115 N.H. 682 | N.H. | 1975
The issue in this case is whether the contents of the affidavit and the evidence presented orally under oath were sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant to take blood samples, saliva samples, and hair samples from the head and pubic area of John Doe. A warrant was issued by Keller, C.J., who transferred Doe’s objections prior to execution of the warrant.
Stains on the pillow on which the victim’s head rested, on testing, were found to be type A blood. Seminal stains on a towel revealed that the subject was a secreter and had type AB or B blood. The affiant on May 21, 1975, found fingerprints on the outside window in front of the victim’s apartment which were partly smudged and in a position which indicated the person had slid the window open. These were found to match the fingerprints of Doe who could not successfully explain how his prints got on the window. Several hairs were found on the sheets of the bed where the victim was found, and one on her abdomen and one on her left hand. Laboratory tests showed all these hairs to be of Negroid origin. All other black men living in the apartment house consented to give samples of
Before issuing the warrant, the trial justice heard sworn testimony of the affiant with regard to the credibility of the persons named in the affidavit who had given information, and of the captain in charge of the State Police Criminal Laboratory, who testified as to the competency and reliability of the persons who performed the various tests and as to the importance of obtaining samples from Doe to either rule him out as a suspect or establish a relationship or consistency with the items and materials found at the scene.
At a later hearing before the issuance of the warrant, the justice heard evidence from the same captain and from a doctor at the New Hampshire Hospital as to the manner in which the samples would be taken and the amount thereof. This testimony revealed that there would be no pain involved in taking the hair or saliva samples and the blood sample would be less than that required for a blood alcohol test. The evidence given under oath before the warrant was issued may, of course, be considered along with that contained in the affidavit. State v. Titus, 107 N.H. 215, 220 A.2d 154 (1966); State v. Salsman, 112 N.H. 138, 290 A.2d 618 (1972); State v. Moreau, 113 N.H. 303, 306 A.2d 764 (1973).
The warrant provides that the samples shall be taken at the New Hampshire Hospital and prescribes the quantities to be taken, that the blood shall be taken under the supervision of a named doctor, and that the hair and saliva samples shall be taken by the captain of the crime laboratory. It further provides that Doe shall be detained only during the time necessary to transport him to and from the hospital and not over two hours at the hospital.
We begin by disposing of any claim that the evidence with respect to the informers was insufficient to establish the reliability of their information or their credibility. The identity of each person giving information was disclosed by name in the affidavit, their relationship to the victim and Doe was set forth, the employment of some was given, and the absence of any circumstances which would
Doe does not and cannot seriously claim that the State cannot take the samples in question if fourth amendment requirements are met. This was decided in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). No fifth amendment rights are involved. Id.; State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 336 A.2d 244 (1975). Also there is no question but that the samples will be taken in a reasonable manner in the hospital and the court has provided that his attorney may be present if he wishes. The sole question remaining, therefore, is whether the facts and circumstances presented to the court were sufficient to support its finding that probable cause to search existed. We hold that they were.
Contrary to Doe’s contention in oral argument, probable cause to search is not the same as probable cause to arrest. Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a man of ordinary caution in the belief that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963). But the right to search is not dependent upon the right to arrest. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925). Probable cause to search exists if the man of ordinary caution would be justified in believing that what is sought will be found in the place to be searched (Id. at 162) and that what is sought, if not contraband or fruits or implements of a crime, will “aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); see Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 664, 687 (1961). We do not hold that probable cause to arrest is lacking, but only that it is not essential to the issuance of a search warrant.
“[Ojnly the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-09 (1965); State v. Comeau, 114 N.H. 431, 321 A.2d 590 (1974). The evidence presented to the trial justice in this case meets this test.
The evidence before the court established that Doe is a black
We are of the opinion that this was sufficient to justify the search for evidence and the limited detention necessary to conduct it. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). We are also satisfied that there is a sufficient nexus between the evidence sought and the crime under investigation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307.
Exceptions overruled.