81 Mo. 231 | Mo. | 1883
The defendant, a negress, was indicted for murder in the first degree, and on trial had, was convicted of that offense. The person killed was Joseph Miller, a negro, and the killing was done by stabbing him with a knife. Various reasons are urged, why a reversal of the judgment should occur. For the most part, the cause was well tried, but, nevertheless, such errors occurred during the progress of the trial as must accomplish a reversal of the judgment.
I. The State should not have been permitted to ask the witness, Maria Fuller, if she had been confined in the work-house, and this too, over the objections of the defendant. If the witness had been sentenced to the locality mentioned, there was record evidence of the fact which could readily have been produced. State v. Rugan, 68 Mo. 214; State v. McGraw, 74 Mo. 573; State v. Lewis, 80 Mo. 110.
II. If there was any error in refusing to let Sis Clark and Rachel Nighton testify respecting the difficulty between
III. Under the rulings of this court in the cases of State v. McLaughlin, 76 Mo. 320; State v. Turner, lb, 350, and State v. McGraw, 74 Mo. 573, it was error to cross-examine a defendant testifying in his own behalf, as to matters not testified upon in the examination in chief. ¥e have read the testimony of the defendant, both in chief, and on cross-examination, but do not find that the cross-examination extended beyond that in chief, at least if it did, it was as to matters so very trivial and unimportant, that we are not prepared to say that we should reverse because of anythingin the cross-examination contained.
IY. The evidence on the part of the State well warranted conviction of murder in the first degree; indeed, the evidence may be said greatly to preponderate in favor of
But there was other testimony which, if believed by the jury, brought the case under the provisions of section 1250, since that section recognizes an intentional killing when done in the heat of passion, caused for instance by a blow, as amounting to nothing more than manslaughter in the fourth degree. This was true as to manslaughter even at common law. And an instruction under that section, should therefore, have been given. Eor the errors heretofore pointed out the judgment should.be reversed and the cause remanded.