282 N.W. 810 | Minn. | 1938
The information charged that "said Matthew Eich on the 30th day of March, A.D. 1938, at the city of Minneapolis, * * * then and there being, did wilfully, unlawfully, wrongfully, unjustifiably, knowingly and feloniously expose a certain poison, drug and substance generally known as strychnine, * * * with intent that the same should be taken by an animal, to-wit: a dog [describing it], the property of and belonging to George A. Furlong, and which said strychnine was then and there taken and eaten by the said dog; contrary to the statute," etc.
Defendant's demurrer was based upon the contentions that (1) the facts alleged did not state a public offense; (2) the statute violates the due process clause of U.S. Const. Amend.
1. The first question is whether the act, § 10448, violates U.S. Const. Amend.
The principles of law applicable in determining whether a statute, as applied to a particular defendant, is unconstitutional for indefiniteness have been discussed recently by this court in State v. Northwest Poultry Egg Co.
Defendant's main assault is that the word "unjustifiably" fails to present a sufficiently definite standard. Because of the complexity of our social organization and the attendant difficulty of successfully enumerating each specific forbidden act, the legislature by necessity has had to enact many criminal statutes which are broad in their scope and character. Otherwise the fertile mind of the criminal could find omissions and loopholes as means of escape. The statute belongs to the category of such comprehensive and inclusive acts as do not readily yield to exactness of definition. We think it presents a sufficiently definitive standard. It is possible to determine with reasonable certainty what the law regards as forbidden. Many factors indicate this. The word "unjustifiable" and its antonym "justifiable" are far from being unknown in our law. For instance, 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 10067, makes a premeditated killing of a human being murder in the first degree unless it is *137 "excusable or justifiable"; and by § 10113 the term "justifiable" is used in connection with libel. While often the statutes define what is meant by the word, yet that would not seem to be always necessary, as the word from common usage has a well known meaning. Unquestionably the legislature has the power to prohibit absolutely the use or exposure of poison to or in connection with any animal, wild or domestic. Yet the legislature might well think that it was not feasible to enact such a rigid law in light of the conditions existing in our society where, by common acceptance, poisoning might be justified in the light of the interests to be protected. Defendant should not be heard to complain that the legislature has recognized that in some cases it is not a crime to use or expose poison when the dividing line, though not clear-cut, is ascertainable with reasonable definiteness. Poisoning of animals is, in most instances, a secret and anonymous act. It is of that nature because the party using or exposing poison realizes that there is a moral stigma attached to his conduct, not approved by the norms accepted and adhered to by society as a whole. A man of ordinary understanding certainly must realize that it is improper from the point of view of our moral standards to poison or expose poison to an animal belonging to another. Yet it is possible that due to a change or rise of a peculiar circumstance the impropriety dissolves in the new attitude created by the circumstance. The statute must be broad enough so that flexibility will permit intelligence to prevail in its application. It seems to us that a man of ordinary prudence, acquainted with ordinarily accepted moral standards, would have a reasonably clear and certain concept as to when poison could or could not be used or exposed.
In People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal.App. (Supp.) 771, 775, 300 P. 801, 802, the statute provided that, "any person who wilfully * * * inflicts thereon (on any child) unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor." The statute was held to be sufficiently definitive, the court saying (
"The standard thus set up is not abstract. It is concrete. The concept by which it shall be determined whether the punishment *138 is or is not unjustifiable is a fluid one — like the concept by which the action of the 'reasonable man' serves as a criterion in determining the violations of duty which amount to negligence."
If this court were to hold the standard enunciated in this statute too uncertain we would be compelled to hold subsequently many other of our criminal statutes likewise unconstitutional on the same ground although in daily application they operate without difficulty or prejudice. For instance, § 10078 provides that a homicide which results from "culpable negligence" is manslaughter. Obviously these words present as broad a standard as "unjustifiable." Again, § 10070 makes the killing of a human being third degree murder when perpetrated by an act "eminently dangerous" to others and "evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life," although without design to effect death. Furthermore, this court has sustained the constitutionality of a statute making it a penal offense to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway at a speed greater than "reasonable and proper," having regard to the traffic and use of the way or so as to "endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person." State v. Goldstone,
Another factor favoring a construction of certainty is that this provision has appeared in our statutes for many years. Fundamentally identical is G. L. 1889, c. 209, § 5. (By that act the offense was only a misdemeanor.) Also statutes none the less comprehensive have repeatedly been sanctioned by the courts. Thus the "shortest practicable route" was sustained in Sproles v. Binford,
We think it was proper for the legislature to define the characteristics of the crime in the manner here adopted. *139
2. The due process clause does not render unconstitutional a statute which compels a party to act at his peril. This is so because "the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, * * *. 'The criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.' 1 East P. C. 262." Holmes, J. in Nash v. United States,
3. The second question certified is whether the statute offends the provisions of U.S. Const. Amend.
If this is the only basis, and we can discover no other, then the question may well be summarily disposed of. All persons coming within its provisions are subject to its penalty. The mere fact that one jury may convict and another acquit upon identical evidence is not sufficient to render the act violative of the equal protection clause. Such possibilities may well be due to the nature of trial by jury and the manner in which our jury system functions.
4. The third question is whether the information is so indefinite as to offend Minn. Const. art.
By 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 10665, it is provided the offense charged in an information must be in plain and concise language *140 and that all provisions of law relating to indictments and for testing their validity shall apply thereto.
It has long been established in this state that a person may be charged in an indictment in the words of the statute, "without a particular statement of facts and circumstances, when, by using those words, the act in which an offense consists is fully, directly and expressly alleged, without uncertainty or ambiguity." State v. Comfort,
5. The fourth question has to do with whether the information and the act under which conviction is sought are so indefinite as to offend Minn. Const. art.
6. Lastly, does the statute offend Minn. Const. art.
We conclude that all questions certified must be answered in the negative.
The cause is accordingly remanded for further proceedings according to law.
So ordered. *142