State v. DuboisState v. Dubois
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cherry, Weber, Gideon, Frick, Jos. H. Erickson
LARCENY—FELONIOUS INTENT TO STEAL MUST BE ESTABLISHED. To constitute “larceny,” the taking of property of another must be with felonious intent to steal which must be established by circumstances of taking or other proof. - CRIMINAL LAW—FELONIOUS INTENT QUESTION FOR JURY, WHERE EVIDENCE MIGHT LEAD TO DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. If evidence is such that all reasonable minds should conclude that taking of property of another was without felonious intent, question is one of law, and verdict of guilty should be set aside, but if reasonable minds may differ and arrive at opposite conclusions, finding of jury must control.1
- LARCENY—EVIDENCE HELD TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION OF STEALING CALF. Evidence held to sustain conviction of felonious stealing calf belonging to another, as against defense that taking was in good faith and with honest belief that calf was property of defendants.
Appeal from District Court, Seventh District, Carbon County; F. E. Woods, Judge.
John E. Dubois and another were convicted of grand larceny, and they appeal.
AFFIRMED.
McCarty & McCarty, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and L. A. Miner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
CHERRY, J.
The taking of the calf from the pasture of Brown by the defendants, at the time and place alleged, was admitted; but it was contended by way of defense, that the defendants took the calf in good faith, and with the honest belief that it was their own property, and that therefore no theft was committed. The only question in dispute was the bona fides of the defendants’ claim, and the evidence relating to that subject was somewhat conflicting. Without attempting to refer to or review the whole of the evidence, it is enough to say that there was substantial evidence on the part of the state to the following effect:
Brown owned a large tract of land lying west of and adjoining the main public road, and about two miles northwest of the town of Moab. On this land, cattle belonging to various persons were pastured from time to time. The land was fenced, and the usual entrance to it was at a place on the main road opposite and near Brown‘s house. Previous to and on the date of the alleged larceny, Brown had a number of cattle, including the calf in question, pasturing on his land. The calf in question was a red heifer calf about 5 months old, without brands or marks. It was what is called a “doggie,” or motherless calf.
On September 29, 1921, the defendants, with the permission of Brown, went to the latter‘s land to look for some cattle claimed by them to be missing from a bunch of cattle mortgaged by them to a bank, and which the bank had previously kept in Brown‘s pasture. They entered Brown‘s land from the main road at the usual place of entrance near Brown‘s house, and proceeded to the westerly part of the land, where they found the calf in question. It is not
At the trial the defendants contended that they had lost a calf similar to the one taken from Brown, and that they took the calf from Brown‘s pasture with the honest belief and claim that it was their own. The calf lost by them, however, was admitted to have been about 15 months old at the time, while the calf taken from Brown‘s pasture was shown to have been but 5 months old. In this connection it was shown that the defendant John E. Dubois had had considerable experience in the cattle business, resulting in the inference that he could readily discern the difference between a calf 15 months old and one 5 months old.
The defendants introduced considerable evidence tending to explain their conduct and to support their claim to the
The mere taking of personal property belonging to another does not, of course, constitute larceny. The taking must be with the felonious intent to steal, and this element must be established by the circumstances of the taking or other proper proof. As a general rule, the question 1 of whether or not the taking is felonious, is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. But the rule is not absolute. The taking may be under such circumstances that there is no legal warrant for the jury finding it to be felonious, as in State v. Morrell, 39 Utah, 498, 118 P. 215; State v. Chynoweth, 41 Utah, 354, 126 P. 302.
It is not easy to state a rule by which it may be determined in each particular case whether the evidence is or is not sufficient in this respect, to support a verdict of guilty. If the evidence is such that all reasonable minds 2 should arrive at the conclusion that the taking was without felonious intent, then the question becomes one of law, and the verdict of guilty should be set aside. But if, after a consideration of all the evidence, reasonable minds may differ and arrive at opposite conclusions, the finding of the jury must control. State v. Gurr, 40 Utah, 162, 120 P. 209, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 320.
In the case at bar, there were circumstances shown in connection with the taking of the calf by the defendants which, we think, justified the jury in finding felonious intent. The fact that the calf was taken out of the pasture, not through the usual outlet, but by a roundabout route which avoided
Additional errors are assigned upon the sustaining by the trial court of objections by the district attorney to certain questions propounded by defendants’ counsel to the prosecuting witness on cross-examination. We have carefully examined the record and find no error in this respect. The questions complained of were in most cases allowed to be answered in a slightly variant form, and those which were not answered were clearly not cross-examination.
The judgment is affirmed.
WEBER, C. J., GIDEON and FRICK, JJ., and JOS. H. ERICKSON, District Judge, concur.
THURMAN, J., did not participate herein.