51 P. 456 | Idaho | 1897
The appellant, who was the defendant in the court below, was convicted of the crime of bringing sheep into the state without having first obtained the certificate or permit of the deputy sheep inspector. He waived a jury trial, and the case was submitted to the court on a written stipula
The appellant contends that said judgment is erroneous, because the act of the state legislature under which he was convicted is repugnant to certain provisions of the federal constitution: (1) To paragraph 1, section 2, article 4, which provides that citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states; and (2) to that provision of section 8, article 1, which authorizes the Congress to regulate commerce. The defendant was convicted under the fourth section of an act entitled “An act to amend sections 2, 3, 5, 6, 7; 8, 11 and 12 of an act to create the office of sheep inspector for the state of Idaho; to provide for the appointment and to define the powers and duties of said officer and his deputies, and fixing his salary and the compen-. sation of his deputies and providing for the prosecution of offenses in said act,” approved March 12, 1897 (see Sess. Laws 1897, p. 115), which act is commonly called the “Scab Law.” Said fourth section is as follows: “That section 6 of said act is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 6. Any person, persons, company, corporation or association, intending to bring, or cause to be brought from any other state or territory into any of the counties of the state of Idaho, any sheep, he or they must first notify the deputy sheep inspector of the district or county nearest to the point of entrance into this state, that at a fixed date he will be within twenty miles from the state line at a designated point, with said sheep for inspection; and it shall be the duty of the deputy sheep inspector to examine such sheep within three days, and if pronounced sound, to immediately dip such sheep once, and then, upon being tendered his compensation as hereinafter provided, issue a permit allowing such sheep to enter this state subject to such regulations as are enforced on resident sheep. But if such sheep are found scabby or infected with any contagious or infectious disease, then the deputy sheep inspector must dip said sheep twice, with an interval from eight to fifteen days between dipping, and then issue a permit for said sheep to enter said state under the same regulations as heretofore provided; provided, how
It is contended that said act, and the act of which it is amendatory, are police regulations enacted for the purpose of the suppression and prevention of disease among sheep. The legislature, no doubt, had authority to enact laws for such purpose; but, in so doing, it must not come in conflict with the provisions of the constitution of the Dnited States. Section 2, article 4 of the constitution of the Dnited States, is as follows: “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of- citizens in the several states.” And section 8, article 1, provides, among other things, that the Congress shall have power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with Indian tribes.” Numerous cases involving the construction of statutes similar to the one under consideration have been passed upon by the supreme court of the Dnited States. All decisions from that court give to the commercial clause of the federal constitution a most liberal and salutary construction. And all statutes passed professedly as police regulations have not been tested by the innocent titles they may have, but by their natural and probable effect upon interstate commerce; and, if found in any manner to harass or burden such commerce, they have been invariably declared void. The leading case in construing the commerce clause of the federal constitution is that of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The construction given that provision by the great Chief Justice Marshall in that decision has not been questioned or doubted. It has been cited and approved in many cases. (See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Welton v. Missouri, 91 D. S. 275; Railroad v. Husen, 95 D. S. 465; Brown v. Houston, 114 D. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1091; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
Applying the rule laid down in the foregoing authorities to the fourteenth section of the act providing for the appointment of a sheep inspector (see Sess. Laws 1895, p. 124), and the fourth and sixth sections of the act amendatory thereof (see Sess. Laws 1897, p. 115), and the facts of this case, it is made clearly to appear that said sections' place unnecessary burdens and restrictions upon owners of sheep who desire to bring them into the state, as well as upon transportation companies, and greatly interfere with interstate commerce in the matter of the transportation and sale of sheep, and are therefore repugnant to the commercial clause of the federal constitution, and void. Said section 4 requires any person, company, or corporation intending to bring sheep into the state to notify the deputy sheep inspector that at a fixed date he will have his sheep within twenty miles from the state line, at a designated point; and it then is made the duty of said inspector to examine such sheep within three days after such notification, and, if such sheep are found to be sound and healthy, to immediately dip them; and then, upon tender of his compensation, he shall issue a permit allowing such sheep to enter the state. But in ease such sheep are found scabby, or infected with a contagious or infectious disease, then such inspector must dip them