*1 Texas, Petitioner, STATE of
Lynn D. DURHAM Clarence Schar
bauer, Trustees Under the ofWill Turner, Respondents.
Fred
No. D-0992. Supreme Court of Texas.
March *2 64 royalties of its share of
defraud State deposits gas from oil which underlie and fund review permanent school lands. We respondents established whether the take-nothing their sum- their entitlement to mary judgment against the State. court appeals summary judgment. affirmed judgment of804 S.W.2d 312 . We reverse the and to the trial appeals the court remand
proceedings. for court further applies Act Relinquishment of 1934 land dedicated to the Permanent School
all
Act,
retains
Fund. Under this
ownership
underlying perma-
of the minerals
Morales,
Rangel,
Dan
Jose Manuel
David
property,
the surface
nent school fund
while
Durst,
Richards, Philip
M. Hube-
R.
Priscilla
the State’s
owner becomes
Austin,
nak,
Bills,
petitioner.
Liz
for
authority
negotiate
execute oil
sole
and
Worth,
Munn,
Barry
E.
Fort
N.
Cecil
gas
The surface
leases on said lands.2
Small,
Beck, Midland,
Austin,
Carter
Ed
H.
gets
keep
the lease
one-half of
owner
Burdette,
Worth,
Bledsoe,
C.
Fort
Robert
compensation
his or her
consideration for
for
Midland,
Blair,
Worth,
B.
Gene
Sloan
Fort
damages to
es-
services and for
the surface
Dallas,
McCoy,
Yarbrough,
L.
Jack
Fletcher
764,
Corp.,
Scott Exxon
763 S.W.2d
tate.
Austin,
Corby
Maroney,
Tighe,
L.
D.
Charles
(Tex.1988).3
766
Midland,
Considing,
Vaughan,
E.
Julia
5,1930,
Land office
March
the General
On
Small, Jr., Austin,
respondents.
for
C.C.
of land
Reid a 101.35 acre tract
awarded Bob
County, in
known as the
in Pecos
what is
OPINION
Relinquish-
Yates Oil Field. Pursuant to
Act,
GONZALEZ,
owner
Justice.
ment
Reid became the surface
gas
oil
to the
and the
was reserved
ease,
gas
In this oil
the State seeks to
day,
conveyed
3.97
same
Reid
State.
impose fiduciary duties on surface owners
Jr.;
Turner,
Tur-
to Fred
acres
tract
permanent
fund
The State
school
lands.
until June 1933.
ner did
file
deed
against
and enti-
filed suit
several individuals
1933,
18,
an oil and
May
Reid executed
damages and a constructive
On
seeking
ties
tract,
acre
entire 101.35
Relinquishment
Act of 1934.1
lease
trust under the
acres,
Bryant. On
including
to M.D.
alleged
conspiracy to
the 3.97
It
that there existed a
Tex.Gen.Laws,
167,
5.01(a)(31),
notes,
§
at
Relinquish-
1987
1359,
ch.
1.As
the court of
912,
Tex.Gen.Laws,
complex:
history
ch.
by
ment Act’s
1919 Tex.Gen.
amended
1987
81,
Laws,
C.S.,
249,
by
6,
3086,
1-3,
2d
at
1921
by
ch.
amended
§§
1987 Tex.Gen.
at
amended
112,
C.S.,
38,
Tex.Gen.Laws,
repealed
30-31,
1st
ch.
at
Laws,
948, §§
at 3176.
ch.
2,
(1925),
§
by
at
recodi-
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.
2419
5367-5379,
1,§
arts.
at
as Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.
fied
currently
According
are
there
Tex.Gen.Laws,
(1925),
by 1939
tit.
1512
amended
1,444
Act
still
effect.
Relinquishment
leases
3,
4-a,
474,
Lands-Public,
by
§
at
amended
ch.
474,
880,
Tex.Gen.Laws,
by
ch.
at
amended
1949
provides
in return
Act
559,
1096,
Tex.Gen.Laws, ch.
amended
1949
at
leasing agent,
surface
acting
1938,
Tex.Gen.Laws,
635,
as the State's
repealed
by
ch.
1975
at
all
Code,
Tex.Gen.Laws,
oil
granted an undivided
owners are
!5/i6
by Natural Resources
1977
However,
871,
2689,
I,
2(a)(1),
we
gas underlying the lands.
at
ch.
art.
sec.
recodified
Tex.Gen.Laws,
Code,
portion
1977
ch.
Act does not vest
Natural Resources
have held that the
52.171-.185,
2457,
871,
rather,
owner;
§§
at
art.
1
I. sec.
in the surface
of minerals
384,
860,
Tex.Gen.Laws,
by
at
ch.
1979
ownership,
amended
surface
and the
full
State retains
81,
Tex.Gen.Laws,
21(k),
§
ch.
amended
1983
given
right
in the
to share
owner is
Tex.Gen.Laws,
624,
405,
ch.
at
1985
amended
Corp., 763 S.W.2d
Exxon
Scott v.
consideration.
44-45,
2319,
§§
Laws,
amended
1985 Tex.Gen.
at
516,
Robison,
766;
8
Tex.
at
Greene v.
652,
2407,
by 1985 Tex.
ch.
at
amended
655,
(1928).
Gen.Laws,
§
at
amended
ch.
4, 1933,
27, 1937,
conveyed
trespass
November
filed a
November
Fasken
On
remaining
Reid,
his entire
to Turner.
try
Bryant,
title suit
Thus,
years
three
after the
and others who claimed an interest
Reid,
nearly fifty-percent
Turner owned
sought
appoint-
tract. The State also
Meanwhile,
Midland’s interest
the tract.
receiver, alleging drainage
from oil
ment of
*3
tract,
completed
Midland
two wells on the
gas
adjacent
and
wells on
tracts.
major producers.
It is
both of which were
appointed
The trial court
a receiver. On undisputed
ac-
the additional interest
26, 1934,
March
an
Turner executed
quired by
the
Turner was not shared with
gas
provided
lease to A. Fasken which
for a State.
$20,000bonus,
per acre annual rental and
$2
early
employee
In
the
1960’s a former
one-eighth royalty
equally by
a
to be shared
Turner,
Knickerbocker,
Andrew
wrote the
the State and
Turner.
lease also stated
Attorney
claiming
General of Texas
knowl-
any party
assign
could
his interest at
edge
irregularities regarding
the transac-
any time.
Fasken intervened
the 1933
Attorney
tions. A first assistant
General
asserting
lawsuit
his
property
interest
the
reviewed the information and concluded that
under the lease.
pursuing
there was “no basis under law” for
3, 1934,
April
On
the trial court rendered
alleged
cause of action.
judgment
simple
that Turner held fee
title to
later,
Twenty-five years
brought
subject
the 3.97 acres
to the mineral interest
al.,
against Lynn
this suit
D. Durham et
and
of the State. The
also confirmed
groups
alleging
three other
of defendants
subsisting
Fasken had “a valid and
oil
approved by
that the Turner-Fasken lease
gas
Turner,
lease executed
Fred
Jr.
the court in 1934 was a sham transaction as
individually
and as
of the State of part
conspiracy
of a
to defraud
State of
Texas,
lessor_,”
as
conflicting
set aside
its share of Turner’s interest under the Re-
interests,
receiver,
discharged the
and denied
linquishment Act. The
filed a suit
a nn
gave
royalty
all other relief. The lease
against successors to the interests of Turner
to Turner and the
provided
State and
a
original
and the other
shareholders Mid-
$20,000
payment.
day
bonus
On the same
as
Corporation, seeking
accounting,
land
an
judgment,
Fasken transferred the east
past damages,
impose
and to
a constructive
half of
Bryant, reserving
the lease to M.D.
requested
trust. The State
million in
$162
overriding royalty
a
interest.
%6ths
punitive damages, plus
actual and
interest
attorney’s
groups
Each of
fees.
the four
Turner, Fasken,
Hunt,
Brian
and the law
take-nothing
of defendants moved for a
sum-
Cantey, Hanger
firm of
& McMahon entered
mary judgment.
agreement
14, 1934,
April
into an
dated
to
corporation,
form a
to be named Midland
facts,
In addition to the above
Producing Company,
purpose
for the
of drill-
summary judgment
evidence included
ing
short,
on the west half of the
In
lease.
Knickerbocker,
testimony
of Andrew
to
incorporation agreement
called for Tur-
the effect that the lease between Turner and
convey
ner and Fasken to
their oil and
sham,
Fasken was a
and that Fasken was a
company,
mineral interests
the tract to the
through which
strawman
Turner could obtain
which was to redistribute mineral interests
provided
an interest
excess of that
for
along
company
signatories
with
respondents
stock to the
Act. The
agreement.
a 10-
presented
previous
received
Knick
evidence
claims
year management
brought against
contract
services
erbocker had
Turner and his
estate,
disgruntled
characterizing
Midland.4
him as a
½6 n
agreement
convey
parties
company’s
royalty,
called for Turner to
his
base
3/i6ths
interest,
field,
royalty
provide
management
overriding royalty
his
in the east half of the
expertise
developing
Additionally,
overriding royalty
the lease.
and a
free
in the west
%ths
n
n
half,
Fasken,
Turner,
agreement
convey
required
Fasken to
his
to
to
to the law
fioths
firm,
working
Bryan
company
interest in the west half and his reserved
Hunt. The
'/ioth
return,
override in the east half of the lease. In
distributed its stock to the
in the same
company
convey
signatory
proportions.
was to
Marmaduke,
(1855).6
We well, agency any beginning the an offset owner not the State’s that the surface terminates, may existing and the State purposes. the lease general agent for all Within however, Act, property. undertake the Norman to re-lease scope the of 678, Giles, 21, 219 684-85 148 Tex. S.W.2d agent the is the State’s to the surface owner (1949). fact reasoning overlooks the This the assets are entrusted extent that to act as an owner, that in fact continued must Turner of the surface who the control receiver, he, executed the agent, and not the It is well that trust. settled abuse himself and selling behalf of charged with an asset for agent an in 1934 incorporated fiduciary duty acknowledged and to the own owner owes Furthermore, temporary er, by judgment. while duty that the violates this allegation on the orders based for his benefit. were obtained acquiring the asset own admissibility this should unsigned copies not decide the issue of presented State also proceeding. further purporting to show Turner and letters evidence be offered $20,000 actually gave Fasken he law firm lease, was paid half of which alleges as a bonus for Tur- exactly the State 6. This is what paid State also the testi- interest, to Turner. The offered ner, respondents’ predecessor did Ralph Yarborough, mony who was of Senator Turner, the claims that this case. The State general representing attorney the State assistant owner, effect into a scheme surface entered litigation, that he not have Reid would in the true, If this is to himself. lease minerals judgment if agreed 1934 he had known to the duty agency to the was a of Turner's breach plan. alleged preconceived State. does presence or absence this evidence case, do disposition of the and we our not affect
67 drainage, final estoppel. makes no or See Texas Co. v. 154 Tex. (1955); 494, 83, 89 McNutt v. determinations that 281 S.W.2d conditions existed (Com. Cox, 409, 129 626, agency; contraiy, 133 Tex. S.W.2d 627 termination of the to the App.1939); Crawford, State v. 771 S.W.2d judgment expressly recognizes Turner’s 624, 1989, (Tex.App. writ de agency subsisting.7 status as valid and —Dallas nied); Son, High Lewis Cox & Inc. v. Plains Nothing State Reid or the Underground No. Water Conservation Dist. resulting would allow (Tex.Civ.App.— 662-663 contrary to obtain a lease on terms to the n.r.e.). Amarillo writ ref'd We are interests of the State. sympathetic plight respondents appeals’s In addition to the court of accept judicata but if we were to the res upholding summary judg reasons for opinions, perpe dissenting views of the all a ment, respondents argue present that the keep trator of fraud needs do is the scheme represents impermissible suit signs judg concealed until the trial court collateral judgment. attack on the 1934 matter, ment a related then declare that sought judg State has not to set aside the he and his successors interest are home ment; alleged it has fraud extrinsic to the free. judgment, equity powers and invokes the recently We held that the doctrine of res *5 impose the court to a trust. constructive judicata subsequent involving will bar a suit Consequently, the State’s claim is not a col subject prior the same matter as a suit lateral example, attack. For in Dilbeck v. through diligence, the of “which exercise Blackwell, 126 (Tex.Civ.App.- S.W.2d 760 litigated prior could have in a been suit.” 1939, ref'd), Texarkana writ a heirs of dece Corp., Barr v. Resolution Trust 837 S.W.2d brought dent alleging suit that the executor (Tex.1992). According 627 to the facts al- by obtaining probate committed fraud court leged by rendering the the trial court approval of a sale to parties, third who in fact judgment the 1934 did not and could not purchasing were it on behalf of the executor. adjudicated the issue of an undisclosed remedy court held that the of construc Thus, plan acquire improper to an interest. tive “is against trust authorized as relief the that the lease was “valid and extraneous fraud and is in not conflict with subsisting” against did not inoculate it the the rule upon collateral attack the alleged adjudi- fraud the trial court did not probate orders of the court involved.” Id. at cate, way knowing indeed had no of about.8 761; generally see Hodges, Collateral At The circumstances of State v. Standard as 164, Judgments, tacks on 41 Tex.L.J. 187 they judicata relate to res are similar to the (1962). Standard, alleged ease. In facts the Although ju- couched terms of res litigation first between the involved dicata, principal argument the of the dissent covering particular which of leases a two ing just Justices is that it is not fair to be controlling: tract would the one be executed owner) litigating sixty (the events that occurred almost by B.L. Standard surface to years However, ago. the Mining Company, State its sover Trace or the one executed eign capacity, ordinary litigants, unlike is not the Commissioner of the General Land limitations, laches, subject Refining Company. to the defenses of to Humble Office Oil judgment provides: consistency positions judicata "2. The intervenor. of these two on res Fasken, readily apparent. subsisting is not A. has valid and Turner, Jr., individually lease executed Fred Hecht would make much of the State’s Justice Texas, and as of the State of as lessor ...” stipulation the a valid In lease is lease. added). (emphasis context, the "admission” of the State is that nothing irregular there is about the lease other Cornyn willing give judica- 8. plan Justice is not to res acquire than the secret for Turner to judgment's ta effect to the 1934 determination benefit from the minerals he should have shared agent, position that Turner was the State's a matter State. The State’s not incon Standard, squarely litigation. holding at issue in that Yet he would with the v. 414 sistent (Tex. 1967), judicata preclude use res of matters S.W.2d 148 that a lease which con not, not, litigated. veys improper that were and could be an interest is invalid. 68 Later, place a on the non-movant to in favor of Standard. tions burden Court held through present support the non-mov-
after the State learned the recorda- evidence defense, had tion of an amended lease Standard ant’s claim or “we never shift working, option acquire part of Trace’s proof unless burden of non-movant lease, argu- the State sued to invalidate has ‘establish[ed] the movant until fiduciary ing that Standard had breached its to a on the entitlement obligation. judicata held that The Court res presented to the trial court expressly issues bar suit “[a]s did not the second because by conclusively proving all elements essential parties, [the shown later acts of action or a matter of his cause of defense as ” suit] at issue in the first did not reflect Brand, 551 v. 776 law.’ Casso S.W.2d true was never intended contract and (Tex.1989), quoting City Houston Clear issues (Tex. to be such. The now be Auth., them 589 678 Creek Basin S.W.2d legal arise of matters resolved out whose 1979). summary judgment may not be A could have been or effect considered based a weakness the non-movant’s prior proceeding, there is decided proof unless pleading or it establishes res application no basis for doctrine of insur right of action or an absence of judicata.” at S.W.2d recovery. Swilley v. bar mountable (Tex.1972). Hughes, 488 66-67 S.W.2d
Finally,
argue
respondents
by accepting
ratified
the lease
bene
acknowledge
respon-
We
difficulties
knowledge of
acquiring
fits after
the facts
defending
that oc-
dents face
transactions
1960 n
late
from Knickerbocker. This
However,
nearly sixty years ago.
curred
by estoppel. A
argument is ratification
simi
supported
cannot
summary
be
argument
in Texas
lar
was made
Co.
respon-
any of
advanced in the
the reasons
(1955). In that
154 Tex.
dents’
therefore reverse
motions. We
held:
case
court
*6
judgment
of
remand
appeals
of the court
and
in this
is well settled
state that
[I]t
proceedings.9
for
to the trial court
further
public
holds
lands in trust for
state
school
people of
the benefit
all the
the state
of
HECHT, J.,
by
joined
Dissenting Opinion
sovereign
in its
ca-
and administers them
ENOCH,
PHILLIPS, C.J.,
by
and
J.
The
conduct of
officers
pacity.
acts and
recovering
agents
estop it from
and
cannot
CORNYN,
Dissenting Opinion
J.
of
those lands or the value
the minerals
Justice,
HECHT,
dissenting.
produced
Relinquishment
The
therefrom.
conveyance of
a
a mineral
Act authorized
County
In
district court in Travis
1934 a
only by
estate in the land here involved
Turner,
gas
that Fred
Jr.’s
declared
lease,
by estoppel.
sale or
not
of the State of Texas was
lease on behalf
at
Id.
89.
subsisting”.
gist
The
of
“valid and
that Turner
complaint
this case is
Separate
respon
from the other
State’s
dents,
duty
Relinquishment
under
his
are the successors
violated
defendants who
arranging
n.
to
of
at 64
Act
ante
in interest
to Hunt claim
their motion
working
part
acquire the benefit of
summary judgment
because
for
should stand
royalty.
If
his own
produce any
interest
in addition to
has failed to
evidence
the State
duty,
then the lease
any conspiracy or Turner
violate his
part
Hunt
did
was
adjudi-
the lease has been
Again,
argument
not valid. Since
preconceived plan.
valid,
res
summary
cated
claim is barred
State’s
misperceives the role of
judicata.
dissent.
jurisprudence.
jurisdie-
I therefore
in our
While some
record,
trial
therefore the
prayer
not
and
the State
that we
included
In its
for relief
asks
proper
to
grant
remand
the court of
determine
is not
to
to
motion
court’s refusal
summary judgment.
Vordenbaum,
We
to
State’s entitlement
ly
Ackerman v.
before us. See
complaints
the State's
do not reach the merits of
1966)
(Tex.
may
(appellate court
express
opinion thereon because the
and
no
only if
consider denial
any question
preserve
not
for review.
State did
preserved).
point
properly
has been
summary judgment was
State’s
motion
facts,
undisputed,
accepted
all
it
material
are
because it did not want
these.
In 1930 Turner
a 3.97-
drilling
complaint
was deeded
a
risk of
well.
State’s
acre tract of land in the Yates
Field in
Oil
is not that it received less than it was enti-
County.
property
per-
Pecos
transaction,
Since
was
tled to from the
but that Turner
land,
manent
fund
school
the State reserved
and Fasken received more. The State’s
ownership
Leasing
of the minerals.
of the
had,
something
claim is not for
it should have
appears
delayed by
minerals
to have been
something
argues
but for
it
Turner and
conflicting claims to the tract.
In 1933 the
Fasken should not have had. The basis for
being
concerned that
the tract was
this claim is that Turner breached his statu-
adjacent
property,
drained
wells
filed
duty
tory
by obtaining
to the State
for him-
quiet
suit
Turner and others to
title
associates, through
self and his
Midland Pro-
appointment
to the tract and for
of a receiver
ducing Company,
portion
of a
benefit
develop
to
the minerals. The district court
working
interest under the lease.
appointed
gave
a receiver and
him exclusive
The State is correct in its contention that if
possession and control of the tract with
Turner
executed
lease
Fasken
order
“complete power
authority
manage,
and
portion
working
to obtain a
of the
develop
control and
the same.” The receiver
which was not to be shared with the
develop
solicited bids to
the minerals and
authority
then Turner exceeded his
as the
report
plead-
filed a
with the court.
In their
Relinquishment
under the
Act.
ings Turner and Fasken asked the court to
a similar
We faced
contention
approve a lease of the minerals between
Standard,
(Tex.1967),
71 n terminated, royalty automatically any equally to be shared subse reforming and Turner. After the lease to quent executed the surface owner lease advantageous make its terms even more purporting capacity to be in the as the approved the district court agent leasing State’s is “without effect.” lease, judg- Turner-Fasken and rendered Giles, 21, 219 Norman v. 148 Tex. incorporating ment the lease terms. (1949). 678, Indeed, it was Turner’s drainage precipitated that failure to offset specifically permitted party The lease interest, assign following ap the Reid and resulted in the his a series transactions, assignments pointment and other Tur- of a receiver. Once Turner’s eventually acquired part ner terminated, of what became agency legal impediment no was extremely profitable working prevented acquiring him from an interest Although the mineral estate. Turner’s deal- Act to the excess of that afforded ings Attorney came to the General’s atten- agency surface owner. And as as the soon 1960s, legal tion took no filed, power was all was terminated suit seeking ap- action until it filed suit in 1988 convey rights to the oil and interests proximately damages. million in $162 resided with the district court. The fact that The essence of the State’s claims is that Turner executed the lease under the court’s lease, although the Turner-Fasken its terms authority approval sup cannot essentially approved by were dictated and port agency as a conclusion Turner’s Reid, the district court in State v. was the surface owner under the Act was somehow product of a sham transaction and a breach Moreover, ques if resurrected. even some fiduciary duty of Turner’s as the State’s leas- tion remained about Turner’s continued au ing agent ap- under the Act. The court of thority leasing agent, as the peals affirmed in favor of appointment superseded court’s of a receiver interest, holding Turner’s successors in any authority might that Turner have re leasing agent Turner’s status as the State’s tained act behalf the State. See carry general fiduciary duty did not with it a Marshall, 152, Kirby v. Dilworth & 260 S.W. did, and that even if it (Tex.Comm’n App.1924, judgm’t agency any duty status and flowing from that Morris, adopted); Alworth v. 19 S.W.2d status were terminated under the terms of writ). no (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland agree the Act. I appeals’ with the court of resolution of this issue. The recital in the that the Reid by Tur- Turner-Fasken lease was executed agency Turner’s was terminated as a mat- State,” “individually ner and as of the ter of law under the Act his failure to legal significance has no context. The drainage offset pro- from the tract. The Act court, receiver, through the assumed district agency vides that a surface owner’s status is complete authority to decide to a lease whom if terminated a well is not drilled within 100 granted 1,000 would be and under what terms. days discovery of the of oil within feet 31,1919, recognize Reid did July Leg., the tract. Act of 36th C.S., 3-5, agency § Turner’s was valid and subsist- 2d ch. status 1919 Tex.Gen.Laws ing, valid and We held that under such circum- but that Fasken’s was agency subsisting.2 stances the Nor is the of other surface owner is absence judgment provides part: parcel All that certain tract and of land situ- Texas, County, having ated in Pecos about 57 miles agreed open All Court to jury being waive a the town of Fort Stockton and to submit the matters of facts East from *9 Court, thereupon Survey as well as of law to the part Reid as of the Bob described pleadings, Court heard the the evidence and [legal description vest- tract] follows: counsel, being fully argument ad- follows; ed as premises, vised in the does render the follow- simple title is vested as 1. The fee ing judgment, to-wit: Turner, Jr., subject all hereto in Fred ORDERED, IT IS ADJUDGED AND DE- the reservation of minerals in and under the following CREED that the title described same as set forth in the Patent from the State land, Texas, County, tract of situated in Pecos of Texas to Bob Reid.... to-wit: language con- affirmative
cerning legal relationship to Turner’s determinative; automatic termi- agency Turner’s was one of nation of status protect sought the reasons by filing the interests Reid place. first the judgment I would affirm of the court of appeals. TV, INC., Ca CABLE Warner HOUSTON Communications, Inc., ble Warner Cable County, Inc., Communications Harris Inc., Communications, Peti and Warner , tioners ASSOCIATION, WEST INWOOD CIVIC al., Respondents. et
No. D-3190. Supreme Court of Texas.
May Taylor, Bruch Ben Ronald Hogan, Jennifer Wiesenthal, Houston, petitioners.
G. for Johnston, Holman, Cheryle R. David W. Houston, respondents. George, H. Kevin REHEARING ON MOTION FOR PER CURIAM. neighborhood clubs civic Seventeen and/or (Plaintiffs) sued
homeowners’ associations1 (Cable TV, and others2 Houston Cable Inc. Club, intervenor, Fasken, Forest Civic has a valid Tower Oaks Civic Association, Ponderosa A. Association, subsisting executed Westa- Oakwood Glen Turner, Jr., individually Association, and as Sequoia Fred Estates Civic dor Civic Texas, lessor, Club, Club, to the said A. as The Hunt- North Hill Civic Estates 26, 1934, lessee, Fasken, as dated March Association, Improvement Cutten Green As- wick sociation, to-wit_ follows, substantially being Association Homeowners Tallowood then sets out all the terms Improvement Associa- Windfem Forest Civic Turner-Fasken lease. tion. Asso- include Inwood West Civic 1. The Plaintiffs Commu- Association, include Warner ciation, 2. The other defendants United Dis- Oak Creek Civic Communications, nications, Inc., Association, Club, Warner Cable Civic Grantwood Civic trict Fund, Inc., of Har- Communications Inc. and Warner Cable Village Hill Maintenance Turtle *10 Club, C.I.A., County, ris Inc. McKamy Belmar Civic Meadows