179 Mo. 95 | Mo. | 1903
— This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree. q
The defendant was indicted in the criminal court of Buchanan county for the murder of Alfred M. Fen-ton on the 20th day of July, 1902.
The indictment is sufficient and in the ordinary form. 1't is not questioned by defendant. The facts out of which this prosecution grew are in substance as follows:
On the night of the homicide the defendant was in Rushville, a town in Buchanan county. About eight o ’clock he was in conversation with Hally Conrad, Wez Yazel, Hally Chitwood, Luther Moberly and perhaps other young men of that town about thirty or forty feet from Dr. Culver’s drugstore, in said village. Jeff Fenton, a brother of the deceased, was walking along the street, and as he approached the above mentioned group of young men, the defendant was swinging a 38 Colt’s revolver on his finger, and turning to Jeff Fenton said, “Hold on a minute; wait a minute and take a drink with me.” Fenton replied he didn’t care to take a drink, but the defendant insisted, and to prevent trouble Fen-ton drank with him.
After so doing, defendant pulled Jeff Fenton by the shoulder and told him he liked him and his brother Alf and would die for them; that although they had once had hard words he had since worked for them and was friendly to them now and expected to remain so. Soon, however, this friendly tone changed and he demanded to know of Jeff Fenton where his brother Alf was. Jeff attempted to excuse himself, saying he must go and take his wife and child home, to which defendant replied, “No you won’t g — d d — n you, you will never take them home again,” and placed his hand in his shirt bosom and started to draw his pistol, but Moberly, a deputy sheriff, stepped in and said, “Consider yourself under arrest;” and at the same time took defendant’s pistol
In attempting to subdne defendant Moberly struck him with the revolver. They took him to a justice of the peace, Esquire Allison. The justice ordered him under arrest, and directed the officer to go after Jeff Fenton to make the complaint against defendant for disturbing the peace, and placed defendant in charge of Conrad and Merritt. They, however, released the defendant, who threatened to go home and get his gun and lull both Moberly and Jeff Fenton; that he would kill Moberly if it took him a thousand years. During the time they were at the house of Allison the justice, defendant was very violent and abusive. Mrs. Allison begged him not to use such language, as her mother was old and infirm,' and it would frighten her.
At this time defendant had his trunk at the house of Mrs. Mary Stanton, where he stayed a portion of his time, and when Conrad released him he went to Mrs. Stanton’s and got his shotgun and left her house.
Returning towards the business portion of the town and carrying his gun in both hands, he met Charles Webb and Robert Page and drew the gun on them and asked who they were, and when they told him he said, “All right; go on.” Further on he halted Rev. Mr. Chapman and demanded to know who he was, and when he ascertained said, “Oh, it’s the preacher, is it.?” and asking to be excused, passed on down the street.
After this he stopped Virgil Morrison about opposite the home of Luther Moberly and thrust his gun in his face, but when he discovered who it was, released him, saying, “I am hunting Luther Moberly or Jeff Fenton; I don’t give a damn which one it is. I shall go and get them. I have got it in for them, and by g — d, I am going to kill them,” and then started down the street. He also stopped other citizens in the same manner, and when he found out who they were, said he was looldng for Moberly or Jeff Fenton.
After turning to the others, and finding out who they were, he said, ‘ ‘ That is all right. ’ ’ About this time Alf Fenton, the deceased, Charles Sampson and Cy Fisher, drove up in a buggy. The defendant inquired of Jeff Fenton if that was not Alf’s buggy, and-Jeff said it looked like it. The defendant thereupon stepped out from the shade of the trees in which he was stand-' ing, and stopped the horse. He asked, is that you Alf, and Alf answered,' “No,” and started the horse, but the defendant stopped him again, whereupon Fisher and Sampson got out of the buggy.
The defendant asked Alf Fenton who the parties were who had jumped out of the buggy, and he told him Fisher and Sampson. He then told them to get back and Alf also requested them to do so and they did so.
The defendant then pointed bis gun at Alf Fenton, placing the muzzle near to his face. And the latter caught the gun and attempted to push it away, whereupon defendant shot him twice, and Alf Fenton fell out of the buggy and was heard to say, “Oh, you have killed me. What did you do it for?” Fisher had jumped from the buggy, and he knocked Dunn, the defendant, down.
To his brother, Alf Fenton said, “Mark Dunn killed me and I don’t know what he done it for; let me kill him before I die.” The deputy sheriff, Moberly, came up, arrested defendant and took him away.
The defendant was not hurt, but implored those around him not to kill him, saying he had killed Alf Fenton, but that Moberly was the cause of it. The deceased was unarmed at the time he was shot.
The evidence tends to show there had been a former difficulty between the Fentons and defendant. • In January, 1902, which was six months prior to the killing, while on a hunt in Arkansas, he told Fred Franklin that if Alf or Jeff Fenton ever crossed his path he would Id 11 them, and two years before he had told one Herman Yazel, in a conversation which took place in an old brick building in the village of Rushville, that if he and Alf or Jeff Fenton ever came together, he would “git him.’’ At another time while the defendant and "William Stigers were painting on the Christian church in Rush-ville, he told Stigers that he had had trouble with the Fentons and "never wanted them to cross his path. In June, 1902, a month prior to the killing, the defendant made the remark that he would kill Alf and Jeff Fenton if they ever crossed his path, and asked Charles Van Hooser to take the Fentons to Reub Sampson’s, so that he might have an opportunity to kill them and get away. At still another time the defendant said in the hearing of Norvilie Johnson, that Alf and Jeff Fenton had done him wrong, and he would get them and get them right,
The defense was that of insanity.
The defendant is about thirty-six years old, married, has a wife and one child. Was married August 25,1901. He is a painter by trade.
For two or three weeks prior to July 20, 1902, defendant was at work at his trade painting the house of George Huff near Hall’s station. His wife testified that on July 14th or thereabouts he came home sick, being unable to prosecute his work further, complaining of severe abdominal pains and pains in his head. These continued with such severity that defendant’s wife and her family all became alarmed because of his complaints, condition, and peculiar acts. A physician, Dr. Jones, was called on Tuesday of the week prior to this alleged murder, and after examining defendant, pronounced him to be suffering from lead-colic and lead-poisoning. Defendant’s condition remained the same, practically, without change the entire week. During this week, as he had for some time prior to this and continuously, defendant suffered from acute insomnia, being unable to sleep on an average more than three hours per night and on some nights not at all.
On Sunday morning, July 20th, after passing a restless and sleepless night, defendant arose about nine o’clock, and after eating a light breakfast, went down to the village where he spent the forenoon with several young men, among whom was Jefferson Fenton.
No trouble or incident of note occurred during the forenoon.
Defendant took dinner with Halley Conrad, at Mrs. Stanton’s, Conrad’s mother.
After dinner Conrad and defendant drove to the country and returned, and defendant went to a ball game on the outskirts of the village, where he acted as
Dr. Jones, who was called to see defendant on Tuesday prior to the homicide on Sunday, found him suffering from neuralgia of the stomach which was the only symptom of lead-poisoning he observed in defendant at that time.
The physician prescribed a small tablet composed of capsicum and myrrh while at the house and followed this with a prescription of pepsin and bismuth and they had the desired effect. Nest morning defendant was so much better that no further call by the physician was required. On Saturday defendant was at the physician’s house and made a contract to paint it for him. Defendant was perfectly rational that day.
The defendant testified he had had lead-poisoning twice before in his life, one at San Francisco, and once at St. J oseph, and recovered each time.
Dr. Jno. M. Dunsmore, of St. Joseph, an expert, a graduate of Trinity College, Canada, who had made nervous diseases a specialty for four years, testified that on the 8th of November, 1902, he examined the defendant in the jail at St. Joseph at the request of his attorneys to ascertain his mental condition; had had no previous acquaintance with defendant. He found him to be a physically sound man; no heart lesions; no'organic trouble of the lungs or any other important function of the body. His skin was the only thing that indicated ill health. It was yellow, but he had been in jail there for more than three months, removed from the sunlight and exercise. He examined his mouth for a blue black mark which he had expected to find, but was unable to discover it. As to his mental condition the defendant struck the doctor as being an intelligent, sharp, shrewd
A hypothetical question covering all the facts detailed in evidence, beginning with defendant’s return from Huff’s to the home of his father-in-law, down to and including the killing, was submitted to Dr. Duns-more, and he was asked as to his opinion of the sanity or insanity of the prisoner at the time of the homicide.
“The exciting cause would simply be the condition of the brain as the result of the detrimental influences to the nerve centers at the culmination of this lead-poisoning or colic, and the cerebral symptoms coming after. The disease lying dormant there had culminated and that was the cause.”
'As to the blows given him by Moberly, he didn’t think they were sufficient to add any other exciting cause, but they might accentuate it to a degree* to a delirious state.
On cross-examination this witness testified that he had practiced medicine five years; was in charge of a private hospital for nervous troubles; that he had only one case of lead-poisoning in this hospital; that he noticed no dyspeptic condition; did not examine defendant’s urine and did not find any albumen in it, couldn’t tell whether he was constipated. Did find slight sclerosis of the arteries which is common among men addicted to intoxicants and old men; saw no signs of hallucinations nor of epilepsy; no organic trouble with his heart, but a slight hypertrophy; nothing the matter with his liver or kidneys. Wouldn’t say there was a distinct blue line on the gums, nothing the matter with the organs of respiration, nor vision. His examination, in a word, led him to the conclusion that the defendant was mentally sound and right.
The defendant testified in his behalf, that he
Defendant explained his conversation with Franklin on that trip. He admitted making a threat to kill A]f Fenton, but says it was conditional that if Fenton attempted to shoot him, he would kill him.
He testified in regard to his condition during the week preceding the homicide; that he suffered extreme pain from the colic; became frightened; lost consciousness and told them to send for whiskey and Jamaica ginger; couldn’t get the ginger; sent for Dr. Jones and remembers, his coming, but didn’t know when he left. The doctor prescribed. Was in bed most of the week; felt better on Saturday and went to see the doctor about painting his house for him. Has no recollection of going home Saturday night. The first he recalls is that Sunday morning he found himself at Mrs. Stanton’s; sat and read while she went to church; went up into the village, loafed around and finally went to dinner with Halley Conrad. After dinner he and Conrad drove out to look at a piece of corn, came back and-went to ball game and kept the score; head pained him so he thought he would have to get some one to take his place; after returning to town, a crowd of young men got a pint of whiskey and he took a drink out of it behind the saloon. Some one then produced a half pint and he took another drink; that morning he took a drink with deceased out of a bottle the latter offered him. That Sunday afternoon he got a pistol from Chitwood. He had the privilege of trying it and he got it so as to try it next
The court instructed on murder in the first and second degree; the law as to insanity as a defense; and drunkenness; the competency of defendant and his wife as witnesses; the credibility of witnesses, and the form of the verdict.
Other facts may be noted if deemed necessary in the course of the opinion.
I. The first contention of defendant that it was a physical impossibility for defendant to have shot and killed deceased in the manner detailed by the State’s witnesses, is without merit, independent of his plea of insanity.
The evidence disclosed that the defendant was ■armed with a double-barreled shotgun; that deceased was in a buggy with Cyrus Fisher and Charles Samp
The defendant alone was armed, with a double-bar-^ reled gun; he was seen to discharge both barrels and Alfred Fenton received two wounds at the time. Out of one the surgeon extracted eleven shot, and out of the other, ten. Without a recapitulation of all the testimony on this point, ibis sufficient to say that it leaves not a reasonable doubt that defendant shot and killed Alfred Fenton as charged in the indictment.
II. The defendant was a witness in his own behalf and testified at considerable length as to his sickness-from lead-poisoning in St. Joseph and San Francisco,' and during the week prior to the homicide at Rushville. He detailed his symptoms, such as excessive pains in his stomach, insomnia, want of appetite, nervousness, and loss of memory, etc. Dr. Dunsmore testified as a witness for defendant. A hypothetical question based in part upon the testimony of the defendant, was propounded to him. The counsel for the State objected to-the question because many of the facts assumed were not in evidence. The court did not sustain this objection, as made, but held that it was improper to the extent that it was based upon evidence given by the defendant himself, and this is urged as error by the defendant. It is obvious that the hypothetical question propounded included much that had not the slightest tendency to throw any light one way or the other upon the sanity or insanity of defendant. An expert, moreover, can not be asked his opinion on a hypothesis having no foundation in the evidence. On the other hand, ■ as the
The ruling of the criminal court that the facts which the evidence of the defendant tended to prove could not be incorporated in the hypothetical question propounded to the expert can not be sustained.
Doubtless this ruling, made during the trial, was predicated upon the decision of this court in State v. Soper, 148 Mo. loc. cit. 234, wherein it was held that physicians could not give opinions touching a defendant’s sanity based on statements made by bim concerning his previous personal history, because such statements were hearsay; but in that case as the opinion shows these statements were not under oath, the proposition is entirely sound; but in this case, the defendant’s statements were under oath and were evidence in the case.
Clearly we think they were not to be excluded merely because they were testified to by defendant.
But conceding that the facts to which defendant testitled should not have been rejected solely because given in evidence by him, the further question arises whether their omission was prejudicial. In other words, were they by themselves, or in conjunction with other facts testified to by other witnesses, the basis for an opinion by an expert as to his sanity or insanity?
The defendant in substance testified that in 1893' while following his profession as a painter in the city of St. Joseph, he was seized with abdominal cramps and pains; that prior thereto he had severe headaches and suffered more or less from insomnia; that following the cramps he fell into convulsions, during which time his shoulders and head were drawn backward; that this attack was followed by sickness for five days during which he lived chiefly on milk; that he completely recovered
It is apparent from the very circumstantial account given by defendant of his travels, occupation and places he visited, that there was no loss of memory occasioned by either of his sick spells.
The defendant had recovered entirely from these sick spells and had no recurrence thereof for nearly eight years and during that time had not followed his trade regularly. In two respects the evidence so far fails to establish chronic lead-poisoning, which the experts testify may result in insanity: first, there is wanting that constant use or contact with the lead which will result in lead-poisoning, and, second, it is evident from the quick recovery in each spell, that the disease in defendant, if at all, had not reached that stage in which it had affected the brain, because the expert testified that when it resulted in mental affection it involved the tissues of the brain; that they degenerated and this was a permanent condition, and yet this same expert found this defendant by actual examination to be a bright, shrewd, intelligent man, physically and mentally sound and none of the indicia which he would expect in lead-poisoning present in his case, and yet it was on his evidence alone that the defense of insanity rested. So far as the court excluded this evidence as
The defendant’s counsel then changed his question and omitted all reference to the sickness of defendant at St. Joseph in 1893, and at San Francisco in 1894, and began with his personal history some three years prior to the homicide, and while the court had ruled he could not base his question on defendant’s evidence, it is plain that he substantially stated every fact to which defendant had testified that bore even the slightest relation to his sanity or insanity.
Not only is this our conclusion from a careful reading of the hypothetical question in connection with defendant’s own testimony, but such was the view of the learned judge of the criminal court, because, after a recapitulation of the facts'’assumed to be in evidence down to and including the arrest of defendant by Moberly, the deputy sheriff, and while he was in charge of Merritt and Conrad, the record recites that at this point, the judge said, “Now,-all this is based upon 'what the defendant said himself. Proceed, though, with your questionBut one construction can be placed, then, upon the court’s action, and that is that while he was of opinion, as he had first ruled, that it was not competent to include in the hypothetical question facts testified to only by defendant, he had so far modified his views as to permit the question though based on defendant’s evidence.
So much of the question as contains facts detailed after defendant’s arrest by Moberly and after Moberly struck him, could not have been based on defendant’s evidence, because he testified positively that after the lick by Moberly everything ivas a blank until he recovered consciousness after the homicide and found himself
So that while the court in fact announced an incorrect rule, and at first excluded the sworn statements of defendant in the framing of the hypothetical question propounded by defendant, it in effect reversed itself, and permitted so much of defendant’s statement that really had any bearing on the case to be incorporated in the amended question. Our conclusion is that thus permitting defendant’s statement to be made the basis of the question, the criminal court corrected its own error, and defendant has no just cause of complaint on that ground, and, moreover, it is apparent that no harm resulted to defendant anyway, because the expert testified he was insane, if not intoxicated, and he could have done no more if the first question had been allowed.
III. One other objection urged is, that the court excluded from the hypothesis of defendant that there was no motive for defendant’s shooting deceased. When counsel for the State urged this objection, the court remarked there was no evidence except defendant’s that there was no motive, but “ there was evidence showing there was no ill feeding.”
Mr. Martin, counsel for defendant, said: “Why, the testimony shows that these men were the best of friends.”
The Court: “Wiry, of course you have proven that fact; but as to whether there was a motive, I don’t think the testimony shows that. I don’t think that assumption ought to be made to the physician.”
Mr. Martin: “Now, I understand that the doctor can assume that these men were close personal friends'?”
The Court: “Yes, I have stated that.”
After all it is but another way of assuming there was no motive. If the expert was in fact one competent to pass upon a psychological question,. he certainly would assume that a man’s close personal friend would
This exception must be overruled. To the hypothetical question thus propounded Dr. Dunsmore made this answer:
“Provided that this prisoner did not take proportionately more liquor than the others did (there being evidence that he took at least three drinks from bottles that day, and no evidence how much he took at a drink.); that he didn’t take a lion’s share of the liquor, probably consuming a half pint on the two occasions — assuming tliat he was not under the influence of liquor; I would answer the question this way: that from the symptoms that you have given in your question I would say that I believe the man was temporarily insane, but that it is not necessary that he would be continuously insane from that attack of lead colic, but it would be my impression that he was mentally aberrated. ’ ’
In other words, sane up to the very moment of firing the deadly shots, insane when he fired them, and sane immediately afterwards. This court has on two occasions repudiated such a doctrine. It is the doctrine of “uncontrollable impulse,” which this court has expressly disapproved. [State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. loc. cit. 317; State v. Soper, 148 Mo. loc. cit. 237; State v. Levelle, 34 So. Car. loc. cit. 131.]
And this is the only kind of insanity which could find support in this evidence. This defendant was sane enough to make contracts for painting houses on both Saturday and Sunday, and excite no suspicion that he was ‘ ‘ aberrated. ’ ’ He was sane enough to keep the score of a baseball game up to five o ’clock that afternoon. Of sound enough mind at eight o’clock that night to point out the defects in a revolver he had been trying to purchase. Was sane enough to question the authority of
The doctor very properly qualified his opinion by assuming that defendant was not intoxicated, conceding that if intoxicated defendant’s conduct could readily be
Morgan says that he staggered when he walked, and Mr. Chapman says he was “decidedly intoxicated.”
In addition to this, he was seen and himself testified he drank three times out of bottles that day. The jury doubtless took this view of the case.
IV. As to the failure to prove a motive, it has been so often ruled that it was not necessary to do so, that it is sufficient in this point to cite some of the cases. [State v. McLaughlin, 149 Mo. 33; State v. David, 131 Mo. 380; State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 620-621.]
But in this case there was evidence of an old quarrel and threats by defendant to kill deceased and his brother if they ever crossed his path.
V. Again, it is insisted that the court erred in striking out of Dr. Jones’s evidence, that defendant told him some days prior to the homicide that he (defendant) believed he was going crazy. This was a self-serving statement of defendant, no part of the res gestae, and a mere conclusion of defendant. It was properly excluded.
VI. During the argument, Mr. Motter, one of the counsel for the State, said, “ There was some mysterious feeling of jealousy between the defendant and Alfred Fenton, the deceased, which under the law the State was not permitted to show.” Exception was taken to this. To appreciate this assignment it should be recalled that the State had proved by various witnesses that a feeling of enmity had existed for more than a year prior to the homicide, and when the witness William Stigers was on the stand he testified that when he and defendant were painting a church in Rushville, defendant had said that he never wanted Alf and Jeff Fenton to cross his
VII: As to reopening the case, it was within the discretion of the court to permit counsel for the State to introduce evidence of which he had learned after the State rested in chief. This is well settled law.
In view of the whole record, we find no reversible error. The instructions were full and fair. Indeed, they have not been assailed and we see no cause for interfering with the verdict of the jury. There was ample evidence, if credited by the jury, and it was, to sustain the verdict of murder in the first degree.
The judgment is affirmed and the sentence which the law pronounces must be carried into execution, and ibis so adjudged.