State v. DulakState v. Dulak
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Peterson
Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of aggravated robbery,
1. Defendant’s contention that his conviction should be reversed outright is based on two separate arguments: (a) that the Minnesota courts do not have jurisdiction over him because he is an Indian- and (b) that the state failed to prove that he committed the offense or that he had the requisite intent.
(a) The first of these arguments is answered by our decisions in State v. Folstrom, 331 N.W.2d 231 (Minn.1983), and State v. Rossbach, 288 N.W.2d 714 (Minn.1980), both of which upheld criminal prosecutions of Indians challenged on similar grounds.
(b) The argument that the state failed to prove defendant guilty is also meritless. Evidence establishing that defendant committed the robbery included positive eyewitness identification testimony made by the clerk who was robbed; pictures taken by a hidden camera in the store; fingerprint evidence connecting defendant to a beer bottle found where the getaway car was parked when the robbery
2. Defendant’s alternative contention is that he should be given a new trial because the trial court erred (a) in rejecting challenges for cause of certain jurors with pri- or jury service and (b) in admitting eyewitness identification evidence and the beer bottle on which defendant’s fingerprint was found.
(a) As we stated in
State v. Stufflebean,
329 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Minn.1983), “In an appeal based on juror bias, an appellant must show that the challenged juror was subject to challenge for cause, that actual prejudice resulted from the failure to dismiss, and that appropriate objection was made by appellant.” In this case defendant challenged certain jurors for cause on the grounds that during the same term of jury service they had previously served on a jury trying a different criminal defendant in an unrelated matter. However, defendant has failed to show on appeal that any of the specific grounds for cause provided by
(b) Defendant’s arguments that the trial court erred in admitting the eyewitness identification testimony and the beer bottle are also without merit. The trial court properly concluded that the identification procedures did not create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-identification.
Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977);
Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). Accordingly, the trial court was justified in denying the motion to suppress the eyewitness identification testimony. The trial court has considerable discretion under
Affirmed.