*1 fаilure left proof 18] Yusem’s say. Al- with little to Commissioners brief,
though we conclude that Com- findings are for our
missioners’ sufficient apprise
review and sufficient to Yusem and public of the reasons for their conclu-
sion. entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
STATE
Ryan DYER.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Briefs
Submitted on Jan. April
Decided
Chase,
(Me. 1981);
407(1);
BACKGROUND [¶ 2] The facts viewed Dyer may favorable to be summarized as April follows: On Jamie Patterson, Dyer, Daniel and after socializ- ing together, returned to apart- Tweedie’s ment in Mars Hill 11 p.m. They around met Fred Dixon outside of the apartment, apartment. and Dixon followed them to the talking Tweedie and Dixon were in either room, living the kitchen or the and watching Patterson were television. Dyer went out to the kitchen to cоok some finished, food and before it was Tweedie went to bed. Dyer testified that before retired, Tweedie Tweedie asked Dyer and Patterson, Dixon, they but not if would my place “take care of for me.” testified that he understood the instruction referring meaning to Dixon and they should not “let anything get broken anybody anything anything or steal or like that.” Patterson a slightly offered differ- account, ent and testified that Tweedie Adams, T. Attorney, Neale District Car- room, “came living into the said he was Linthicum, L. Atty., rie Asst. Dist. Pres- and, um, go going bed asked us if we Isle, que for State. just could watch the apartment make T. Ashby, Esq., Hardings Jefferson Law everything sure all right.” Patterson Offices, Isle, Presque for defendant. given permission by сoncluded that “I was the owner of the apartment to and a re- WATHEN, C.J., Panel: sponsibility apartment.” to look after the CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and bed, [¶ 3] After Tweedie went to CALKINS, JJ. became increasingly belligerent. loud television, watching While and Pat-
DANA, J. mаking terson heard Dixon tele- prank Ryan Dyer appeals judg- phone saying from calls he was Tweedie. Pat- ment entered on verdict terson testified that he went into the (Aroostook Superior County, Court War- kitchen and askеd Dixon to leave. Dixon ren, J.) (Class him finding guilty got quite of assault swearing irate and started D), (1983). hollering. He raised his fist at Patterson or control pushed it back. and drew room, or is licensed or a who hit Dixon. entered to be thereon is hair, him pullеd grabbed another nondeadly upon force room, using him out of the and threw across that he reason- and to the extent when aggra- Dyer was indicted for *3 or necessary prevent it to (Class believes ably B), 17-A M.R.S.A. vated assault а criminal the commission of 208(1)(A) (1988). terminate was en- judgment § upon such such other in or jury Dyer guilty finding tered on a verdict premises. (Class D), M.R.S.A. of assault 17-A Dyer appeals. § 207.1 give the instruction The court refused Tweedie, the having found that while
after а interest person possessory with rightful DISCUSSION request his premises, present, in the care of Dyer Dyer contends that and Patterson to take [¶ 4] place possession in in not in refusing give premises court erred did them convey use in of оr authorize them struction on the of force defense or control 104(1). apart- § for Dixon to leave the lawful order on a ment. “Whether should instructed be in defense case al
particular a criminal Premises or I. Possеssion or Control of always depends on whether the evi be Licensed to Thereon at presented generates dence trial the de The first of the de element Christen, 213, ME fense.” 1997 “per was a fense at issue is whether ¶ 4, 335, 704 A.2d v. (quoting 337 State premises or or possession son in control of Moore, 348, (Me.1990)). “A 577 A.2d 350 to be privileged who is licensed or person ‘in defense is issue’ ... if the evidence is 104(1). § At thereon.” sufficient to make the of all facts existence trial, sоlely on court and focused hy constituting the defense a reasonable in or control whether ” for the fact entertain.’ pothesis finder to Dyer contends that premises. of the (citation omitted); quotations Id. see were, least, very li Patterson at the 101(1) § also 17-A M.R.S.A (Supp.2000).2 A “licen premises. censed to be on in “The court must view the evidence in context of tort law is “a see” light most favorable the defendant.” on or remain privileged who is entеr Christen, 213, ¶4, 1997 ME 704 A.2d at only possessor’s virtue con land (Second) of Torts sent.” Restatement (1965). sense, in § this Justification for the use of force 330 Used [¶ 5] Patterson, Dixon to premises by inviting Dyer, in 17-A defense is defined 104(1) all three men apartment, gave as his M.R.S.A follows: enter defining the Dyer was sentenced ten month term of that is set out the statute to a trial, imprisonment county jail all but by proof with at the existence unless crime suspended placed defense, on seven months and was еxception, or au- exclusion of the year. probation for one evidence is in issue a result of thorization as is sufficient admitted at trial that 101(1) pertinent 2. 17-A M.R.S.A. states issue, a reasonable doubt on raise part: disprovе exis- the State its which case must negate any required is not The State beyond a reasonable doubt. tence "defense,” expressly designated as a facts any exception, or exclusion or authorization Thus, premises. leave, license to be on the on to the evidence viewed in the court focusing erred in solely posses most favorable indicates that sion and control of the ignor requested that Dixon ing the Michaud, alternаtive that the be “li v. See State censed or 1222, be thereon.” 17-A (finding 724 A.2d 104(1); see also Handyman purpose limited “[f]or the of determin- ” Co., Equip. Inc. City Rental issue,’ Port ing whether ‘in [a] [is] land, ¶ 9, 1999 ME 724 A.2d suspend courts should disbelief as- (stating given that “words must be mean story sumе that de- supports ing and are not to treated meaning be true). position fendant’s is less superfluous”). correctly contends that an *4 may order to leave be an by communicated II. Criminal Trespass 17-A person.” “authorized [¶ 7] The second element at issue is § 402(1)(D); Sebunya, Holland v. 2000 Dyer “reasonably whether believe[d]” he ¶¶ 160, (find 21-22, 205, ME 759 A.2d 213 was “terminating] the commission of a ing trespass complaint criminal that the trespass” by criminal Dixon. president of the Portland branch of thе 104(1). person posi in the NAACP in was authorized and tion of Dixon a commits criminal trespass ordering a the defendant removed from if, “knowing person that that is not li Armen, public meeting); v. A.2d State 537 so, censed or privileged to do ... Re (Me.1988) 1143, 1145-46 (finding сrimi any mains in place in defiance of a lawful trespass nal that of manager action office order to leave that personally was commu congresswoman’s justi district office was nicated person by to thаt the owner or leave); fied asking constituent to State another person.” authorized (Me.1981). Gordon, 855, v. 437 A.2d 857 402(1)(D) (Supp.2000). Gordon, In trespasser the challenged the police officer’s status as an Having been “authorized invited en residence, private person” ter a to order him to leave a could be restaurant. Gordon, come trespasser failing at by to leave after 437 A.2d 857. We found that being given by night authority a lawful order to the had manager “еxpress the owner or person, other authorized rowdy and the ask to leave.” Id. customers “mere demand of owner night manager, constitutes a The within the defendant’s lawful order purposes hearing, for the of the crimi her dеlegated authority to the Tauvar, trespass police officers, nal v. police statute.” State 461 requesting offi (Me.1983). 1065, A.2d per 1067 Unlike a cers to ask the at defendant to leave. Id. public place, son who is authority dеlegable invited to no 856-57. This was reason for requesting required. police removal is officer because evidence did parties See id. Although the do not not that the dis demonstrate owner had some agree owner,3 that night did not how limited the manager’s “express personally any Dix- authority.” communicate order to Id. at 857. poses The evidence does not reflect of a of whether criminal statute as "one Tweedie meaning was the оwner or a tenant of the flexible not ... confined to a chattel, building. testimony simply right states that it who has the absolute in a but apartment. applies was pr either his house his also who See has LoSacco, thereof') (сitations Conn.App. quota- 12 529 A.2d control (1987) omitted). (defining pur- 1351 "owner” for tions
877
he,
that,
my place for me” while
viewed care of
10]
contends
[¶
him,
See Mi
were in the kitchen.
most favorable
251, 17,
that Tweedie “ex
A.2d at
chaud,
evidencе demonstrates
724
1998
authorized” him and Patterson
pressly
Therefore,
theory
that
“Express
take care of his
au
that Dixon knew that
reasonably believed
authority
directly
thority is ‘that
which is
longer
to remain when
he
no
licensed
agеnt
granted
upon
to or conferred
reasonable
requested
he was
leave is
express
principal
...
terms
conclude that Dixon
because the
could
Libby
....’”
Mut. Ins.
Concord Gen.
hearing
delegat
when Tweedie
was within
(Me.1982)
Co.,
(quoting
A.2d
452
981
authority.
ed this
Frost,
Me.
A.2d
Stevens v.
82
evidence,
the light
This
viewed
(1943)).
authority “depends
Express
Dyer, is
for a
most favorable to
sufficient
prin
on manifestation
consent
hypothesis”
a “reasonable
to entertain
cipal,
goеs
perceptions
to the
granted
that
ex
Patterson were
party.”
Id. at
agent not
third
authority
press
hearing
within Dixon’s
(emphasis added); see also Restatement
convey a lawful order to terminate
crimi
Agency
(1958) (“An
agent
(Second)
Dyer reasonably be
trespass;
nal
that
do,
only,
is authorized
do
what it
Dixon,
requested
after
lieved
infer
is
for him to
reasonable
*5
refused,
defying
was
lawful
light
desires him to do in
principal
the
order;
Dyer
that
was licensed to be on
principal’s
manifestations and
facts
using
non-
premises
as he knows or
know them at
should
criminal
deadly force to terminate the
acts.”).
time he
find that
We
Tweedie’s
Dixon. See
statement
care of my place
“tаke
for
402(1)(D).
104(1),
§§
the defense
Because
jury
me”
is sufficient for
to entertain a
premises
by the evi
generated
hypothesis”
“reasonable
that
could
dence,
in refusing
court
in
erred
grant
believe that
and Patterson were
struct
as to that defense. See
express authority
ed
Dixon to
order
Hernandez,
premises.
leave the
(“Failure
give
A.2d
a re
addition,
In
for
reason-
statutory
quested jury instruction on
ably
necessary
“believe[ ] it
to ...
termi-
generated
the evidence is er
nate
trespass,”
...
criminal
ror.”).
104(1),
reasonably
must
he, Dixon,
that
knew
believe
Dixon
that
entry is:
...
“not licensed or
[r]e-
Remanded to the
Judgment vacated.
in the apartment. 17-A M.R.S.A.
main[ ]”
Superior
proceedings
Court
for furthеr
402(1)(D).
requirement
This
can be met
opinion.
with
consistent
this
by establishing
present
that Dixon was
when Tweedie authorized
to take
WATHEN, C.J., with whom
See,
Gordon,
e.g.,
care of his
CLIFFORD, J., joins, dissenting.
“it
(stating
dant’s of Tweedie’s words determinative,
is not rather it is the au-
thority perceived by Dixon from the state-
ment. Dixon committed a criminal tres-
pass, thereby triggering the defendant’s
right to defend the if only