State v. DumlerState v. Dumler
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Prager
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Prager, J.:
This case involves the construction and constitutional validity of certain Kansas statutes which provide for a maximum 55 mile per hour speed limit on Kansas highways. They were enacted by the legislature during the “energy crisis” of 1974. The defendant-appellant, George C. Dumler, was charged with driving 90 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour speed zone. He was convicted in Saline county magistrate court and appealed to the district court. In the district court the defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the statutes involved were unconstitutional or, in the alternative, that under established rules of statutory construction the legislature had suspended all statutes
The first point raised by the defendant on this appeal is that the trial court erred when it refused to sustain the defendant’s motion to dismiss because by the enactment of
The problem in this case arose because of the energy crisis of 1974. In order to conserve gasoline and petroleum products the Congress of the United States enacted
“The Secretary of Transportation shall not approve any project . . . in any State which has ... a maximum speed limit on any public highway within its jurisdiction in excess of fifty-five miles per hour, . . .”
The effect of this statute was to deny federal highway funds to any state having a maximum highway speed limit in excess of 55 miles per hour. The Kansas legislature in response to this federal en
“8-1336. Maximum speed limits, “(a) Except when a special hazard exists that requires lower speed for compliance with section 2, the limits specified in this section or established as hereinafter authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in excess of such maximum limits:
“(3) Fifty-five (55) miles per hour in all other locations. In the event that the Congress of the United States shall establish a maximum speed limit greater or less than the limit prescribed by this paragraph, the state highway commission may adopt a resolution, subject to the approval of the governor, establishing such speed limit as the maximum speed limit of this state. . . .”
8-1337 authorized the state highway commission to vary the maximum speed, provided that the commission not establish a máximum speed limit in excess of 55 miles per hour in accordance with 8-1336 (a) (3). 8-1338 gives similar power to local authorities with the same limitations. In 1975 the statutes were amended to substitute the newly created secretary of transportation for the state highway commission.
8-1340 is the section which provided for the expiration of the supplemental act and the suspension of the highway code’s speed limits until the supplemental act expired.
“8-1340. Expiration of act; suspension of speed limit statutes until expiration. The provisions of this act shall expire on the date when the Congress of the United States shall remove all restrictions on maximum speed limits, and until said date the operation of sections 8-1557, 8-1558, 8-1559 and 8-1560 of 1973 Senate bill No. 587 and any other statute of this state establishing or authorizing the state highway commission or local authorities to establish maximum speed limits are hereby suspended.”
The supplemental act was enacted as Chapter 29, Laws of 1974.
“any other statute of this state establishing or authorizing the state highway commission or local authorities to establish maximum speed limits.”
Following the passage of Chapter 29, the legislature adopted Chapter 33, Laws of 1974, the revised uniform act regulating traffic on highways. Chapter 33 repealed 8-532 and 8-533 and replaced them with 8-1557, 8-1558, 8-1559 and 8-1560. In order to correct Section 7 of Chapter 29 the legislature enacted Chapter 30 which simply amended Section 7 of Chapter 29 to replace the words “8-533 and 8-532” with the words “8-1557, 8-1558, 8-1559 and 8-1560.” Otherwise Section 7 of Chapter 29 remained as it was originally enacted.
In construing these statutes we must first consider certain basic rules of statutory construction established by this court. The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. (Farm & City Ins. Co. v. American Standard Ins. Co., 220 Kan 325, 552 P. 2d 1363.) This intent is to be determined by a general consideration of the whole act. It is the duty of the court, so far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. (Fleming Company v. McDonald, 212 Kan. 11, 16, 509 P. 2d 1162.) When the interpretation of one section of an act according to the exact and literal import of its words would contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature, the entire act should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding so far as may be necessary the strict letter of the law. (Gnadt v. Durr, 208 Kan. 783, 494 P. 2d 1219; Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1, 509 P. 2d 1130.)
We must apply these rules of statutory construction to the statutes in question. 8-1336 and 8-1340 were enacted by the legislature at the same time as part of the same act. The act was entitled “An act relating to and supplementing the uniform act regulating traffic on highways; establishing speed limits on highways; and suspending the operation of certain statutes.” (Laws of 1974, Ch. 29, 30.) These two statutes must be construed
in pari materia.
The defendant’s contention is that the clause suspending “operation of any other statute” in 8-1340 includes 8-1336. In our judgment such a contention cannot be sustained. A more logical interpretation would be that this clause refers to any other statute
outside
of this
Although the uniform act which regulates traffic on highways and the supplemental act are not strictly penal statutes in the usual sense, our construction of the statute does not conflict with the rule of strict construction to be applied to penal statutes. The interpretation which we have adopted does not add or subtract words, nor does it attach anything other than the ordinary English meaning to the wording. The purpose of the rule which requires strict construction of penal statutes is to establish a rule of certainty regarding individual conduct. There can be no uncertainty as to the meaning of the statute now before us. The establishment of the 55 miles per hour speed limit was one of the most publicized and controversial statutory changes of recent years. There is no complaint raised by defendant that the statute, or intent of the legislature, is so vague as to make it impossible for a citizen to know how to conduct himself in order to be in conformity with the law. Suffice it to say, the supplemental act created a valid 55 miles per hour maximum highway speed limit in Kansas. We reject the defendant’s first point on the appeal as being without merit.
The defendant’s second point on the appeal is that the district court erred in its refusal to sustain the defendant’s motion to dismiss because
The defendant is correct in his general statement of the law that legislative power to make a law cannot be delegated by the Kansas legislature to the Congress of the United States. It is equally true, however, that the legislature may make a law to become operative on the happening of a certain contingency or future event. A comparable situation was before this court in City of Pittsburg v. Robb, 143 Kan. 1, 53 P. 2d 203. Because of the economic depression in the 30’s Congress enacted the national industrial recovery act which created a federal emergency administration of public works which, among other things, was authorized to aid cities in financing the construction and improvement of publicly owned facilities and instrumentalities. In order that Kansas municipalities might take advantage of this federal act, a special session of the legislature was called by the governor in 1933. At this special session the legislature passed legislation authorizing municipalities to issue and sell special revenue bonds to pay the cost of installing and improving publicly owned utilities. One section of the Kansas act provided:
“ ‘This act shall become ineffective with the expiration of the national industrial act and amendments thereto.’ ”
George Robb, the state auditor, refused to register the revenue bonds of the city of Pittsburg, contending that the Kansas act was unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the United States Congress. The city of Pittsburg filed an original action in mandamus in the supreme court to oompel the state auditor to register the bonds. The defendant’s position was that the continuing existence of a law of this state depended, not upon the action of the Kansas legislature, but on the aotion of Congress or
“While the legislative power of the state is by the constitution vested in the legislature, yet that body has authority to pass a law whose operation is by its terms made to depend on a contingency, even though that contingency be some action on the part of the legislature of another state.”
Under this decision the effeot of a statute may be contingent, according to existing law of another state, according to future law of another state, or according to a change in the law of another state. In
City of Pittsburg v. Robb,
supra, we stated that it is now settled beyond dispute by both state and federal decisions that the legislature may prescribe a rule to be applied according to the existence or nonexistence of some fact which some officer or board is required to ascertain. In analyzing 8-1336 and 8-1340 it is clear that the Kansas legislature has by no means totally yielded to the Congress its authority to establish maximum speed limits in Kansas. By virtue of 8-1340 the supplemental act, which creates the 55 miles per hour speed limit, expires on the date when the Congress of the United States shall remove regulations on maximum speed limits and the provisions of 8-1557, 8-1558, 8-1559, and 8-1560 immediately come into operation. Should Congress prescribe a different maximum speed limit for a state to
It should be noted that a similar Nebraska statute was recently upheld in State v. Padley, 195 Neb. 358, 237 N. W. 2d 883. In that case the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated the general rule discussed above that, although the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, it can make a law to become operative on ■the happening of a certain contingency or on ‘the ascertainment of a fact on which the legislature intends to make its own law depend. The court then pointed out that it is the privilege of the Congress to fix the terms on which federal money allotments to ■the states are to be made; it is entirely optional with the states ■to accept or reject such offers. The mere fact that sharing in federal road funds was contingent on the state’s adapting a maximum highway speed limit of 55 miles per hour did not render the Nebraska speed limit statute unconstitutional. State v. Padley, supra, is directly in point. We have concluded that under the circumstances presented in ‘this case the Kansas legislature has not unlawfully delegated or surrendered its legislative power to the Congress of the United States and the statutes in question are not unconstitutional for that reason.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.