— Defendant was convicted of grand, larceny in the circuit court of Dunklin county, and sentenced to two years in the penitentiary, and has appealed.
The information charged him with the larceny of “one buggy and one set of leather harness, both of the value of one hundred dollars,” on October 8, 1910. Pie was living on a farm near Senath, in Dunklin county. His father lived near Manila, Arkansas, about sixteen miles south of Senath.
The defendant had purchased eighty acres of unimproved land covered with timber and brush near his father’s, and had cleared away a place to build a house. He had bought lumber in Senath and hauled it in a wagon to his farm. He made a trip with a load of lumber leaving Senath about eight o’clock on Saturday night, October 8, 1910, and passed by the buggy shed of Ben Vardell, which was on the side of the road about an eighth of a mile from Vardell’s house. The evidence tended to show that there were tracks of horses, similar to the tracks of defendant-’s horses, in front of the buggy shed the next morning, and tending to show that defendant’s team had stopped there and that the buggy tracks indicated that it had been tied behind the wagon, and the tracks were such as to show that the buggy had in that way been taken to defendant’s place in Arkansas. It was found in his possession about sixty rods from the public road behind some bushes. Vardell’s harness was in the buggy. The collar was missing. ' '
The defendant testified: That he did not take prosecuting witness’s buggy, but that on the Sunday morning (October 9, 1910), at the State line, or about a mile and a half beyond, he had bought it from a man named Carter whom he met about daylight, for
The prosecuting witness testified that the defendant told him that he got the buggy up the road, and that when asked where it was, he said, “it was down the road a piece,” and that defendant also said, “I am here among strangers and I would like for you to take the money and bring the buggy back providing it belongs to you.”
Defendant, in his direct testimony, stated he bought the buggy on the State line, on Sunday morning, on the road where he was traveling from his house at Senath. On cross-examination he was asked about the kind of horses he was driving and how they were shod. There was an objection on the ground that it was a matter not gone into on the direct examination. The objection was overruled and exception taken.
One' of the jurors on his voir dire stated that he had talked with the prosecuting witness about the arrest of defendant, that nothing was said about the facts in the case and that the juror had formed no opinion, and had thought no more about it. Defendant’s challenge of the juror was overruled.
In his opening statement to the jury the prosecuting attorney stated that the defendant at the previous lerm of the court had forfeited his bond and that a requisition was issued for him. There was an objec
I. The fact that the information charges the larceny of two separate articles without stating the value of each does not invalidate the information when the aggregate value is stated. [State v. Koplan, 167 Mo. 298; State v. O'Connell, 144 Mo. 387.]
II. The challenged juror was not incompetent. He had talked with the prosecuting witness about the arrest of the defendant, but had heard none of the facts as to his guilt or innocence, and had formed no opinion. It was held in State v. Riddle, 179 Mo. l. c. 294, that when a juror had heard a part of the evidence of one witness, but had formed no opinion, he was a competent juror.
III. We consider the statement made by the prosecuting attorney that defendant had forfeited his bond and that a requisition had been issued for him as proper. It tended to show flight on the part of the defendant, which is “evidence of guilt and of a guilty conscience.” Besides, the defendant’s objection was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard the remarks, and there was no exception. Under the circumstances there was no error. [State v. Kullman, 225 Mo. l. c. 632.]
IY. The cross-examination of the defendant as to the kind of horses he was driving and how they were shod was germane to the subject-matter of the direct examination and was proper. He had testified that he had bought the buggy while traveling on the road from his house at Senath. The particulars of that journey were proper matter for cross-examination.
Y. The instruction given on the subject of reasonable doubt was full and clear.
The defendant asked an instruction on the presumption of innocence and it was refused. It should have been given, but such refusal is not reversible error where the jury has been fully instructed on reasonable doubt. [State v. Maupin, 196 Mo. 164; State v. Kennedy, 154 Mo. l. c. 289.]
All the other instructions asked by defendant were fully covered by those given.
We find no reversible error in the record and the judgment is affirmed.
— The foregoing opinion of Roy, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.