State v. DodsonState v. Dodson
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jessica E. Dodson, appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to a prison term of eighteen months. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} The Medina County grand jury issued an indictment charging Dodson with one count of possession of heroin in violation of
{¶3} The trial court ultimately found that Dodson met the criteria for intervention in lieu of conviction (“IILC“). Consequently, Dodson entered a guilty plea to all three counts in the indictment and the trial court stayed the criminal proceedings without entering a finding of guilt.
{¶4} Although Dodson was eventually placed at CBCF, she was unsuccessfully terminated a short time later. At a hearing, the trial court accepted Dodson‘s plea of admission and found her guilty of violating the terms and conditions of her probation. The trial court sentenced Dodson to a jail sentence of an additional thirty days and continued Dodson on probation.
{¶5} However, Dodson again violated her probation. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court accepted Dodson‘s plea of admission and again found her guilty of violating the terms and conditions of her probation. The trial court then imposed a prison sentence on Dodson of six months incarceration on each of the three counts of possession to run consecutively with a credit of 206 days for time already served.
{¶6} Dodson now brings this timely appeal and raises one assignment of error for our review.
II.
Assignment of Error
The trial court committed plain error and erred as a matter of law in sentencing Appellant to consecutive sentences for allied offenses that arose from the same conduct and were not committed separately or with separate animus.
{¶7} In her sole assignment of error, Dodson contends that the trial court committed plain error when it imposed consecutive prison sentences because her convictions were allied offenses arising from the same conduct and were not committed separately or with separate animus. We disagree.
{¶8} In this case, Dodson did not seek to merge her charges prior to entering her guilty pleas to possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, and aggravated possession of drugs and the trial court‘s subsequent acceptance of those guilty pleas. Consequently, Dodson states that her separate convictions were proper “since the merger process was waived below.” Dodson contends that regardless of this waiver, her convictions for possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, and aggravated possession of drugs are allied offenses which arose from the same conduct and, therefore, the trial court committed plain error when it did not merge her convictions for sentencing purposes.
{¶9}
{¶10} As we stated previously,
{¶11} “Whether multiple punishments imposed in the same proceeding are permissible is a question of legislative intent.” State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, ¶ 10. “Absent a more specific legislative statement,
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant‘s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
Accordingly,
{¶12} Dodson contends that her convictions for possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, and aggravated possession of drugs are allied offenses of similar import because they were committed on the same day and arose from the same conduct. However, in State v. Helmick, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27179, 2014-Ohio-4187, this Court previously recognized the following:
Generally, crimes relating to different controlled substances are of dissimilar import and do not merge. Under
R.C. 2628.11(C) , drug possession offenses are classified and penalized based on the type and quantity of the controlled substance involved. Where each violation ofR.C. 2925.11 requires proof of the identity of a different drug that was possessed * * * the legislature intended the possession of the different drug groups to constitute different offenses.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 26. Other Ohio courts have also concluded that the legislature intended the possession of different drugs to constitute different offenses and thus, crimes relating to different controlled substances are of dissimilar import. See State v. Huber, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010-CA-83, 2011-Ohio-6175, ¶ 7 (“[T]he fact each violation of
{¶13} In this case, Dodson was convicted of possession of heroin in violation of
{¶14} Accordingly, Dodson‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶15} Dodson‘s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.