{¶ 1} Abоut five months after a bench trial, the court entered a judgment convicting *32Bradley D. Doughman of domestic violence. Doughman claims that the nearly five-month delay from the trial until the court found him guilty was unreasonable and resulted in a denial of his constitutional rights to due process of law and the administration of justice without denial or delay. As a result he contends the trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence him. He relies initially upon R.C. 2838.11(F), which states that a bench finding shall be announced in open court not more than 48 hours after submission of the case, and Sheffield v. Nieves ,
{¶ 2} We reject Dоughman's claim for several reasons. First, R.C. 2938.11(F) is directory, not mandatory. Second, Nieves is not binding upon our court and contains little analysis to make it persuasive. And as we have held, the test to determine both a due process and constitutional speedy-trial claim in a post-trial context is the same as the test for pretrial delay. Third, the nearly five-month delay and the lack of reasons to justify the delay do weigh in Doughman's favor. However, he did not assert his right to a timely court ruling, and although he speculates about the court's faded memory, he has not established any prejudice from the delay. Under these circumstances, he has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional speedy-trial or due-process rights.
{¶ 3} Doughman also contends that he is entitled to reversal of his conviction and discharge based on Crim.R. 32(A), which requires that sentence shall be imposed without delay. But he concedes that provision and the cases he cites construing it are inapplicable here because the rule addresses a delay between a conviction and the sentence, which he does not direсtly contest here.
{¶ 4} Therefore, we overrule Doughman's assignment of error and affirm his conviction.
I. FACTS
{¶ 5} In July 2015, a deputy sheriff filed a complaint in the Adams County Court alleging that Bradley D. Doughman had committed domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) by choking and punching his wife in the nose. After Doughman's аrrest he was released from jail on his own recognizance.
{¶ 6} On October 19, 2015, the court held a bench trial on the criminal charge. At the conclusion of the trial the court stated that it would "make a decision and advise the parties." One hundred and forty three days later, on Marсh 10, 2016, the trial court issued a journal entry finding Doughman guilty of domestic violence and ordered a presentence investigation.
{¶ 7} Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Doughman to a suspended jail term, one year of community control, a fine, and court costs.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 8} Doughman assigns the following error for our review:
THE DELAY OF NEARLY FIVE MONTHS BETWEEN MR. DOUGHMAN'S BENCH TRIAL AND THE COURT FINDING HIM GUILTY WAS UNREASONABLE AND RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO, A DIVESTMENT OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION, AND A VIOLATION OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION'S ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 GUARANTEE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE "WITHOUT DENIAL OR DELAY."
*33III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error Doughman asserts that the nearly five-month delay between his bench trial and the court's finding him guilty violated his constitutional right to due process of law and the state constitutional right to the guarantee of the administration of justice "without denial or delay." As a result, he contends the trial сourt lost jurisdiction to sentence him. He raises a question of law, which we review de novo.
{¶ 10} Doughman primarily relies upon R.C. 2938.11(F), which provides that "[a]ny finding by the judge or magistrate shall be announced in open court not more than forty-eight hours after submission of the case to him."
{¶ 11} He also cites Sheffield v. Nieves ,
The concept of a speedy trial encompasses within its ambit not only the prompt commencement of the trial, but likewise its prompt disposition once commenced. We hоld that a defendant who has rested his case and placed his fate in the hands of the trial judge is entitled to a judgment within a reasonable time thereafter and where that judgment, when it is one of guilt, is not forthcoming until approximately seven months thereafter, he (defendant) has been denied the due process of the law.
{¶ 12} We reject Doughman's claim for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the time requirement in R.C. 2938.11(F)"is directory, not mandatory." State ex rel. Martin v. Mannen ,
{¶ 13} Second, Nieves is not binding on our court and whatever persuasive value it retains is greatly diminished by its lack of analysis. In other words, it is a brief conclusory opinion that provides little guidance for our purposеs here. For example, in State v. Ayres , 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-77-39,
However, were we willing to adopt the rationale of the Nieves case, it being based on the constitutional speedy trial conсept, we still would be of the opinion that the established tests of reasonableness for speedy trial are applicable in the determination of the reasonableness of the time which has elapsed from submission of an action to the trial court until a decision thereon.
{¶ 14} In Ayres , the court held that a six-month delay between a bench trial and the trial court finding of guilt in a criminal case did not warrant vacation of the conviction based on R.C. 2938.11(F) and Nieves because the statutory provision was merely directory, and an application of the cоnstitutional speedy-trial analysis did not warrant a finding that the delay was unreasonable.
*34{¶ 15} Similarly, in State v. Camp , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-78-3,
{¶ 16} Like Ayres and Camp , we believe regardless of whether the issue is framed in terms of constitutional speedy trial or due process, claims of delay between the submission of the case to the trial court and the court's finding of guilt are best addressed using the analysis for determining a pretrial constitutional speedy-trial claim. See State v. Adams , 4th Dist. Adams No. 98CA656,
Whether a delay in completing a prosecution amounts to a denial of the constitutional right to speedy trial depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. Many constitutional speedy trial arguments arise in the context of pretrial delay. See State v. Selvage (1997),at 470, 80 Ohio St.3d 465 . Others involve a delay between the finding of guilt and the imposition of sentence. See Perez v. Sullivan (C.A.10, 1986), 739 [793] F.2d 249. More unique is the context involved here, i.e., the delay in rendering a judgment after submission of the facts. In light of the fact that reviewing courts have consistently applied the pretrial delay test announced in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 687 N.E.2d 433 , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , to post trial situations, see Perez, supra , at 254, we believe it is also applicable here. Implicit in our application of Barker is the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial encompasses delays in deciding a case after its submission to the finder of fact. 33 L.Ed.2d 101
{¶ 17} After applying that test, we conclude that Doughman has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. State v. Blackburn ,
{¶ 18} "To determine whethеr a defendant has been deprived of these constitutional speedy-trial rights, a court must balance four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of a speedy-trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant." State v. Adams ,
*35{¶ 19} "But before engaging in any balancing of these factors, we must make a threshold determination concerning the length of the delay." State v. McIntyre , 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3524,
{¶ 20} In Adams ,
{¶ 21} Here, the reason for the trial court's delay in ruling on Doughman's guilt after the bench trial is not disclosed in the record. There is a January 2016 entry in which the court placed the case on "inactive status pending a decision" from the court, but that entry does not identify the court's reason for doing so. There is "nothing inherent in the charge[ ] * * * which would lead us to conclude that the decision required consideration of complex legal questions or voluminous testimony." Adams at *3. "While the delay in rendering a decision seems inordinate, we know nothing about the trial court's remaining docket and are unwilling to find the length of the delay by itself, results in a violation of appellant's speedy trial rights."
{¶ 22} Turning to Doughman's assertion of his rights, the record reveals he never filed a motion requesting that the trial court rule expeditiously in his criminal case. In fact, he did not file a motion to dismiss the case based on any claimed violation of his constitutional or statutory rights. In Adams at *3, we found that even though the appellant in that case moved to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds after four months had passed from the date of submission of his case to the trial court, that was not conclusive of his rights. Doughman did less here. Significantly, in Martin ,
{¶ 23} For the final factor of prejudice, there is no evidence in the record or argument on appeal that Doughman suffered any prejudice here. The three interests that the constitutional speedy-trial right is designed to protect are: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility *36that the defense will be impaired. Spencer ,
{¶ 24} At oral argument Doughman's counsel focused upon the pоtential of the trial court to suffer from a "faded memory" in deciding the case. However, there is nothing in the record to substantiate that speculation.
{¶ 25} Although the first two factors, length of delay and reason for delay, weigh in Doughman's favor, the remaining two factors, his belated assertion of his rights and his lack of prejudice, weigh heavily against him. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Doughman has failed to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment or due process rights.
{¶ 26} Doughman also cites Crim.R. 32(A), which requires that "[s]entence shall be imposed without unnecessary delay," and cases construing it, in support of his assignment of error. But as Doughman appears to implicitly concede, this rule and the cases he cites construing it "are distinguishable because they addressed a delay between a conviction or plea and the imposition of the sentence." (Emphasis sic.) See State v. Vince , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 2147,
{¶ 27} Finally, Doughman also cites Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution in his assignment of error, but he fails to provide any specific argument on that provision in his brief. Because he apparently relies on the cоngruent nature of the more specific due process/speedy trial argument and this provision of the Ohio Constitution, we believe our analysis also covers both claims. To the extent that he had something else in mind, it is not our duty to create an argument on behalf of the apрellant. See, e.g., State v. Markins , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3387,
{¶ 28} Because Doughman has not established any reversible error by the trial court, we overrule his sole assignment of error.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 29} Having overruled Doughman's sole assignment of error, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Abele, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.