STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Don Jacob HAVATONE, Appellant.
No. CR-15-0387-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed March 9, 2017
389 P.3d 1251
David Goldberg (argued), David Goldberg Attorney at Law, Fort Collins, CO, Attorney for Don Jacob Havatone
JUSTICE BOLICK, opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 This case considers the constitutionality of
¶ 2 We also consider whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here. Following a collision after which defendant was airlifted to Nevada, a blood draw was taken at the request of Arizona law enforcement officials, raising the question, unresolved in the trial or appeals court, of which state‘s law applies to decide whether the blood test results should be suppressed. We hold that under Arizona law, the good-faith exception would not apply, and thus if our state‘s law applies, the evidence from the blood draw must be suppressed. However, we remand to the trial court to determine which jurisdiction‘s law applies and, if it is Nevada law, whether it supports application of the good-faith exception.
I.
¶ 3 On September 17, 2012, Don Jacob Havatone drove his SUV, with four other passengers, into an oncoming vehicle on Route 66 northeast of Kingman. A witness driving behind Havatone testified that before the collision the SUV was driving “erratically” for several miles and repeatedly crossed the center line. The other vehicle was occupied only by its driver, L.S. After the collision, L.S. saw a man with his foot caught in the SUV‘s windshield crawl out over the hood and lie down in front of the vehicle. She saw a second occupant, later identified as Havatone, exit the driver‘s side of the SUV and lie down behind the vehicle.
¶ 4 Department of Public Safety (“DPS“) Officer M.P. responded to the scene. He approached Havatone, whom medics were treating. Havatone confirmed he was driving the SUV. When M.P. asked Havatone what happened, Havatone did not respond. M.P. detected a “heavy odor” of alcohol emanating from all the SUV‘s occupants, including Havatone. M.P. looked inside the SUV and saw numerous beer cans and an open bottle of liquor.
¶ 5 Havatone was airlifted to a Las Vegas hospital for treatment. Without seeking a warrant, Officer M.P. followed DPS policy and instructed DPS dispatch to request that Las Vegas police officers obtain a blood sample. Havatone was unconscious when the blood sample was taken. The sample showed a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC“) of 0.212.
¶ 6 The State charged Havatone with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor while his license was suspended or revoked, aggravated driving under the extreme influence of intoxicating liquor with a BAC of 0.20 or more with a suspended license, aggravated assault of L.S. with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, recklessly endangering L.S. with a substantial risk of imminent death, and four counts of aggravated assault of the occupants of his vehicle with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.
¶ 7 Havatone moved to suppress the blood test results, arguing that the test was a warrantless search prohibited by the
¶ 9 On appeal, Havatone argued that the statute authorizing his blood draw while unconscious violated his
¶ 10 We granted review because the issues presented are of first impression and statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under
II.
¶ 11 We review rulings on motions to suppress for an abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court‘s ruling. State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84, 87 ¶ 8, 302 P.3d 609, 612 (2013). “An error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 228 ¶ 9, 349 P.3d 200, 202 (2015). Both a statute‘s constitutionality under the
¶ 12 Arizona‘s “implied consent” statute,
A. A person who operates a motor vehicle in this state gives consent ... to a test or tests of the person‘s blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or drug content if the person is arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed ... while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. The test or tests chosen by the law enforcement agency shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state ... (1) [while] under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.
....
C. A person who is dead, unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering the person incapable of refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided by subsection A....
Subsection C, at issue here, is known as the “unconscious clause.”
¶ 13 After we granted review, the State acknowledged that the unconscious clause is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. The State takes the position that blood may be taken from a DUI suspect under the unconscious clause only if case-specific exigent circumstances exist. We agree.
¶ 14 A blood draw taken or directed by the government implicates privacy rights protected by the Constitution. The
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
¶ 15 In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), decided after the arrest here, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in DUI cases where police relied solely upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood. Such a “compelled physical intrusion” beneath the skin and into the veins “to obtain a sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation ... implicates an individual‘s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.‘” Id. at 1558 (citation omitted). The Court confirmed the view, expressed in prior cases, that such searches could be justified only by exigent circumstances. “In short,” the Court ruled, “while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, ... it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1563.
¶ 16 Following McNeely, we ruled in State v. Butler that Arizona‘s implied consent statute,
¶ 17 McNeely and Butler establish that absent an exception to the warrant requirement, nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws from DUI suspects are unconstitutional. We conclude that the unconscious clause can be constitutionally applied only when case-specific exigent circumstances prevent law enforcement officers from obtaining a warrant. Here, the State concedes that exigent circumstances did not exist. Rather, Officer M.P. testified he was following department practice to procure a blood draw anytime a DUI suspect was sent out of state for emergency treatment. Because the test was taken pursuant to a blanket policy rather than the presence of case-specific exigent circumstances, Havatone‘s
¶ 18 Our decision does not vitiate
III.
¶ 19 Although the dissent attempts gamely to resuscitate the argument, ¶ 40, the State expressly concedes that the record “does not show exigent circumstances beyond the natural dissipation of alcohol in Appellant‘s blood.” Hence, the search violated the
¶ 20 The State argues that the blood test results should not be suppressed for two reasons: (1) at the time of the blood draw here, the unconscious clause expressly authorized the blood draw and had not been ruled unconstitutional; and (2) nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws were permitted based on natural alcohol dissipation in the blood prior to McNeely, which was not decided until after Havatone‘s blood was taken. For those reasons, the State asserts that the blood draw satisfies the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We disagree. DPS should have known that routinely directing blood draws from DUI suspects who were sent out of state for emergency treatment, without making a case-specific determination whether a warrant could be timely secured, was either impermissible or at least constitutionally suspect. Thus, the good-faith exception does not apply.
¶ 21 The dissent suggests that the good-faith exception applies unless the police officers exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for
¶ 22 Here, the officer followed DPS policy and training that seeking a warrant was unnecessary under the circumstances. When the
¶ 23 The record here shows that the DPS officer followed the department‘s regular practice, in which he was trained, to request blood draws without a warrant whenever a
¶ 24 That belief was mistaken. Davis instructs that law enforcement acts in good faith if “binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice.” 564 U.S. at 241. But warrantless blood draws from DUI suspects based on a “per se exigency” rather than the totality of individual circumstances have been discredited for over fifty years. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court upheld admission of a blood test taken from a defendant whom police had probable cause to believe had committed a DUI offense. The Court observed, “Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned.” Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
¶ 25 The dissent suggests that the emergency in Schmerber was based on the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood—that is, a per se exigency—rather than individualized circumstances making a warrant untenable. ¶ 53. It was not. The Court concluded that the emergency justifying the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw was based on the “special facts” of the case, “where time had to be taken to bring the accused to the hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident,” thus “there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.” Id. at 770-71.
¶ 26 It is true that alcohol dissipation starts a fast time clock, but under Schmerber, additional facts are necessary to show it was not feasible to obtain a warrant during that time frame. As McNeely observes, in the decades since Schmerber, technology has made it possible to quickly obtain warrants by phone or otherwise. 133 S.Ct. at 1561-63. The State does not allege any such “special facts” justifying a warrantless blood draw. Indeed, the State concedes that no exigency existed apart from the ordinary dissipation of alcohol in the blood, and the DPS officer testified that telephonic warrants are possible but he was trained to not obtain a warrant when a DUI suspect is airlifted out of state.
¶ 27 The Court in McNeely emphasized that it did not announce a new constitutional rule but rather reaffirmed Schmerber‘s emergency requirement. “[I]n Schmerber, we considered all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case and carefully based our holding on those specific facts.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1560; see also id. at 1559 (“Our decision in Schmerber applied this totality of the circumstances approach“); id. at 1561 (courts should “decide each case on its facts, as we did in Schmerber“). A per se rule that warrants are never required is at considerable odds with the Schmerber rule that warrants are required absent special facts. Hence, the routine practice of directing blood draws in a particular context, where no exigent circumstances existed, was impermissible at the time Havatone was arrested.
¶ 28 The State argues that the good-faith exception applies because
¶ 29 When the law is unsettled, “exclusion of the evidence obtained” in a ques-
¶ 30 Arizona case law in effect at the time of Havatone‘s blood test did not “specifically authorize[] a particular police practice,” see Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 (emphasis omitted), of directing warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws from unconscious DUI suspects absent exigent circumstances. In State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 709 P.2d 1336 (1985), we held that a formal arrest was not necessary for police to obtain a blood sample from a DUI suspect drawn by medical personnel for treatment purposes. We applied Schmerber as recognizing exigent circumstances based on dissipation of alcohol in the blood. Id. at 285-86, 709 P.2d at 1344-45.2 Construing former
¶ 31 In State v. Huffman, 137 Ariz. 300, 302, 670 P.2d 405, 407 (App. 1983), the court of appeals held that no arrest is necessary for a blood draw under the unconscious exception. The court applied Schmerber, holding that a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw from an unconscious DUI suspect requires probable cause “and that the officer
¶ 32 In State v. Flannigan, 194 Ariz. 150, 152 ¶ 9, 978 P.2d 127, 129 (App. 1998), police officers directed a blood draw from a DUI suspect relying on “the department‘s policy that exigent circumstances always exist in vehicular aggravated assault and manslaughter cases.” Although the case involved a different statute, the court of appeals analyzed Schmerber‘s exigent circumstances rule as we do here:
In Schmerber, exigent circumstances existed because of the evanescent quality of alcohol and because the police reasonably believed that they did not have time to “seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant” before evidence of the defendant‘s intoxication would be destroyed. Schmerber does not provide a blanket exception to the warrant requirement whenever a suspect is believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Rather, the evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person‘s body creates an exigency only if the evidence might disappear before the police can obtain a warrant.
Id. at 154 ¶ 20, 978 P.2d at 131. The court aptly concluded, “The officers’ rote application of the department‘s untenable policy ... violated Flannigan‘s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” Id. at 155 ¶ 25, 978 P.2d at 132.
¶ 33 Here, the officer‘s “rote application” of department policy to obtain warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws from DUI suspects who are transported to another state for medical treatment was inconsistent with federal and state appellate precedents, and certainly was not “specifically authorized.”
¶ 34 For those reasons, DPS‘s practice of directing routine, warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws from DUI suspects sent outside the state for medical treatment was not objectively reasonable under Arizona law at the time of the draw. Therefore, the trial and appeals courts erred as a matter of Arizona law in concluding that the State satisfied its burden of proving that the impermissible blood draw was justified by the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
¶ 35 The dissent asserts that our decision “risks ‘set[ting] the criminal loose in the community without punishment.‘” ¶ 63. As in any case in which law enforcement tactics are measured against constitutional protections, this may be the unavoidable result in some DUI cases. But other evidence of impaired driving likely exists in such cases that support continued prosecution for DUI. Here, evidence of probable cause, and hence evidence potentially supporting a guilty verdict, was abundant (defendant was the driver, witnesses saw the car driving erratically, the officer smelled alcohol, and there were beer cans and a liquor bottle at the accident scene). Moreover,
IV.
¶ 36 The parties disagree whether Nevada or Arizona law applies to this case.3 The trial and appeals courts did not resolve the issue because they concluded the good-faith exception would apply in either state. The parties
¶ 37 Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals’ decision, reverse the trial court‘s decision on the motion to suppress, and remand to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PELANDER, V.C.J., joined by BRUTINEL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 38 For almost fifty years, Arizona‘s “implied consent” law has specifically and expressly allowed law enforcement to obtain for testing a blood sample of a DUI suspect who is unconscious.
¶ 39 As of 2012, the warrantless blood draw from the unconscious DUI suspect here was permissible because it was authorized under Arizona‘s implied consent law and was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances that the trial court found based on the investigating officer‘s testimony. Contrary to the majority‘s assertion, supra ¶ 20, under the law in effect at that time, admissibility of the blood test results did not require the state to show that the officer made “a case-specific determination whether a warrant could be timely secured.” But even if the majority is correct in concluding otherwise, and assuming that Arizona law applies, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply because the blood draw was objectively reasonable and no legitimate purpose is served by suppressing the blood evidence in this case.
¶ 40 Based on legal developments that occurred after September 2012, I agree (and the State concedes) that current law renders
¶ 41 The majority faults the investigating DPS officer for having “followed DPS policy and training” in requesting the blood draw. Supra ¶ 22. But the majority‘s emphasis on “department practice,” id. a matter barely touched on in the suppression hearing, disregards much of the officer‘s testimony and the trial court‘s findings. And we of course must
¶ 42 It is quite clear that Officer M.P. accurately determined that Havatone was driving under the influence of alcohol and caused the head-on collision that seriously injured himself and others. See supra ¶¶ 4-5, 35. Contrary to the majority‘s suggestion that the officer “fail[ed] to take individual circumstances into account,” supra ¶ 22, at the suppression hearing Officer M.P. testified that “exigent circumstances” supported his request for the blood draw based on the following factors that he identified: a very “chaotic” accident scene that he was responsible for investigating; the alcohol-related “serious collision” that resulted in severe injuries to Havatone and others; and Havatone (the driver/DUI suspect) being transported for emergency medical treatment out of state, where an Arizona warrant would have no force or effect. That testimony hardly suggests a disregard of circumstances warranting the officer‘s blood-draw request. Indeed, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court‘s ruling, Officer M.P.‘s testimony supported the court‘s implicit determination that ”Schmerber‘s emergency requirement” was satisfied. Supra ¶ 27.
¶ 43 Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and specifically citing the factors to which Officer M.P. testified, the trial court expressly found that “the totality of the circumstances” supported the officer‘s request for a warrantless blood draw. We should defer to the trial court‘s finding, which was supported by the record and applicable law in effect at the time of the blood draw. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (holding that “as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal,” but that appellate courts should “review findings of historical fact only for clear error and ... give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers“); cf. Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 194 Ariz. 363, 366-67 ¶ 11, 982 P.2d 127, 1280-81 (1999) (because “reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on weighing the totality of the circumstances[,] ... we will give substantial deference both to the trial court‘s findings of fact and its application of law to fact“).
¶ 44 Assuming that Arizona law applies in this matter, I also disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. Rather, I agree with the trial court and the unanimous court of appeals that the seizure of Havatone‘s blood sample was objectively reasonable and that no legitimate purpose is served by suppressing the blood evidence in this case. Therefore, the good-faith exception applies. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from section III of the majority‘s opinion and its holding that under Arizona law evidence relating to Havatone‘s blood sample must be suppressed.
¶ 45 The exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from presenting evidence obtained in violation of the
¶ 46 The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permits law enforcement to rea-
¶ 47 “Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule ... may well generate disrespect for the law and administration of justice.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. Only when the benefits of deterrence outweigh the social costs, which will include the high cost of excluding reliable, trustworthy evidence, should the rule operate. Davis, 564 U.S. at 237.
¶ 48 As noted above, law enforcement may reasonably rely on statutory authority later declared unconstitutional, Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50, or on binding appellate precedent later overturned, Davis, 564 U.S. at 240-41. Although either of these disjunctive factors is sufficient to support the good-faith exception, both exist here. DPS Officer M.P.‘s request for Nevada authorities to obtain a sample of Havatone‘s blood was made pursuant to, and in accordance with, Havatone‘s implied consent under
¶ 49 The majority holds that “the unconscious clause [in
¶ 50 Those recent cases cannot retroactively support a finding that Officer M.P. exhibited “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for
¶ 51 When the events in question occurred in September 2012, no court had suggested, let alone concluded, that
¶ 52 In short, as of September 2012, no Arizona court had suggested that the continued validity of the unconscious clause was dubious. Yet the majority unpersuasively suggests that, under the state of the law at that time, the provisions of
¶ 53 Contrary to the majority‘s reasoning, supra ¶¶ 24-27, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), neither casts doubt on the pre-McNeely validity of
The officer in the present case ... might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence[.]’ We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner‘s arrest.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (citation omitted). Given the similar circumstances of this case (with the additional fact here that the injured DUI suspect was transported out of state), the DPS officer likewise “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency” that authorized the warrantless blood draw. Id.
¶ 54 Tellingly, the pertinent Arizona cases interpreting and applying Schmerber do not support the majority‘s analysis and conclusion, but instead support application of the
The United States Supreme Court in Schmerber held that a blood sample may be taken without a search warrant if it is taken in a medically approved manner and based on probable cause to believe the person is intoxicated. In such a situation exigent circumstances permit a warrantless seizure because, “... the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system.”
147 Ariz. at 285-86, 709 P.2d at 1344-45 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770).
¶ 55 To authorize a warrantless blood draw under the medical blood draw exception,
¶ 56 The majority alternatively posits that the law on this point “was, at most, unsettled” in September 2012. Supra ¶ 28. Again, I disagree. Although Cocio did not address the unconscious clause, its finding of exigent circumstances based solely on the “highly evanescent nature of alcohol” in the blood and its rapid dissipation rate was not limited to the medical blood draw context. 147 Ariz. at 286, 709 P.2d at 1345. In that regard, consistent with Cocio, other courts also viewed Schmerber as broadly establishing a per se exigency based on the dissipation factor alone. See State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 547 & n.11 (Minn. 2008) (citing Cocio among other cases that interpreted Schmerber “as concluding that the naturally rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream creates an emergency that justifies a warrantless blood draw“); State v. Blank, 90 P.3d 156, 164 n.1 (Alaska 2004) (Matthew, J., dissenting) (same); People v. Harrison, 405 Ill.Dec. 362, 58 N.E.3d 623, 628 (2016) (same); see also People v. Harris, 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198, 205 (2015) (noting that before McNeely, “California courts uniformly interpreted Schmerber as permitting forced blood draws based solely on probable cause of DUI because the natural dissipation of alcohol or drugs in the blood was itself an exigent circumstance“).
¶ 57 The same exigency we recognized in Cocio, the natural dissipation of alcohol, would also be an exigency when, as here, a suspect is unconscious. And as we acknowledged in our recent opinion regarding the medical blood draw exception (
¶ 58 The majority‘s reliance on two court of appeals cases is even more curious. Supra ¶¶ 31-32. The majority correctly observes that the court in State v. Huffman “applied Schmerber,” supra ¶ 31, but disregards the Huffman court‘s statement that under Schmerber the natural dissipation of alcohol in blood justified officers in taking a blood sample from the unconscious DUI suspect pursuant to the implied consent statute‘s unconscious clause. 137 Ariz. 300, 303, 670 P.2d 405, 408 (App. 1983). The court thus affirmed the denial of Huffman‘s motion to suppress even absent any other evidence of exigency or any showing that the officer could not have obtained a warrant.
¶ 59 State v. Flannigan, on which the majority also relies, supra ¶ 32, is inapposite. 194 Ariz. 150, 978 P.2d 127 (App. 1998). That case involved a driver‘s methamphetamine (not alcohol) use and negligent-homicide conviction under
¶ 60 Because the seizure of a blood sample from Havatone while he was unconscious and receiving emergency medical treatment in another state was specifically authorized by a longstanding statute that no court had even questioned, much less ruled invalid, it matters not that Officer M.P.‘s actions were taken pursuant to his DPS training or department policy. That training and policy were permissible under Arizona law, which Officer M.P. had no reason to question. Just as the officer had no reason to question the constitutionality of the statute based on then-existing law, he likewise had no reason to question the validity of the department‘s policy. Whether Officer M.P. “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency” that authorized the warrantless blood draw under the statute, or under the department‘s policy, should not matter. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770; see State v. Dennis, 297 Kan. 229, 300 P.3d 81, 83 (2013) (holding that “it was unnecessary for the officer to specifically articulate [a state statute] as authority for the [warrantless] search because application of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not governed by a subjective inquiry. The question is whether an objectively reasonable officer could rely on [the statute].“). The majority does not persuasively establish otherwise.
¶ 61 “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the
¶ 63 Through its revisionist reinterpretation of prior Arizona cases, the majority imposes an unrealistic and unreasonable expectation on police officers to divine, based on subsequent case law, that a presumptively valid state statute does not actually allow or mean what it says. But law enforcement officers are not legal technicians and should not be expected to anticipate or predict a future change in our case law. Exclusion of the BAC evidence here “does not result in appreciable deterrence” and thus “is unwarranted.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under these circumstances, depriving the prosecution of that evidence necessarily “suppress[es] the truth” and risks “set[ting] the criminal loose in the community without punishment.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 237, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (citation omitted).