2007 Ohio 3121 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2007
Lead Opinion
{¶ 3} In Miller, this Court held that a journal entry must contain five things to comply with Rule 32(C) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure:
*3This rule requires that the trial court's judgment of conviction contain:
1. the plea;
2. the verdict or findings;
3. the sentence;
4. the signature of the judge; and
5.the time stamp of the clerk to indicate journalization.
Id. at ¶ 5. But see State v. Williams, 9th Dist. No. 06CA008927,
{¶ 4} In this case, the trial court failed to include "the verdict or findings" in its journal entry. Accordingly, under this Court's holding in Miller, it is not a final, appealable order. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Dobrski's first assignment of error.
{¶ 6} Section
{¶ 7} The concurring opinion suggests that Section
{¶ 8} The trial court conducted a hearing on whether Mr. Dobrski should be classified as a sexual predator on April 14, 2006, immediately prior to his sentencing. The State requested that he be classified a sexual predator because the victim was his 12-year-old daughter, whom he had assaulted repeatedly over a year and a half. The State also noted that there were drinking and domestic issues "involved in the house." It concluded that "there is a severe likelihood that [Mr. Dobrski] will continue to repeat that behavior whenever it is that he is released."
{¶ 9} Mr. Dobrski's lawyer argued that Mr. Dobrski's situation did not satisfy "enough of the factors under the statute to be labeled as a sexual predator." He requested that he be classified a sexually oriented offender.
{¶ 10} The trial court asked the prosecutor and Mr. Dobrski's lawyer to help him with the classifications, saying, "[i]t's been a while since I worked with it at this point." Mr. Dobrski's lawyer explained that a classification as a sexually oriented offender requires registration for 10 years, a classification as a habitual sexual offender requires registration for 20 years, and a classification as a sexual predator requires registration for life. The trial court then stated that it was going to classify Mr. Dobrski as a habitual sexual offender:
This Court's going to make a classification that because of the number of offenses involved here, it was not over a huge period, but *6 it was over a period of one year, going to make a classification of a habitual sexual predator at this point.
There was then a discussion about Mr. Dobrski signing a form explaining the restrictions that would apply to him as a habitual sexual offender.
{¶ 11} The court next indicated that it was ready to move on to sentencing. As it was beginning to do so, however, the prosecutor interrupted and asked if she and Mr. Dobrski's lawyer could have a discussion with the court at side bar. Following that discussion, the court changed its classification of Mr. Dobrski from a habitual sexual offender to a sexual predator. The only reason stated by the trial court for classifying Mr. Dobrski as a sexual predator was that he could not properly be classified as a habitual sexual offender:
*7THE COURT: The Court having been advised that the fact that there is not a prior to this, the Court will make then — withdraws its finding on habitual and make the, make a classification of sexual predator at this point.
. . . .
THE COURT: . . . Now, I think, Ms. [Prosecutor], does that satisfy your classification at this point?
[Prosecutor]: Yeah. As I look at it, I have another guide, and I believe that the issue we discussed at side bar regarding prior is a requirement for habitual.
THE COURT: Now —
[Mr. Dobrski's Lawyer]: I think we can stipulate, Judge, that Stanley does not have a prior sexually oriented offense.
THE COURT: At least I can't — I don't see one listed.
[Mr. Dobrski's Lawyer]: Or offense that would kick in the habitual sexual offender possibility. And so it's our position that the only classification that the Court could make, would be a sexually oriented offender. The Court has found otherwise, and we will leave that for a later date with the appellate court.
The trial court then proceeded to sentence Mr. Dobrski.
{¶ 12} In State v. Eppinger,
Finally, the trial court should consider the statutory factors listed in R.C.
2950.09 (B)(2), and should discuss on the record the particular evidence and factors upon which it relies in making its determination regarding the likelihood of recidivism.
Id. at 166.
{¶ 13} In this case, the trial court failed to articulate any evidence or factors that it relied upon in determining that Mr. Dobrski is likely to again commit a sexually oriented offense once he is released from prison. As noted by the Supreme Court in Eppinger, the legislature did not contemplate that every individual who commits a sexually oriented offense will automatically be classified a sexual predator:
Although certainly even one sexually oriented offense is reprehensible and does great damage to the life of the victim, R.C. Chapter 2950 is not meant to punish a defendant, but instead, "to *8 protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state." R.C.
2950.02 (B). Thus, if we were to adjudicate all sexual offenders as sexual predators, we run the risk of "being flooded with a number of persons who may or may not deserve to be classified as high-risk individuals, with the consequence of diluting both the purpose behind and the credibility of the law. This result could be tragic to many." . . . Moreover, the legislature would never have provided for a hearing if it intended for one conviction to be sufficient for an offender to be labeled a "sexual predator."
Eppinger,
{¶ 14} Perhaps Mr. Dobrski should be classified a sexual predator. At this point, however, the record is inadequate to allow meaningful review of the trial court's classification of him as one. Accordingly, his second assignment of error must be sustained.
{¶ 16} Mr. Dobrski's second assignment of error is sustained. The trial court's sexual predator determination is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appeal dismissed in part reversed in part, and cause remanded in part.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
*10Costs taxed to both parties equally.
Concurrence Opinion
{¶ 17} I concur in the majority's determination that a sentencing order lacking a finding is not a final appealable order, and that it does not give this Court jurisdiction over any claims related to the sentencing. I write separately to point to an additional reason that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal.
{¶ 18} The statute governing sexual predator adjudications, R.C.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 19} I concur with the majority's finding that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address appellant's first assignment of error, because the trial court did not enter any finding of guilt after appellant entered his no contest plea.
{¶ 20} I respectfully dissent, however, as to the majority's finding that we have jurisdiction to consider appellant's second assignment of error that the trial court incorrectly classified him as a sexual predator. Under the circumstances of this case, I would find that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider appellant's second assignment of error.
{¶ 21} The concurring opinion correctly states that R.C.
{¶ 22} R.C.
{¶ 23} I am further troubled by the majority's determination that this Court has jurisdiction to review a sexual predator classification without an underlying conviction, because a significant number of the relevant factors that the trial court is directed to consider in its determination are directly related to facts arising out of the offender's conviction. Specifically, R.C.
{¶ 24} Finally, I am concerned about the practical impact of the decision to address a challenge to a sexual predator determination in the absence of a final, appealable order of conviction. This Court recently held that we do not have jurisdiction to address piecemeal appeals of criminal convictions. In State v. Goodwin, 9th Dist. No. 23337,
*14"Allowing, or indeed requiring, a criminal defendant who wishes to appeal to appeal on some charges before all charges against him or her in a case have been disposed of would potentially result in multiple appeals from the same case, each appeal addressing less than all the issues. Among other things, such a procedure would unnecessarily generate law of the case issues.
"* * *
"This Court concludes that requiring all charges against a defendant in a single case to be disposed of before the trial court's judgment on any charge is final is what the legislature intended in adopting Section
2505.02 (B)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code and furthers the purpose underlying ArticleIV , Section3 (B)(2 ), of the Ohio Constitution. Further, to the extent possible, this Court needs to be consistent for the guidance of trial courts and future litigants." Id. at ¶¶ 11 and 13.
{¶ 25} In Goodwin, in recognizing the requirement in R.C.
{¶ 26} Although I dissented in Goodwin, I did so upon reasoning that each conviction and sentence is independent from all others, irrespective of whether multiple charges have been disposed in a single case. In this case, a sexual predator classification cannot by its nature be independent of the underlying conviction of a sexually oriented offense. The sexual predator determination is a proceeding necessary to the complete disposition of the underlying criminal action. Accordingly, I find that this Court is bound by stare decisis and is precluded from reviewing on appeal appellant's sexual predator classification in the absence of a final, appealable order of conviction.
{¶ 27} The majority has not addressed the contingency, where we uphold the trial court's determination that the offender is a sexual predator, yet reverse his conviction of the sexually oriented offense(s) in a later appeal. Under those circumstances, will a defendant be permitted to file a second appeal regarding his sexual predator adjudication? Would a defendant have the sophistication and knowledge to file a motion to vacate the sexual predator adjudication pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)? Would an indigent defendant have any meaningful ability to appeal *15 the collateral disability which is not supported by any legal basis? For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent from the majority's finding that this Court has jurisdiction to consider appellant's second assignment of error regarding the propriety of his classification as a sexual predator. *1