State v. Dixon

Plaintiff-Respondent, State Wisconsin, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. Curtis L. Dixon,

Supreme Court 3, 1993. argument No. 91-1092-CR. Oral March Decided 24, 1993. June (Also 442.) reported 501 N.W.2d defendant-appellant-petitioner was there For the Boyle by Wendy P. Patrickus, and A. Gerald a brief argument by Boyle, S.C., Milwaukee and oral P. Gerald Boyle. P. Gerald argued plaintiff-respondent the cause was

For the general attorney by Balistreri, J. Thomas assistant attorney Doyle, E. on the brief was James whom with general. ABRAHAMSON, This is a review J.

SHIRLEY S. appeals unpublished of filed of court decision the of an affirming judgment of the circuit court a 2,1992,1 June Judge. county, Geske, Circuit Janine P. Milwaukee

for (Ct. Dixon, 342, 492 App. N.W.2d Wis. 2d 1992),

The circuit court denied the motion to the suppress cocaine, evidence defendant, and the Curtis L. Dixon, was the possession convicted cocaine with intent to deliver. The court of appeals affirmed order also of the evidence and denying suppression affirmed the of conviction. judgment

The this is whether issue before court the defen- dant, who was the truck with the the owner, is entitled to claim the protection of Fourth to the States Amendment United Constitution. The to this issue turns whether response the defen- dant had a reasonable that is an privacy, interior of the vehicle searched that as society willing recognize reason- able. We conclude under of the totality circumstances the defendant had reasonable expecta- tion of in the interior of the vehicle. Accordingly we decision reverse the of the court of and appeals remand the cause the circuit court.

The for this facts are disputed purposes 7,1989, review. On January the defеndant was driving a Nissan Pathfinder in Milwaukee when was he for stopped by police unmarked car failing stop defendant sole stop sign. The was the occupant of truck, owned Perlean who Bond, had given defendant to the truck that he key so could wash it tires. replace defendant, who car owns a wash and business, automotive had driven the vehicle with the owner's on other occasions before the arrest, for the work purpose doing on it.

Upon the defendant's truck stopping the police officer pulled patrol the сar alongside the truck and asked the defendant for his driver's license. When the defendant not could locate the he immediately license, obeyed the police officer's to get instructions out of the his driver's truck. He then located license. According testimony, the officer's when the officer looked police he brick-shaped package, into the truck saw a wrapped on floor behind the front newspaper, passenger The officer further testified that there was police seat. slit or tear in the a оne-to-two-inch long newspaper which he saw a a white through plastic bag containing substance which he believed to be cocaine. powder Based on what he considered a view" observa- "plain seized the from tion, officer police package truck. was with charged

The defendant possession deliver, more than 30 of cocaine with intent grams 161.16(2)(b)l 161.41(lm)(c)3, to secs. contrary Stats. 1990-91. The defendant moved to evi- suppress He dence ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‍of the cocaine found the truck. testified his, that he did not see the paсkage that was vehicle, and that he did not know the package contained cocaine. package the motion to suppress.

The circuit court denied it was a close question, While that acknowledging had no reasonable court held that the defendant circuit he "did not have control because for the vehicle other than over or responsibility he and other than that was transitory way very was found guilty it at the time." The defendant the circuit court. trial before that the defendant concluded appeals court

did not have a reasonable of his use of the truck because of the limited purposes of his to use truck and the limited scope the defen- The court of concluded appeals truck.2 stop justified concluded that the was The circuit court traffic reasonable cause to believe the basis of the officer's had been violated. law possessed authority

dant or control over the vehicle to only use it in a manner consistent with the defendant's scope permission complete agreed upon work. sought The defendant rеview in this court.3 The issue before this court is whether the defen- permission dant, who was the truck with the protections owner, is entitled to claim the of the give Fourth Amendment. Whether the facts rise to an expectation individual's reasonable The circuit court plain also concluded excep- view tion was not satisfied. The state has challenged aspect this of the circuit court's decision.

Although the circuit court concluded that the search of the car and seizure of the cocaine were incident arrest, to the stаte argue position did not this appeal to the court of appeals. The appeals court of deemed argument this abandoned by the state. The state does not argument make this in its brief in this court. state conceded argument at oral there is no evidence that an arrest was made before the cocaine was seized. 3In concurring opinion in which he cites United States v. Lochan, (1st 1982), 674 F.2d 960 Cir. Judge Fine concluded that grant owner's to the defendant to use her truck created a bailment and that transitory, purpose limitеd bailment objective does not create an justifiable reasonable and privacy. Relish, on Moore v.

Relying 634, 639, 193 Wis. 2d N.W.2d (1972), Judge dissenting Moser's opinion concluded that a power bailee has to exercise "all possessory rights" over the vehicle, including right to exclude all others from pos property, sessed accordingly and that the defendant had a reasonable privacy. Citing numerous federal and holding state cases that a non-owner bailee with control of the vehicle with the owner's may challenge allegedly illegal search, Judge Moser concluded that the defendant could challenge the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle. of the search is a subject or area which was space of constitutional law which we review inde- question of the circuit court and court of The appeals. pendently underlying circuit court's of fact the determi- findings has a reasonable nation whether the individual will not be set aside unless privacy they are erroneous.4 clearly of the Fourth Amendment

The primary objective United States Constitution is the protection to the The Fourth intrusions. privacy against governmental to be Amendment that "the of the provides right people effects, houses, secure in their and persons, papers, seizures, searches and shall not against unreasonable violated, issue, upon be and no Warrants shall but affirmation, cause, Oath or and probable supported by searched, to be and particularly describing place In this case the things or to be seized." persons of whether the evidence of cocaine shоuld question the defendant have been turns on whether suppressed Fourth Amendment. The assert a claim under the may Court has refocused inquiry United States Supreme the Fourth Amendment from traditional con- under and seizure to standing a search cepts challenge search and seizure an of whether analysis disputed of the accused which the has on infringed to protect. Standing Fourth Amendment was designed law, now a matter of substantive Fourth Amendment expecta- framed in terms of reasonable or legitimate Illinois, Rakas v. 128, 439 U.S. tion of privacy.

(1981).

The United States Court has stated Supreme law must by "legitimation expectations Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 317 N.W.2d (1982). Amendment, have a source of the Fourth either outside of real or reference concepts personal property or to that are recognized per- law understandings Illinois, Rakas v. mitted 439 U.S. by society." (1981).5 Rakas n.12 court did not tell how us we are to determine the that are "understandings recog- the Rakas nized and Thus test permitted by society." bright does not "a line between the provide protected Illinois, Rakas v. and the 439 U.S. at 168 unprotected." see also 439 U.S. at (White, 144-48; J. dissenting); (Powell, J., U.S. at 152 concurring).

The determination of whether an accused has a ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‍reasonable or legitimate (1) invaded whether

place depends individual has his or her conduct exhibited an actual by (subjec- tive) of in the area searched and in expectation privacy (2) item, the seized whether such an is expectation or in legitimate that it is one that is justifiable society to willing as reasonable.6 We shall focus on recognize the of the objective part whether inquiry, namely, under the facts of the case is to society willing recognize the defеndant's of expectation privacy.7 property determinative concepts may While law not the of privacy protected by Amendment, they interests the Fourth are Salvucci, factors to be considered. United States v. 448 U.S. Illinois, (1980); 128, 143, 91-93 Rakas v. 439 U.S. 144 n.12 Whitrock, (1981); 960, 974, 468 State v. 161 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 696 (1991). Milashoski, 72, 85,

6 State v. 163 Wis. 2d 471 N.W.2d 42 (1991) (quoting Rewolinski, 1, 13, 159 Wis. 2d (1990)). Ciraolo, N.W.2d 401 See also 476 U.S. California (1979). (1986); Maryland, Smith v. 442 U.S. argues The state that the any defendant's conduct refuted subjective expectation privacy package actual in the following that the factors are Our court has stated determining whether an acсused has an in relevant recog- society willing expectation of is (1) a whether the accused had nize as reasonable: property (2) premises; the the whether premises; (3) (lawfully) legitimately the is accused complete dominion and con- the accused had whether (4) right the others; to exclude whether trol and precautions customarily taken those took accused (5) put property seeking privacy; was whether (6) private privacy is use; whether the claim of some privacy. This notions of list with historical consistеnt totality controlling not or exclusive. The factors is controlling is standard.8 the circumstances person a the mere fact that state asserts that permission legitimately present in a vehicle with is necessarily he or she mean that the owner does pas- legitimately expect privacy driver and can senger argues of the vehicle. The state areas gives when the owner of vehicle is created bailment operate of the it, and because another may qualifications inter- limit a bailee's which various of the bailment car, the exact nature est legiti- assessing operator has a whether relevant in the car. mate analysis argues that the on this state Based privacy had no reasonable defendant vehicle was his to use the truck because knowing package, the and denied about The defendant cocaine. is not his. the defendant package the was But he denied that rights regard to the seized asserting his fourth amendment item; of the interior of the truck. challenging he is the search 8 Fillyaw, 104 711-12 n.6, 312N.W.2d 2d Wis. (1981).

for a limited purpose and a limited time. The majority of the court appeals adopted this reasoning.

We must examine the of the totality circumstances to determine whether expecta- defendant had an tion in the interior of the truck that is society to willing as reasonable. to recognize According record, the defendant had property truck; he was a given bailee. owner had him per- mission to drive the truck and to do repairs it. While the defendant was in of the possession vehicle, he had right exclude from the vehicle any person other than the owner аnd those on the vehicle. In working addition, the defendant and the owner had a personal as well as a business and the defendant relationship, had had the owner's to drive the truck on other occasions. This relationship prior use vehicle point having the defendant an expectation of the interior of truck is will- society as ing recognize reasonable. As Professor LaFave written, has bailment "ordinary still relationships deserve to be recognized as establishing a justified expectation privacy upon which Fourth Amendment standing may be grounded." LaFave, Search and (2d 1987). 11.3(e), Seizure sec. ed. p.

We hold that under of the totality circum- stances the defendant had an privacy in interior the vehicle society is to rec- willing ognize as reasonable.

Our is holding supported by numerous cases involving vehicle searches. These cases conclude, as did Moser's Judge dissenting opinion the court of appeals, that a person who borrows a car and drives it with the owner's has pri- vacy which society willing to recognize as reasonable. Rubio-Rivera, See, States v. 1271, 917 F.2d United e.g., (accused (19th 1990) who offered suffi- Cir. he from to show gained possession cient evidence United expectation privacy); owner has reasonable (7th 1990) Garcia, 1413, States v. F.2d 1419 Cir. 897 (accused's permis- of the vehicle with the owner's "use subjective with accused] provides [the sion legiti- is reasonable expectation privacy (6th Blanco, mate"); United States v. 344 Cir. 844 F.2d 1988) bailee's recognize expecta prepared (society auto); of a rented in the door privacy panels tion of (11th Miller, v. States 821 F.2d 547 Cir. United 1987) (accused Mеnd's car with to borrow United States privacy); has a legitimate expectation (5th 1987), mod Dotson, v. 1127, 1134-35 F.2d Cir. 817 (5th 1987) grounds, on other 821 F.2d 1034 Cir. ified period for an extended car (legitimate possessor when he loaned the car had even privacy States v. United washed); the car get to Mend (7th 1984), cert. 475, 483 n.11 Cir. Griffin, 729 F.2d (1984) (accused borrowed a denied, 830 who 469 U.S. interest from his brother had a protectable car Williams, vehicle); United States v. 714 F.2d 1983) (accused (8th occasionally who bor n.1 Cir. (with nephew from the owner's rowed the vehicle from the and had knowledge) owner’s had a on thе of the search day to use vehicle nephew United vehicle); protectable (7th v. 1981), Cir. cert. F.2d Posey, States (1982) (accused car bor denied, U.S. 959 legitimate expectation privacy); wife had rowed from (9th Portillo, 1313, 1317 Cir. States 633 F.2d United (1981) (accused bor denied, cert. 450 U.S. 1043 1980), had legitimate car from Mend rowing Ochs, 1247, 1253 United States v. 595 F.2d privacy); (2d. 1979) (owner Cir. of car allowed accused to use car wished; whenever he reasonable expectation pri of vacy); United States v. Tragash, 691 1066, F. Supp. (S.D. 1988) (driver 1070 Ohio of a rented vehicle had a subjective expectation of that privacy society is pre United States v. reasonable); to as pared accept McMichael, (D.C.Md. 1982) 541 956, F. 958 n.5 Supp. (accused full use of having parents' car has "standing"); Wells, (Fla. 1989) 539 So. ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‍2d 468 464, n.4 (accused had protected privacy borrowed v. car); People Campbell, 114 551, Misc. 2d 451 (accused (1982) 987, N.Y.S.2d 989 driving truck with owner's permission and dominion over cargo truck and had legitimate v. expectation of privacy); People Regnet, 111 (1981) 2d 105, 642, Misc. 443 N.Y.S.2d 644 (accused car borrowed from driving wife had legitimate of expectation рrivacy).9

In distinguishable fact situations from the case at bar, several courts have held non-owner driver does not have a reasonable expectation of interior of a In vehicle. one recurring pattern, fact accused's to the owner of relationship the vehicle or to the vehicle is too attenuated to allow the court to hold the accused has a reasonable of expectation pri- See, e.g., United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 vacy. (10th 1984) (accused Cir. car rented and not named on the rental аgreement; unrelated third present car, not party, arranged the rental of the car; no reasonable privacy); United expectation Erickson, (10th States v. 1984) 732 F.2d 788 Cir. (accused's possession of and authority fly airplane unexplained; no reasonable expectation privacy); 9 Robinson, (Ct. Compare Minnesota v. 458 N.W.2d 421 1990) (accused App. car, Minn. transporting one-time user of owner; car no expectation reasonable privacy). Ospina, States v. F. 1183-85 United Supp. 1988) (accused (D. drive Utah claimed surname, whose address and vehicle rented another know; not no number accused did reasonable telephone Peters, United States v. privacy); (7th 1986) (accused, Cir. former F.2d drove on occasional but car, others, car owner basis, with owner's accused permission; not regular search; no of car at time of reasonable possession Gollaher, Missouri privacy); 1982) (accused (Mo. has no reason- Ct. App. S.W.2d under holding when car able expectation of car at for debt and not statutory possession lien Ayala, New York v. 2d search); 147 Misс. time of (1990) (lienholder not rea does have N.Y.S.2d 236 Carolina v. North of privacy); sonable expectation (1992) 64, 414 S.E.2d 68-69 Swift, 550, N.C. App. (non-owner from car who was to protect passenger Com of has reasonable expectation privacy); others no Freeman, 467, 441 A.2d monwealth v. 195 Pa. Super. (1982) (accused sto in possession no car; privacy).10 legitimate expectation len dif- situation, fact which also In recurring another is the owner of the vehicle bar, from case fers the In the courts in car. these circumstances the present not the non-owner driver does held that generally have in interior privacy the expectation a legitimate have driving not mere The courts have viewed of the vehicle. who the vehicle's owner to establish that as sufficient his possessory transferred in the vehicle was present Wisumierski, 736-37, 10 See also State 2d 106 Wis. (1982), did not have holding that accused N.W.2d 421 agreed to let the accused the owner expectation when to the van the van but had delivered have control of accused. in

interest the vehicle to the driver. The courts distin- guish these from in cases those which an owner of a thereby conveying vehicle lends it to the accused to the right enjoy possessory accused the in interest e.g., See, vehicle owner's absence. United States (10th 1991) (accused v. driving 925 F.2d 1242 Jefferson, Cir. present passenger; per- car when owner as no luggage sonal trunk; accused did not claim interest expecta- trunk; crack cocaine found in no reasonable privacy); Lochan, tion of United States v. 674 F.2d 960 (1st 1982) (accused driving passen- Cir. car owned ger; prior no evidence оf accused's of car; use accused luggage personal belongings had or no in the car; seized; no accused claimed hashish no rea- privacy); Flowers, sonable Illinois v. (Ct. 1982) (accused App. Ill. Dec. 444 N.E.2d 242 present "standing"). with owner has no totality We conclude under the circum- stances defendant had an society willing the interior of vehicle to rec- ognize as reasonable. For the forth, reasons set we appeals reverse decision of the court of and remand proceedings the cause to the circuit for court further opinion. consistent with this By appeals the Court.—The decision of the court of is reversed and the cause remanded to circuit court. (dissenting).

STEINMETZ, J. I hold would that Dixon not did have an in Bond's society willing recognize truck that to as reasonable. challenge As a result, Dixon is to not entitled grounds. search of that on truck Fourth Amendment prove court, In the trial the burden onwas Dixon to that he had a reasonable

474 Illinois, v. See Rakas U.S. 130 439 Bond's truck. v. Callaway, State 503, 520, 317 106 Wis. 2d (1978); n.1 denied, (1982), cert. (1982); 459 967 U.S. 428 N.W.2d Rhodes, 722, 724, 2d N.W.2d 630 Wis. 439 149 1989). (Ct. burden, he satisfy In effort to this an App. facts. following establishеd only of Bond's truck for custody Dixon had it business to his automotive transporting purpose change. a tire He was "one given only for a wash and key he on his for placed ring individual which key," he Dixon cars up testified safekeeping. picked business, he as of his and day part other or so" "every in the past. Bond's truck for servicing had picked up times he had Dixon not establish number of did Bond's serviced truck. previously he and Bond were "dat- Dixon also established that he testifying, time the search. While ing" friend mine." Bond as "a "a girlfriend" referred to Bond However, does indicate whether the record or marriage, had a akin to a relationship and Dixon in the initial mere were they acquaintances whether references to Indeed, Dixon's stages courtship. mine," and "dat- "friend girlfriend," Bond —"a Dixon failed the latter.1 Regardless, ing" suggest — had which was relationship he and Bond prove had implicit that Dixon enough suggest intimate for other than purposes to use the truck services Bond. specified performing suppress evi an order on a motion reviewing "When may the evidence at dence, take into aсcount appellate court hearing." trial, suppression well as the evidence at as (Ct. Griffin, App. State 198, 2d N.W.2d Wis. grounds, other 1985), 2d 388 N.W.2d 535 131 Wis. aff'd (1987). (1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 868 brief, In Dixon only established that he was a a repairman customer's vehicle for a limited time for period of services purpose performing that vehicle which Therefore, the customer requested. issue before us a It very narrow one. does not involve a defendant who borrowed a vehicle from its use; owner for the defendant's own it does not involve a defendant who rented or leased a vehiсle from its owner for the defendant's ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‍use; own and it does not involve a who defendant was commissioned by the owner of vehicle to use that vehicle for a substantial time period of to task perform some for the owner. Given this narrow fact situation, I conclude that Dixon did not have a reasonable privacy in Bond's truck. The bailment relationship between Dixon and Bond was too and too lim- simply transitory ited in to such scope expectation. create

The cites 15 majority cases its conclu- support sion that Dixon had a reasonable in Bond's truck. one Majority op. Only 471-472. cases, these People Campbell, N.Y.S.2d 987 (1982), is somewhat to the case at bar. In analogous the owner of a Campbell, truck hired the defendant drive truck from New York to Long Bellemore Island back for and again purpose of and picking up transporting garments. his arrival cargo Upon New York with the cargo, truck and the defendant was stopped police. searched the truck police determined that garments were stolen. The defen- dant was subsequently with charged cоnspiracy and possession stolen property.

The defendant moved to suppress the stolen mer- He chandise. argued, that he had part, a reasonable expectation of support truck. To this argument, he pointed the fact that kept personal he including overnight bag, property, in the truck. The Supreme York Court concluded that the defen- New expectation. dant had such an Id. at 989-90.

Campbell from at bar. The defen- differs the case Campbell specifically purpose hired for the dant was cargo. transporting Here, the truck and its only necessary the defendant drove Bond's truck as a servicing incident to the truck. From a common sense partakes standpoint, Campbell arrangement of a arrangement greater expectation than Camp- between Dixon and Bond. That the defendant kept personal property in the illustrates this bell truck Accordingly, Campbell unpersuasive. I fact. find respectfully disagree I with the New addition,

In holding Campbell. person Supreme A York Court's by of a to drive said truck and hired the owner truck acquire сargo relatively does not for a short distance in that truck. Like reasonable transitory simply the bailment is too bar, the case at expectation. scope to create such an and too limited majority remaining address The cases cited than the fact which are much different fact situations support do not bar; therefore, these cases situation holding. majority's cases involve Most of the cited permission unqualified from defendants who had for the defendants' own vehicle owner to use vehicle purposes. Miller, 546, 547-48 821 F.2d United States v. (11th 1987); Dotson, 817 F.2d United States v. Cir. (5th 1987), on other 1127, 1134-35 Cir. modified (5th 1987); grounds, States v. 1034 Cir. United 821 F.2d (7th 1984), cert. 475, 483 n.11 Cir. 729 F.2d Griffin, (1984); Williams, denied, United States v. 469 U.S. 830 (8th 1983); States v. 777, 779 n.1 Cir. United 714 F.2d (7th 1981), Posey, denied, 37, 39 - 41 Cir. cert. 663 F.2d (1982); Portillo, v. 633 F.2d 455 U.S. 959 United States

477 (9th denied, cert. 1043 1313, 1980), 1317 Cir. 450 U.S. Ochs, United States v. (1981); 1247, 595 F.2d (2d. denied, 444 cert. 1979), (1979); Cir. U.S. McMichael, States v. United 541 F. 958 n.5 Supp. (D. Wells, 1982); Md. 539 So.2d nom., (Fla. on other sub Flor grounds 1989), n.4 aff'd Wells, v. People Regnet, ida (1989); U.S. (1981). 642, 644 scope permission

N.Y.S.2d in these cases was much more broad than granted in the instant case. As granted scope above, Dixon had to drive explained merely truck in order the service on the perform Bond's vehicle that Bond requested. Blanco,

United States v. 344, 844 F.2d 346-350 (1988) (6th denied, cert. and 1988), Cir. 486 U.S. 1046 United States v. 1068 - 70 Tragash, F. Supp. (S.D. 1988), Ohio also cited the involved by majority, for their own defendants who rented vehicles purposes, the a fact situation which is also much different than In a cases, case at bar. these the defendants purchased in the vehicles at which gave issue property to for their right them an use the vehicles unqualified own for a of time. purposes specified period Garcia, also cites United States majority

The (7th 1990). Garcia 897 F.2d 1415-18 Cir. who received from the permission involved a defendant of a truсk to the truck from Texas to Indi- owner drive the to use the vehicle Again, scope permission ana. Garcia was much broader than the scope this case. The Garcia defendant was to drive granted which states, the owner's vehicle several through take a of time. On a period trip would substantial from this one can the driver to deviate length, expect Here, Dixon food, lodging, route for etc. prescribed only for time had to drive Bond's truck change to it and its tires. needed wash majority cites United States v. Rubio- also (10th 1990) Rivera, to F.2d Cir. holding. support that the defendant its Rivera held privacy in the reasonable the case had a permis- driving merely he had he was because vehicle ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‍owner, from the vehicle's sion to use the vehicle scope permission. regardless I of the of that nature disagree holding. simply Examination of the with this necessary scope to deter- nature and of a bailment has reasonable mine whether bailee property. I am in accord with in the bailor's majority op. majority point. this at 469. on See majority Finally, also Professor LaFave cites holding. "ordinary support He bailment its states that recognized relationships as estab- still deserve be privacy upon lishing justified expectation which standing may grounded." 4 be Fourth Amendment 11.3(e) Wayne LaFave, R. sec. Search and Seizure (2d 1987). However, cases cited LaFave ed. distinguished support proposition be of this can by majority. grounds Id. as the cases cited the same 1993). (2d Supp. Therefore, 1989 & at 334 n.239 ed. apply pronouncement does Professor LaFave's here. the fact situation foregoing I dissent. reasons,

For P. Justice JON WILCOX I am to state that authorized opinion. joins dissenting this

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Dixon

Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 24, 1993

Citation: 501 N.W.2d 442

Docket Number: 91-1092-CR

Court Abbreviation: Wis.