124 Mo. 1 | Mo. | 1894
At the October term, 1892, of the-St. Louis criminal court defendant and one Patrick Murphy were jointly indicted for rape. The assault was committed upon one Ellen Rose., a female over-fifty years of age. The indictment as to Duffy was 'subsequently quashed, and at the March term, 1893, of' said court, he was separately reindicted.
; On May 25, 1893, a trial was had which resulted in defendant’s conviction, fixing his punishment, at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of twenty years. The case is in this court on his appeal.
On the arrival of the transcript the cause was set. for hearing on the tenth day of April, 1894, and argued and submitted on that day. Subsequently, however, on suggestion of the attorney general, that, since the trial of the cause in the criminal court of St. Louis, the indictment had been changed, mutilated and forged in this, that the words “unlawfully and feloniously” had been erased therefrom, by which it. was rendered void and of no force or effect, which suggestions and motion were supported by affidavit, said submisson was set aside on the-day of - 1894.
“Now at this day, it being suggested to the court by the attorney general, who appears on behalf of the state, that the original indictment on file in the St. Louis criminal court has been fraudulently altered since this cause was tried in said court and prior to the time the record herein was certified to this court, in this, that the words ‘unlawfully and feloniously’ have been erased therefrom.
“And, whereas the suggestion thus made by the attorney general is duly supported by affidavits, now, therefore, it is ordered that it may be determined whether in deed and in truth said indictment has thus been fraudulently altered and spoliated as aforesaid; it is considered and ordered by this court, that a rule go to the Hon. Henby L. Edmunds, judge as aforesaid, commanding that he do careful examination make of the said indictment in connection with the evidence and affidavits filed herein, and in connection with such other evidence as he may deem necessary to take, and of his own knowledge, he do determine whether said indictment has been fraudulently altered as has been suggested; and if he, the said judge, do find in manner as aforesaid, that said indictment has been altered, that he do proceed at once upon the affidavits and evidence as aforesaid, and on his own knowledge to restore said indictment to what it was at the time the same was signed and returned by the grand jury into court, and certify the same to this court.
“And that he, the said judge, do on or before the sixteenth day of June, 1894, certify under his hand and seal to this court, how he has discharged this rule and order, together with all evidence taken by him in
“And it is further ordered that a copy hereof be duly certified to the Hon. Henby L. Edmunds by the clerk of this court.”
On the sixteenth day of June, 1894, the Hon. Henby L. Edmunds reported that in obedience to the rule and order of this court he had examined into such matters as he might deem necessary in order to determine whether said indictment had been fraudulently altered since the same was returned by the grand jury and having found that it had been so changed and falsified, he corrected the same and forwarded the corrected indictment to this court together with his report.
This report was approved by this court by an entry of record and the corrected indictment ordered to be filed and stand as the true indictment. The cause was then set down for reargument on the thirtieth day of June, 1894, and counsel duly notified, when it was again submitted on the original briefs filed herein.
The prosecuting witness, Ellen Rose, was fifty-eight years of age; had been married thirty-three years; had borne six children; lived in Illinois, and she and her husband were accustomed to go to St. Louis to sell their produce and do their trading. They always crossed the Mississippi river on the ferryboat at “Cahokia Ferry.” Ellen Rose and her husband went to St. Louis on November 1, 1892, and after having sold out their produce which they took with them to market made some purchases and started back home. They were directed to go up to the bridge and -cross over, but were persuaded by one Schweigeler, who kept a lodging house on the levee, between Sidney and Anna streets, near the ferry landing, to put up with him over night; so they arranged to stay there, put up
Mrs. Rose’s clothing-was wet and muddy; her undergarments were bloody; her nose was bleeding; her lip cut, and she had some scratches on her face. She was corroborated as to her appearance and condition by another witness, Mrs. «Louisa Harris, the police matron, who saw her about twelve hours after the offense was committed.
The evidence on the part of the defendant tended to show that the prosecuting witness was so drunk from the use of intoxicating drinks that she could not walk without assistance; that she was seen in a saloon drinking and treating, and while it tended to show that both Murphy and Duffy had connection with her that it was with her consent.
The first point of contention is the action of the court in overruling defendant’s challenges to Lenard Meyer and Luther S. Taylor, who were summoned and sworn as jurors. Meyer stated upon his voir dire that he did not know the parties, that he had read of the ease, had formed an opinion; that he could try the case fairly notwithstanding the opinion, and that his opinion was of such a character it would require evidence to remove it. Taylor answered substantially in the same
There is nothing, we think, in the point that the court allowed several prisoners charged with various offenses to plead guilty in the presence of the jury called to try the defendant, although he may have objected at the time. It would be strange indeed, if, every time one charged by indictment with crime, and who wanted to plead guilty thereto in a court having criminal jurisdiction, the judge should be required to send out a jury before whom another and entirely different cáse might then be pending.
The third and sixth assignments are substantially the same, in ‘which it is claimed that the court committed error in allowing evidence to go to the jury in relation to Murphy’s connection with the offense for which defendant herein was upon trial. Murphy and Duffy were alike guilty, they acted together, and in concert, and what one did in the presence of the other, in com
There was no error in permitting the introduction in evidence .of the articles of clothing, including the shirt and pieces from defendant’s pants. This court in State v. Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, held that such evidence was competent as tending to show the commission of the crime, and as corroborative of the witnesses on the part of the state.
The mode and manner of examining witnesses and interrogating them rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. And unless it is made clearly to appear that such discretion has been unwisely or unjustly exercised, this court will not interfere. We can not say that the discretion of the court was abused, or that it was not rightfully exercised in this case in the examination of witnesses by the circuit attorney, and the case will not be reversed upon that ground.
Another contention is that the court erred in allowing the testimony of Louisa Harris to go to the jury, over the defendant’s objection. This objection seems to be predicated chiefly upon the ground that there was a striking resemblance between this witness and the prosecuting witness, Mrs. Rose, and is wholly and entirely devoid of merit. No other objection as to why her testimony should not have gone to the jury, other than as herein indicated, was made, except in a general way. We must, therefore, rule this contention against the defendant also.
A further contention is that the acts of Murphy were not competent evidence against Huffy, but nowhere is it suggested by counsel for defendant' in their brief, what particular acts are complained of, nor are we able to conjecture. We have already said that the acts of either one done during the perpetration of
The criticism indulged in by counsel for defendant on the tenth assignment of error, with respect of the conduct of the trial judge during the progress of the trial, we think uncalled for and not justified by the facts as disclosed by the record. Trial courts must be accorded large discretion in the trial of causes that come before them, and nothing less than an abuse thereof will justify a reversal.
A still further contention is that the court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to show the character of Schweigeler’s place, where it seems that Mrs. Rose and her husband had put up for the night, before the alleged assault. Such evidence was clearly incompetent, and had no tendency whatever to disprove the case as made out by the witnesses for the state.
It is also urged that the circuit attorney was guilty of misconduct in his closing address to the jury. While the remarks complained of were somewhat disgusting and revolting, the facts disclosed by the record in the commission of the crime were equally as much so, and we are not prepared to say that they were not justified by reason thereof. As was said by Sherwood, J., in State v. Emory, 79 Mo. 461: “We see no reason why it is not as legitimate for the state to call the attention of the jury to the facts from which unfavorable inferences may be drawn, as it is for any other suitor in the courts.”
A final contention is that the motion for a new trial should have been sustained, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is a well settled rule of this court that it will not reverse a judgment of conviction where there is evidence to support it, but it is unnecessary to invoke that rule in this case, for the evidence showed defendant’s guilt, beyond-