State v. DonahooState v. Donahoo
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Castillo, Michael D. Bustamante, Cynthia A. Fry
OPINION
CASTILLO, Judge.
{1} In this case, we are asked to examine the jurisdiction of a metropolitan court judge, Judge Barnhart — who, although not assigned to Defendant‘s case, presided over a portion of the case because of the unavailability of the assigned judge. Defendant arguеs that under the applicable rules of criminal procedure, Judge Barnhart was without jurisdiction to preside in this case. Therefore, Defendant contends, any ruling made by Judge Barnhart must be void. In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we proposed to hold that Judge Barnhart had the authority to preside over Defendant‘s case, and we proposed to affirm the district court. Defendant filed a timely memorandum in opposition. Having duly considered the memorandum in opposition and remaining unpersuaded, we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{2} We review the district court‘s interpretation of a rule de novo. See State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995).
B. Judge Barnhart Had the Authority to Preside Over Defendant‘s Case
{3} As we discussed in our notice of proposed summary disposition, Defendant‘s case was set for trial on April 21, 2005, before Judge Chavez, who was assigned to hear Defendant‘s case. However, Judge Chavez was unavailable on April 21, 2005. In his absence, Judge Gomez, who did not hear Defendant‘s case, and later Judge Barnhart filled in for Judge Chavez.
{4} Judge Barnhart made some decisions in Defendant‘s case. Judge Barnhart (1) found that the record did not indicate Judge Gomez recused herself and that there was no need to continue Defendant‘s trial setting for at least ten days, pending reassignment of the case to another judge, pursuant to
{5} The case went to trial before Judge Chavez on May 24, 2005. Defendant was convicted of aggravated DWI and failure to yield by Judge Chavez after a bench trial. Defendant appealed the conviction to the district court. That court relied on general concepts of jurisdiction, аffirmed the conviction, and concluded that Judge Barnhart had the power or authority to act as he did and that nothing existed to divest him of that power or authority. Defendant filed a motion for rehearing and argued that the district court overlooked or misapprehended some points of fact or law and the applicability of specific rules of criminal procedure for the metropolitan courts. The district court denied the motion for rehearing and noted that Defendant‘s argument was unavailing.
{6} Defendant lists four grounds as support for his position that Judge Barnhart‘s decisions should be voided for lack of jurisdiction: (1) neither Judge Gomez nor Judge Barnhart was assigned to the case; (2) there was no evidenсe that Judge Chavez, the assigned judge, agreed to have either of the two other judges preside over the case; (3) the parties did not agree to the other judges’ presiding over the case; and (4) the parties were not given ten days to agree on another judge to hear the case. Below and now on appeal to this Court, Defendant relies on the rules of criminal procedure for the metropolitan courts to support his argument, specificаlly
{7}
{8} Defendant agrees that the use of the word “may” is permissive but argues that Judge Barnhart had no jurisdiction in the first place. Defendant acknowledges that district court and municipal court judges would hаve jurisdiction under these facts. According to Defendant, however, Judge Barnhart had no jurisdiction because there is no case law directly on point granting jurisdiction to an unassigned judge in these circumstances and because there is nо specific criminal rule that would create jurisdiction in this case. We do not agree with Defendant‘s conclusion.
{9}
{10} Defendant maintains that “[t]here are only two exceptions under the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts to the general rule that only an аssigned judge has jurisdiction in Metropolitan Court to preside over a Metropolitan Court criminal case.” Defendant argues that one exception is under
{11} Defendant also argues that another exception to the general rule that оnly an assigned judge has jurisdiction over a case in metropolitan court is
{12} Finally, Defendant contends that the plain meaning of
C. Defendant Does Not Establish That Judge Barnhart‘s Ruling Prejudiced Him
{13} Although Defendant argues that Judge Barnhart‘s ruling regarding the continuance requested by Defendant prejudiced him, his argument is unpersuasive. Judge Barnhart‘s rulings were reviewed by Judge Chavez, and Judge Chavez determined that Judge Barnhart did not err. Furthermore, although Defendant‘s memorandum in opposition argues that he was prejudiced by the delay under
{14} Finally, with regard to the motion for rehearing that Defendant raised in his docketing statement, Defendant‘s memorandum in opposition does not point out that this Court‘s proposal was incorrect. See
II. CONCLUSION
{15} Based on the foregoing and those reasons set forth in our calendar notice, we affirm the district court‘s determination.
{16} IT IS SO ORDERED.