52 Ark. 48 | Ark. | 1889
Suit by appellant against Sheriff and his bondsmen, for damages alleged to have been sustained in the seizure of certain goods by the Sheriff.
The only question was as to the character of an instrument of conveyance from one Foster to West.
The court found the facts from the evidence and declared the law as follows: “Thomas Foster, a merchant, was indebted to the firm of Straub & Lohman and D. C. Smith, and on the 2d day of February, 1885-, executed and delivered to D. C. Smith, one of said creditors, to be by him delivered to P. C. West, the trustee therein named, the instrument of writing introduced in evidence. By the terms of the instrument, Foster sold and conveyed to said West, a stock of merchandise in his store-house in LaGrange, Lee County, Arkansas, which was to be disposed of by West as therein directed, and the proceeds applied, after paying expenses, to the payment of the debts due Straub & Lohman and D. C. Smith, reserving the balance of the proceeds to himself. West took possession of and held said stock and merchandise under and by virtue of said instrument. Afterwards, within a few days, the defendant and Sheriff levied several valid writs of attachment upon the stock and took it from the possession of West. The suits in which said writs of attachment were issued and so levied, were against said Foster, and were duly prosecuted and judgment recovered against him for amounts which exceeded the value of the goods taken, and the latter were duly condemned and sold to satisfy said judgments, no surplus remaining. The instrument of writing by virtue of which West took and held possession of the stock of goods was not given by way of security as a mortgage or deed of trust; there is no defeasance. It does not create a lien upon the goods, but conveys them absolutely for the purpose of raising a fund to pay debts, and until this was done, Foster had no legal or equitable interest in the property that could be sold by him or reached by his creditors. The instrument was not a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage. By its terms it was an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and considering it as a deed of assignment it is clearly fraudulent and void as to the attaching creditors.” The Circuit Court was right upon both the law and facts, and its judgment is affirmed.