State v. EckbladState v. Eckblad
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Chambers (en banc)
CHAMBERS, J.
We must decide whether
Washington State has required most drivers and passengers of motor vehicles to wear seat belts since 1986.
In February 2003, a state patrol officer saw a seat belt dangling in the window of a traveling 1982 pickup truck, near the head of a clearly unseat-belted passenger. The officer stopped the vehicle, spoke with the occupants, and arrested the unseat-belted passenger on two unrelated warrants. The officer also noticed the smell of alcohol and marijuana wafting from the cab. Eckblad, one of the passengers, admitted the marijuana was his. He was arrested, and a search incident to arrest unearthed a 9 millimeter handgun, a loaded magazine, and a box of ammunition in a pillow case. Eckblad informed the officer that the weapon and ammunition was also his. It unfolded that Eckblad had prior convictions for assault and larceny, and he was ultimately charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Because these charges were precipitated by the failure of a fellow passenger to wear a seat belt, Eckblad moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal stop. The trial judge held that
ANALYSIS
We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash.2d 103, 114, 937 P.2d 154, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997). Vagueness challenges “are evaluated in light of the particular facts of each case,” unless the First Amendment is implicated. City of Bremerton v. Spears, 134 Wash.2d 141, 159, 949 P.2d 347 (1998) (citing City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)). No free speech issue is raised here.
A statute is vague if either it fails to define the offense with sufficient precision that a person of ordinary intelligence can understand it, or if it does not provide standards sufficiently specific to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 178, 795 P.2d 693. Arbitrary enforcement is not at issue here; instead, we decide only whether
The statute states in relevant part:
Safety belts, use required—Penalties—Exemptions. (1) [Definitions].
(2) This section only applies to motor vehicles that meet the manual seat belt safety standards as set forth in federal motor vehicle safety standard 208 and to neighborhood electric vehicles. This section does not apply to a vehicle occupant for whom no safety belt is available when all designated seating positions as required by federal motor vehicle safety standard 208 are occupied.
(3) Every person sixteen years of age or older operating or riding in a motor vehicle shall wear the safety belt assembly in a properly adjusted and securely fastened manner.
....
(8) The state patrol may adopt rules exempting operators or occupants of farm vehicles, construction equipment, and vehicles that are required to make frequent stops from the requirement of wearing safety belts.
Essentially, Eckblad argues that the statute is vague because it incorporates detailed standards that are difficult to find. But this does not overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 177, 795 P.2d 693. First, specificity does not render a statute vague. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Hull, 705 A.2d 911, 913 (Pa.Super.1998) (statute requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets not unconstitutionally vague merely because the helmet requirements
While seat belt laws have not yet been challenged across the nation as unconstitutionally vague, the closely related regime of motorcycle helmet laws has been challenged in many of our sister states. See generally Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, VALIDITY OF TRAFFIC REGULATIONS REQUIRING MOTORCYCLISTS TO WEAR HELMETS OR OTHER PROTECTIVE HEADGEAR, 72 A.L.R.5th 607 (1999) (collecting cases). Courts have almost uniformly found that these statutes are not unconstitutionally vague, so long as the motorcyclist is put on notice of the general requirement of the law and given a meaningful opportunity to comply. See ABATE of Ga., Inc. v. Georgia, 137 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1355 (N.D.Ga.2001) (rejecting vagueness challenge “because the statute clearly proscribes some conduct, such as riding a motorcycle without any protective head-covering whatsoever.“) aff‘d, 264 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2001); Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831, 836 (Alaska 1972); Buhl v. Hannigan, 16 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1622, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 740 (1993); State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489, 491 (Fla.1969); State v. Albertson, 93 Idaho 640, 642, 470 P.2d 300 (1970); Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 294-95, 217 So.2d 400 (1968); Massachusetts v. Guest, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 941, 941-42, 425 N.E.2d 779 (1981); see also Wasserstrom, supra, § 7, at 643 (listing eight more states that have reached same conclusion); but see People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc.2d 1027, 1030, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1967) (holding that statute requiring the wearing of a helmet approved by a state official was too vague); but cf. People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc.2d 702, 703, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1967) (reaching opposite conclusion).
We have also been called upon to determine whether a motorcycle helmet law that depends, to some extent, on federal standards is unconstitutionally vague. See Spears, 134 Wash.2d 141, 949 P.2d 347. We concluded the helmet statute was not vague, even though the ordinary citizen might have difficulty finding and comprehending the federal regulations, in large part because the ordinary citizen was not required to master the federal regulations. Instead, the motorcyclist was merely obligated to wear a helmet labeled by its manufacturer as complying with department of transportation regulations. Spears, 134 Wash.2d at 155-56, 949 P.2d 347 (quoting
Similarly, we conclude that the statute is not vague facially or as applied to the facts of this case. The ordinary citizen reading this statute is put on notice that there is a general obligation to wear a seat belt.
We caution that we do not hold that the statute is immune from a future due process challenge. It may be unconstitutionally vague as applied to a different case. Cf. Maxwell, 74 Wash.App. at 691-93, 878 P.2d 1220 (holding that similar statute was vague as applied to three motorcyclists who arguably had attempted to comply with the relevant regulations). We do not reach the merits of a vagueness claim where a driver or passenger reasonably believes that a vehicle or its occupants are exempted by state or federal regulation from the seat belt requirements. Eckblad does not contend he believed the 1982 Chevrolet pickup truck in which he was riding was exempted from the mandatory seat belt law, and therefore such a case is not before us.3
CONCLUSION
We concur: JOHNSON, BRIDGE, IRELAND, OWENS and FAIRHURST, JJ.
MADSEN, J., concurs in result only.
SANDERS, J., (dissenting).
The government has determined our citizens are not intelligent enough to decide for themselves whether to wear a seat belt, yet they apparently have enough intelligence to locate and interpret an elusive federal administrative rule. Our case law establishes that the latter task cannot be properly strapped to the laps of our fellow citizens and I must dissent.
We start with the text of the Washington statute,
This section only applies to motor vehicles that meet the manual seat belt safety standards as set forth in federal motor vehicle safety standard 208 and to neighborhood electric vehicles. This section does not apply to a vehicle occupant for whom no safety belt is available when all designated seating positions as required by federal motor vehicle safety standard 208 are occupied.
In one sense (and only one sense), the meaning of this subsection is clear. The entire section, including subsection (3) discussed below, applies only if the vehicle in which the occupant is riding “meets” certain standards contained in the federal regulation cited.1 The converse is true: if a vehicle in which one is riding does not “meet” the federal standard, the entire section does not apply.2 However, from the text one has no idea what the federal standard may be.
Unfortunately the majority does not textually analyze the statute and misstates the legal standards to be applied to vagueness challenges such as Eckblad‘s. Moreover it fails to analyze prior Washington State case law that is directly on point.
The correct standard for vagueness challenges such as this is:
A statute is unconstitutional if it fails to provide fair notice; if the standards to which a citizen must conform are so inaccessible that an average person could not be expected to discover them by reasonable research efforts, then the statute does not provide the requisite notice.
State v. Maxwell, 74 Wash.App. 688, 691, 878 P.2d 1220 (1994) (citations omitted).
The majority neither cites this standard nor analyzes Maxwell. The reasoning in Maxwell is squarely on point and categorically inconsistent with the views of today‘s majority. Maxwell, in turn, rested its holding on State v. Dougall, 89 Wash.2d 118, 570 P.2d 135 (1977). There this court held the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution require that regulatory standards referenced in penal statutes be susceptible to location and understanding by a person of common intelligence. Dougall, 89 Wash.2d at 121-22, 570 P.2d 135.
In Maxwell the Court of Appeals faced a situation identical to the one here. A federal motor vehicle safety standard was incorporated into Washington law by mere reference. While that case dealt with motorcycle helmets rather than seat belts, the text of the administrative rule at issue in that case is illustrative:
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 218 is hereby adopted by reference as the standard for motorcycle helmets.
Maxwell, 74 Wash.App. at 691, 878 P.2d 1220 (quoting
Compare that incorporation-by-reference with the almost identical approach in the statute at issue in the present case:
This section only applies to motor vehicles that meet the manual seat belt safety standards as set forth in federal motor vehicle safety standard 208[.]
The analysis of the Maxwell court is instructive as well:
In order to comply with the statute and the state regulations, an ordinary citizen would have to know where to find the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, or Standard 218. Counsel and the court found it because we are aware of the Code of Federal Regulations; the index therein cites us to chapter 49, section 571.218. The regulation itself consists of sections 1 through 7.3.4 and covers 16 pages. Within those sections are topics such as scope—purpose—application—definitions—requirements—impact attenuation—penetration—retention system—configuration—projections—labeling—helmet positioning index—selection of appropriate headform—reference marking—helmet positioning—conditioning—impact attenuation test—penetration test—and retention system test. Also included are 7 1/2 pages of diagrams and 4 pages of charts.
The regulation fails to inform the average citizen of the location or legal citation of the federal standard it adopts. We have not been advised how a citizen of common intelligence should discover this information.
RCW 46.37.530 , as implementedthrough WAC 204-10-040 , fails to provide citizens with the fair notice required for due process.....
The federal regulation has numerous sections relating to the qualities and tests to be supplied by the manufacturer. Ordinary citizens would not be able to tell which protective helmet met those requirements, even if they could find the regulation. In adopting the entire regulation, the State Patrol has made it impossible for ordinary citizens to understand what is required to comply with the Washington statute.
74 Wash.App. at 691-92, 878 P.2d 1220.
The situation here is identical to Maxwell. We have a vague reference to a “federal motor vehicle safety standard.” There is no indication in the text of
But if some extremely diligent, or perhaps lucky, citizen did manage to locate “federal motor vehicle safety standard 208,” they would then have to translate over 100 pages of detailed technical gibberish to determine if the car in which they were riding was one in which seat belts must be worn.3 If the hidden 16-page regulation in Maxwell was beyond the capacity of a “citizen of common intelligence” to discover and decipher, how can the majority determine that the common citizen could find, much less decipher, the maze that is
Instead of looking to Washington case law for guidance, the majority turns to a string of citations from out-of-state cases, with no analysis of whether the cases cited dealt with the vague reference of inscrutable federal statutes.4 In fact the majority implicitly acknowledges that these cases deal with a situation far removed from that at bar: when a motorcyclist who fails to wear any helmet at all complains that a requirement to wear a certain class of helmet is vague. Division Three of our own Court of Appeals dealt with such a case in City of Kennewick v. Henricks, 84 Wash.App. 323, 927 P.2d 1143 (1996), and correctly held that the defendant could not challenge the vagueness of a helmet standard incorporated by reference when the defendant admitted that he was not wearing any helmet. Although the majority claims that such cases are analogous, the majority can only shoehorn such cases into relevance by an obvious misreading of the statute.
The majority states that “[t]he ordinary citizen reading this statute is put on notice that there is a general obligation to wear a seat belt.” Majority at 1186.5 Not so. The text of the statute says no such thing. There is no obligation to wear a seat belt unless the vehicle in which one is riding meets a certain
The majority‘s claim that “[t]he statute puts the reader on notice that whether an exception applies to a particular vehicle requires a more searching inquiry,” majority at 1186-87, turns the plain language of the statute on its head, as the requirement to wear a seat belt in subsection (3) is conditioned on the occupant‘s car meeting the federal safety standard.
The majority misreads the statute, misidentifies the constitutional test to be applied, and ignores that crucial line of cases which protects Washington‘s citizens from vague and hidden laws. I dissent.
ALEXANDER, C.J., concurs.
Notes
Proper respect to the people‘s legislature is more important than constructional formality. Cf. State v. Dixon, 78 Wash.2d 796, 804, 479 P.2d 931 (1971) (this court will give a statute a constitutional construction, if possible).
Or it applies if the vehicle is a neighborhood electric vehicle, which the parties agree Eckblad‘s truck was not. Regardless, the application of the law to neighborhood electric vehicles was added after Eckblad‘s stop in 2003.Traditional text is a system of displaying words and images in a two-dimensional format on a sheet of paper or other stationary material surface.... Traditional text is typically presented in a linear form with a single path to progress through the text, starting at the beginning and reading to the end.... The reader must follow an invariant and predetermined route dictated by the medium: start to finish, left to right, top to bottom.
Rogelio Lasso, From the Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the Challenge of Teaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1, 8 (2002) (footnote omitted).In contrast to the majority, I believe that “constructional formality“—which might more accurately be described as reading the statute the way the legislature wrote it—is best.
But the requirement in Spears was crystal clear—wear a helmet with the specified label. A citizen did not need to search the federal regulation to see what safety standards that label embodied. The citizen need only make sure their helmet had the label. That case is easily distinguished from cases like Maxwell and the case at bar, in which the task facing the citizen in determining what conduct is prohibited is incomparably more difficult and complex.