized generally that police officers engaging in the detention and arrest of individuals are engaged in a governmental function. See Herbert v. City of Canton, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2001CA00281, 2002–Ohio–906. See, also, Pisoni v. McCord, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00111, 2018-Ohio-64, ¶ 38.
{¶16} The record in the case sub judice reveals Sgt. Gordon explicitly recounted that as he was trying to issue the summons in the hospital waiting room, appellant repeatedly asked questions, spoke on his cell phone, interrupted him multiple times when he attempted to speak with the involved parties, and generally disrupted his attempt to prepare citations for the offenses. See Tr. at 78-82. In the officer’s words:
Um, during the whole process it was my interpretation of an intentional delay, um, if, you know, if I would ask him, hey, sit down, sit down, or would have to ask him multiple times sit down. If during the process he would keep asking me multiple questions and I would have to
constantly tell him, you know, sit down, quit interrupting me, you know, not that you want to go in there as, as the bully that’s in control of everything, but you have to have control over the scene and, you know, you have to get in, handle what needs to be done and go to another call, we had multiple calls pending, I can’t spend all day, you know, when someone’s intentionally or what my perception was, was intentionally trying to delay you. * * * [E]ven at the hospital he had to be told multiple times, sit down, wait until I issue the summons and, you know, it, it caused me a much greater amount of time in issuing the summons then [sic] it would had normally taken had I not had multiple interruptions.
{¶17} Tr. at 79-80.
{¶18} Sgt. Gordon ultimately estimated that appellant’s actions caused him to spend twice as long if not longer responding to and addressing the incident while at the hospital. Tr. at 80-81.
{¶19} In addition, Deputy Amber Alfrey also testified that appellant was argumentative and uncooperative when Sgt. Gordon was attempting to issue the citations, and she likewise noted that appellant during this time began talking on his cell phone. Tr. at 91, 93. She further testified that based on her observations and her own prior experience in issuing citations, appellant absolutely delayed Sgt. Gordon. Tr. at 92.
{¶20} Furthermore, in regard to the issue of privilege under
{¶21} Accordingly, upon review of the record and transcript in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that reasonable jurors could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the misdemeanor offense of obstructing official business.
{¶22} Appellant‘s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶23} In his Second Assignment of Error, appellant argues there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him of the offense of criminal trespass. We disagree.
{¶24} In essence, remaining upon the premises of another without legal authority after being notified to leave constitutes the offense of criminal trespass. See State v. Haley, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2014CA0002, 2014-Ohio-2515, ¶ 16, citing State v. Carriker, 5 Ohio App.2d 255, 214 N.E.2d 809 (1964).
{¶26} Furthermore,
{¶27} In the case sub judice, there is little in the record to counter the State’s basic evidence that appellant did not leave the RCCS premises when clearly advised to do so by agency personnel. Appellant therefore instead urges that the State failed to show that he negligently failed or refused to leave per the statute, maintaining the evidence shows he was concerned about the red mark on the child and had made requests to speak to a supervisor. However, we are not persuaded by appellant’s insufficiency claim in this regard.
{¶28} Finally, appellant again raises the issue of privilege. The definition of said term is set forth in
{¶30} In this instance, Denham testified that she had warned appellant and Chapman, apparently based on experiences with the couple during previous sessions, that cell phone possession during their visit would not be permitted (Tr. at 58) and that she clearly directed them to leave the premises after that rule was violated (Tr. at 59-60). Appellant also admitted in his defense testimony that Sgt. Gordon had warned him previously not to bring a cell phone to visitation sessions. Tr. at 113-114. In addition, Deputy Alfrey recalled observing Sgt. Gordon trying to explain to appellant at RCCS that
{¶31} Accordingly, we reject appellant’s suggestion that his privilege to be at the RCCS facility for purposes of a child visitation appointment extended indefinitely, and upon review of the record and transcript in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that reasonable jurors could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass as charged.
{¶32} Appellant‘s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶33} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Mansfield Municipal Court of Richland County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
By: Wise, P. J.
Gwin, J., and
Hoffman, J., concur.
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